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       My dissertation analyzes the institutional mechanisms that cause the persistence 
of class and status inequalities between rural migrants and urban residents in post-
socialist Shanghai. I examine how remnants of China’s socialist institutions, after the 
gradualist market reform, continue to stratify rural migrants and their second 
generation through sociopolitical processes. Making two thirds of the labor force 
nowadays in China, rural migrants experience social forces in China’s emerging 
market capitalism as well as repercussions from the socialist legacy. Drawing from 
historical archives and a 12-month ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai, I demonstrate 
how rules, norms, organizations and beliefs in contemporary Chinese society make 
rural or urban residence identities the most salient sites of social distinction. I examine 
the blending and segregating processes of rural migrants’ life in the city. I also analyze 
how rural migrants respond to social exclusion with a variety of strategies.  
    I argue that since rural migrants and urban residents have been classified into two 
different forms of citizenship that were deeply rooted in the ideological and 
organizational structures of Chinese socialism. Economic liberalization alone only led 
to limited upward social mobility of rural migrants, the new working class in China. 
Taking rural migrants’ experiences in urban China as an exemplar case of path 
dependent institutional change, I argue that changes in formal rules interact with the 
persistence of informal institutional elements—customs, networks, norms, and cultural 
 beliefs—to produce persistent status hierarchies. Rural migrants respond to these 
structural constraints by developing distinctive coping strategies in the labor market, 
communal life, and education attainment. I argue that the institutional matrix of 
political, fiscal and economic constraints comprises the deeper causes that determine 
rural migrants’ purposive actions and networks to be advancing segregative more 
often than intergrative processes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
        The annual homecoming during the Lunar New Year, the most celebrated festival 
in China, has become bittersweet for most Chinese. Since 2006, the flow of railway 
passengers, as estimated by the Ministry of Railways, has exceeded 100 million 
commuters during the three weeks of what is called the “spring rush” (chunyun). The 
number increases each year due to rising rural-to-urban migration and return 
migrations for family reunions. Every year around this time, the wave of two-way flux 
puts the nation’s centrally controlled railway system to the test of shipping home 
millions of migrants (Financial Times, Jan 7, 2008).1 The state media label them as 
“waìdìrén” (other-landers), “mángliú” (blind floaters), “liúdòng rénkoŭ” (the floating 
population), and “míngōng” (peasant-workers). They are depicted as coming in 
faceless “tides” (chao), with connotations of uncontrollable and disturbing forces. 
Their motives for coming into the cities have been generalized into one claim—to 
make money. 
       The Lunar New Year has become a moment for the average Chinese citizen to 
realize the presence of this large “floating population,” as it is officially labeled, for a 
number of other reasons besides the everyday experiences of overcrowding on long-
distance train rides. It is a time when wage arrears and exploitations of rural migrants 
receive wider attention through the state media, sometimes with reports of top leaders 
helping them to claim back their overdue wages.2 It is also a time when urban 
residents of large cities warn each other about higher crime rates, pointing to the 
                                                 
1
 The snowstorm before 2008 spring festival stranded over one million rural migrants in the Guangzhou 
city railway station alone, causing a national emergency. 
2
 In the spring of 2003, a rural migrant women named Xiong Deming made a direct claim to Premier 
Wen Jiabao when he was on an inspection trip to her hometown about a 2300 yuan wage arrears her 
husband suffered from (China Daily, April 14, 2004).  
 2 
potential criminality of rural migrants in certain migrant-concentrated neighborhoods. 
 
The Largest Internal Human Migration 
       China’s massive rural-to-urban migration has brought a sweeping social change to 
the society. In 1984, after agricultural decollectivization and the collapse of People’s 
Communes in rural areas, the Chinese government deregulated control over peasants’ 
residential mobility, allowing them entry into non-farming jobs in townships and 
cities.3 Such belated deregulation was historical because it re-granted peasants’ 
residential and occupational freedom of mobility. Unlike in central planning, peasants 
no longer face severe penalties for leaving their socialist duty as serf-like farmers.  
       With deepening economic reforms, market incentives also encouraged enterprises 
to recruit cheap rural labor, first into township enterprises in the 1980s, then into urban 
industrial enterprises in the 1990s. As a result of gradual deregulation, the number of 
out-migrating rural workers tripled from 20 million to 60 million within less than a 
decade until the early 90s (Chan, 1994; Zai, 2001). 
       Economic development along the east coast industrial zones began to take off 
after Deng’s liberal policies began in 1992. Rising regional disparities added dramatic 
momentum to the volume of inter-provincial migration towards the southeast, 
especially to Guangdong province (Fan, 1997; Wei, 2000; Wu, 2003; Bian, 1994; 
Chan, 1994). In the following decade, China’s landscape witnessed “the biggest peace 
time wave of internal migration the world has ever seen” (Knight et al., 1999).4 By 
2007, half of the Chinese population become city-dwellers, compared to 20 percent in 
                                                 
3
 Two official documents directed the deregulation of residential control, allowing peasants’ entry into 
township and small cities for non-farming economic activities. They are “Announcements on 1984 
Agricultural Production”, Central Communist Party (January, 1984); and “Announcements on Peasants’ 
Settlements into Townships”, PRC State Council (October, 1984). 
4. According to the 2000 China Population Census, there are 200 million rural migrants in the cities and 
smaller townships, with this number likely to increase to an estimate of around 300 million by 2010. 
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1985 (China Statistical Yearbook 2007).5 In 2008, official estimates of rural migrant 
population reported a figure of around 230 million.6 It is estimated that an additional 
200 to 250 million of rural-to-urban labor transfers should occur by 2025 (World Bank 
2009: 146). From its sheer magnitude, China’s rural-to-urban migration has caused 
massive rearrangements of its geographical and social landscape. 
       During this time, however, the longstanding rural-urban gap in China not only 
persisted, but also worsened when compared to most other developing countries 
(Knight et al. 2006; Eastwood and Lipton 2004). The ratio of average income between 
urban and rural residents increased dramatically, from 2.36: 1 in 1978 to 3.2: 1 in 
2000. By 2005, the real rural income per capita was only 39 percent of real urban 
income per capita. Analysis shows that some 43 percent of this wage gap is 
unexplained by individual characteristics such as education (Wang 2007). Patterns of 
labor market segmentation by administrative arrangements based on hukou are self-
evident: according to a 2005 national survey, 65.4 percent of rural migrant workers 
work in the unprotected informal sector, compared to 29.8 percent of urban workers 
(National Statistics Bureau 2005).7 The poverty rate among rural migrants is 50 
percent higher than that among urban residents (Yusuf and Saich 2009). 
                                                 
5
 Rapid urbanization in the latter half of the 1950s peaked at 20 percent in 1960, and then dropped to 
15-16 percent ever since and throughout the Cultural Revolution. Market reform in the late 1970s led to 
a gradual rebound to 20 percent in 1985, then 26 percent in 1990s, 30 percent in 1996. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics, China was 40 percent urbanized, and by 2006, 44 percent of the 
population were defined as “urban” (using NBS’ 1999 definition). Urban-dwellers are classified by 
NBS to include permanent residents and temporary residents with over 6 months of residence, 
regardless of hukou status. 
6
 This is an official statistic from the State Council on December 20, 2008. Before that, Xinhua News 
Agency released a rough estimate of 210 million farmer-turned-migrant workers on Oct 19, 2008.  
7
 This estimate uses the 1% Population Sampling Survey data in 2005. The size of the informal sector in 
China is hard to obtain due to lack of data. Some studies estimate that 30 to 40 percent of the labor 
force work in the informal sector (Cai et al. 2005; Du et al. 2006). A hukou refers to a type of residency 
permit which classifies the individual into either ‘agricultural’ or ‘non-agricultural’ category. Hukou 
status is passed down on a hereditary basis. The system was established in 1958, and has functioned as 
one important instrument of central planning of the labor force. The state relaxed hukou control in 1984, 
allowing peasant mobility into the cities with temporary residence right. 
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     Administrative categorization, deliberate separation of rural development from the 
urban economy, and the decentralized public finance system have led to rural 
residents’ relatively lower social status and human capital (i.e. education and non-
farming skills). When post-socialist peasants came into cities for survival, they came 
loaded with historical baggage from their socialist past. Although freed of the socialist 
chains that bound them to the land, they faced other forms of structural exclusion and 
discrimination within the urban labor market. Rural migrants’ lack of permanent 
residential rights has turned them into a caste of “transient” members in the city. They 
are seen as cheap and flexible labor and not wanted as permanent citizens. These 
structural bondages lock them into a state of second-class citizenship even within their 
own country.  
       This study examines how remnants of China’s socialist institutions stratify rural 
migrants and their following generations through sociopolitical processes in the city. 
By focusing on the blending and segregating processes of the rural migrant experience 
in Shanghai, and on how these processes interact with public polices, I offer an 
institutional theory of social distinction and post-socialist inequality. 
 
The Commodification of Public Goods  
       Since mid 1990s, both state and local authorities were aware of rural out-
migration being an inevitable trend and the inapplicability of old “blocking” policies. 
Public policies turned to a mode of “managed” migration—urban administrators 
stepped back in order to provide administrative guidance rather than relying on 
coercive controls. Specifically, a system of licenses and permits for managing the rural 
migrant population was established. Every individual needs to obtain a Migration-for-
Work Certificate at his hukou origin. When he arrives in the city, the rural migrant is 
required to apply for a Temporary Residence Permit and other licenses for work.  
 5 
       Early migrants had to pay a large sum of money for these necessary documents. 
Such practices were justified by local authorities as compensation for extending public 
services to rural migrants. In 2001, it was estimated that, on average, a rural migrant 
working in the city of Shenzhen paid 600 yuan per year for their permits (Guangzhou 
Evening News, Mar30, 2001).8 These surcharges later grew so out of control that in 
2002, the state ordered the “temporary residence fee’ (zanzhufei) to be cut down to 5 
yuan per person. 
       Over time, these regulatory activities have created procurable “rents” for local 
authorities. City and municipal governments have increasingly become “fiefdom-like” 
regimes controlled by local officials (Young 2000). The permit system not only 
produced revenues for China’s police system, but also expanded the enforcement 
agency to include a “joint security team” made up of laid-off urban workers. Detention 
and arrests became a common experience among rural migrant workers during the 
years between 1998 and 2003. They were frequent targets of forced bribery, 
repatriation and physical violence.9  
       Meanwhile, local “green card” regimes appeared to selectively incorporate 
migrants with skills or capital. In Shanghai, for instance, rural migrants were allowed 
to obtain the “blue stamp hukou”, a type of “green card” system, through purchasing 
real estate from 1994 to 2002.10 At that time the market needed an injection of capital 
to boost its real estate market (Wong and Huen 1998). Shanghai allowed wealthy and 
educated migrants to invest in the real estate market. The minimum size of a real 
estate purchase had to be 100 square meters. But even for those who are issued with 
                                                 
8
 There were around 4 million rural migrant workers in Shenzhen around the time, so the local 
governments gained around 2.4 billion yuan from the permit system. 
9
 See reports from Human Rights in China, Sept 1999, and China Rights Forum, No.2, 2002, p22-27. 
10
 The name came from the fact that their stamps are blue, while urban residents’ are usually in red 
color.  
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the blue stamp hukou, many were not given legal residence status. Candidates for this 
hukou certificate remained on the waiting list for five years.  
       When the economic function of this policy was completed, urban administrators 
discontinued it. The official explanation was that it had attracted too many 
“undesirable low-human-capital individuals” (di suzhi), which referred to rural 
migrants (Liu, 2008). Since the interpretation of these policies was at the local 
officials’ discretion, many rules were used to disqualify some new homeowners from 
obtaining a Shanghai urban hukou, such as violation of the one-child policy (Liu 
2008). 
       In the 1990s, more than 20 Chinese cities had implemented similar green card 
systems. The commodification of hukou produced two conflicting effects: it relaxed 
the ideological taboo against peasants’ out-migration, but urban residency status 
became even more valued and highly commodified. These changes underline the 
policy oscillations of hukou abolition since the 1990s.  
 
Oscillations in Policy-Making and Hukou Reforms 
       Solinger (1999) refers to the dilemma of hukou reform as “the collision of these 
forces with entitlements and expectations long and inextricably bound to the 
institutions of the prior regime.” A free market order requires the free mobility of 
factors like labor, land, and capital, but China’s partial reform preserved parcels of the 
old “rules of the game.” Media disclosures of labor and police abuse towards rural 
migrants and advocacy from civil rights activists and organizations to make legislative 
changes have built up pressures to reform the hukou system (The Independent, June 
10, 2001).  
       In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security announced a legal review report of the 
hukou system, but only later deferred specific reform measures to local governments 
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(BBC News, Nov 10, 2005). The state allocated no direct finances to make it happen. 
In their recent study, Chan and Buckingham (2008) examine the wave of “hukou 
abolition” discussions in late 2005 and find that these “liberal” reforms have been 
overstated, and their cumulative effects have not contributed to the abolition of the 
hukou system, but rather to the “devolution of responsibility for hukou policies to local 
governments, which in many cases actually makes permanent migration of peasants to 
cities harder than before.”  
       In March of 2010, a news editorial collectively made by thirteen newspapers in 
China urged for a genuine hukou reform. It expressed the hope that “citizens, whether 
they are rooted in the north or south without dividing them into urban and rural, will 
all have the same rights to employment, medical treatment, elderly care, education, 
and freedom of movement.” But this editorial was soon removed from the website, 
and the deputy editor for the Economic Observer, who was one of the initiators of this 
editorial, was removed from his post (New York Times, 1 March 2010; Associated 
Press, March 10, 2010). This repercussion reminds many of what appeared earlier in 
Premier Wen’s annual report at the annual National People’s Congress meeting, where 
he indicated that the government was only considering unspecified reform efforts of 
the system rather than abolition. 
       The fact that hukou has become so infused with every aspect of life makes 
piecemeal reforms ineffective. With regards to pension reform, for example, more 
progressive cities such as Shenzhen have included rural migrants in its pension 
programs. But according to the People’s Daily, 95 percent of rural recipients of this 
type of pension plan have filed for refunds, mainly because, according to the legal 
premises, it will take pensioners (the 1997 legislature) 15 years of continued premium 
payment in one locality to receive its benefits. Due to this restriction, rural migrants 
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with unstable jobs were at a disadvantage. In other words, these welfare items are 
“non-portable” within the old legal framework.  
       Education is another example. Although the state repeatedly “urged” public 
schools to unconditionally accept children from rural migrant families, only a very 
small number of low-tiered public schools complied because there has been no 
allocation of funds. Some education authorities even responded with “innovative” 
policies to continue disqualifying rural migrant children. Hukou restrictions for 
gaokao also prevent nonlocal students from entering into public high schools and 
colleges.  
 
Research Questions 
       Since just more than a decade ago, economists, demographers and sociologists 
have started to examine rural-urban labor mobility in China (Chan, 1994; Liang and 
White, 1996; Scharping, 1997; Davin, 1999; Liang, 2001; Murphy, 2002; Wang, 
2004), rural migrants’ adaptation in China’s urban society (Solinger, 1995; Zhang 
2001; Wu and Treiman, 2004), and their citizenship (Solinger 1999). While some 
research shows that rural migrants are economically better off compared to their pre-
migration conditions (Wang, 2004), others argue that rural migrants experience 
“relative deprivation” in the urban society (Chan, 1996; Solinger, 1995, 1999; Zhang 
2001). Given the fact that rural migrants as an identifiable social group have become 
internally stratified with only a small fraction entering into private entrepreneurship, 
these findings respectively demonstrate viable parts of the whole picture in order to 
help readers understand the patterns and changes. However, I am not satisfied with the 
scholarly efforts to study rural migrants as either the data dots for statistical series or 
pioneers for the emerging Chinese capitalism. As Thompson (1963:12) writes, the 
agency and historical conditioning were obscured in these approaches.  
 9 
       Insufficient scholarly attention is devoted into examining why the pathways of 
rural migrants’ assimilation into the urban society have been rugged. As Roberts 
(1997) points out, China’s rural migrants face similar institutional constraints to 
undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US, including restrictions preventing 
permanent settlement in their destination. But what has turned rural migrants into 
“transient residents” within their home country, even after over three decades over 
market liberalization? Why have this systematic discrimination persisted? This study 
attempts to contribute to the causal understanding of rural migrants’ predicaments in 
the city in the following ways.  
       First of all, this study attempts to directly explain the realistic dilemma faced by 
rural migrants as well as urban administrators after migration networks matured and 
stabilized in the city. The speed of mass migration out of agriculture in China poses an 
anomaly due to the effects of long-term institutionalized closures against the freedom 
of movement. The abolition of migration control in 1984 directly resulted in the 
“spike” of migration flows in the subsequent decade.11 With an increasing volume of 
rural migrants relocating to cities with their family members since the mid 1990s, their 
access to public goods (e.g. housing, health care, and education) in the city becomes a 
major concern. This trend is supported by findings from my fieldwork interviews. For 
example, both migrant school founders and urban administrators in Shanghai recall the 
fast growth of migrant schools after the mid 90s. The situation in Beijing was similar: 
according to the 1997 Beijing Migrant Population Census, about 32 percent of rural 
migrants in Beijing were families. Statistics shows that in 2003, 24.4 percent of rural 
migrants in Shanghai have lived in the city for more than five years.12  
                                                 
11
 Across China, the number of short-term rural migrants increased by 119.7 percent from 1983 to 1988, 
and then experienced a historic high from 1988 to 1993 by 145.5 percent (PRC Population Censuses). 
12
 The 2003 Shanghai Migration Survey (N=332040) was collected by Shanghai Public Security Bureau 
and Shanghai Statistics Bureau. 
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       Scholarly attention is needed to examine how the institutional environment in 
their destination accommodates these “long-term” migrants, or vice versa—how their 
long-term settlement pushes for institutional change. Here I propose an alternative to 
an economic analysis of migration in term of “pull-push” factors: rural-urban 
migration as an instituted process (Polanyi 1957), i.e., the migration across China’s 
dualistic socioeconomic subsystems involve a set of institutionally embedded social 
interactions that are contingent, and constituted by, networks of relationships and 
social norms that serve to delineate group boundaries.  
       Secondly, this study aims at specifying “the mechanisms through which 
institutions shape the parameters of choice” (Nee and Ingram 1998). This approach is 
of primary importance in the research agenda of new institutionalism. Previous studies 
by Chinese scholars tend to overestimate the network-embeddedness of rural migrants, 
making generalizations of their clustered working and living patterns without 
providing a satisfactory causal explanation.  
       The study by Zhang (2001) about the Zhejiang village, a rural migrant community 
in Beijing, was a pioneering step towards causally explaining the ongoing social 
interactions between rural migrants and other relevant actors using ethnographic 
methods. But her study also leaves the “why” question aside, and instead focuses on 
explaining the micro processes of group solidarity and collective action within that 
rural migrant community.  
       Portes and Zhou (1993), when theorizing immigrants’ assimilation into the 
American society, argue that “modes of incorporation” consist of the localized 
complexity formed by (1) the policies of the host government, (2) the values and 
prejudices of the receiving society, and (3) the characteristics of the co-ethnic 
community.” These generalizations are pertinent to China’s internal migrants as well. I 
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analyze how rules, norms, organizations and beliefs in the host society create and 
reinforce different identities and distinctions in rural migrants’ life. 
       Thirdly, the continuity of hukou-based social inequality makes this project another 
case study of path-dependent institutional change in post-socialist societies. Why did 
native-place identity persist as a quasi-ethnicity factor among the Chinese? What 
determines its institutional continuity or divergence? According to Nee (2005), the 
relationship between the persistence of informal institutions and change in formal 
rules is vital in the understanding of lock-in effects from the preceding social 
conditions. This study confirms that it is the stability of informal institutional 
elements—customs, networks, norms, and cultural beliefs—that disproportionately 
accounts for path dependence in institutional arrangements.  
       Meanwhile, migration policies and rural migrants’ collective action have been in a 
constant flux. Within the education system, for example, the emergence of an 
“informal” education sector since 1993 and the subsequent closedown campaigns by 
city governments symbolize the heightened contestation between old and new 
institutions. Rural migrants’ quest for education opportunities has involved 
challenging the society’s underlying political and economic structures with the 
potential for collective action against powerful actors representing the post-socialist 
state.  
       As Powell (2007) argues, while new institutionalism in economic sociology is 
predominantly occupied with the institutional effects on individuals’ and 
organizations’ compliance to the expectations of the fields of their membership, a new 
research direction is to study “how changes in rules, normative systems, and cognitive 
beliefs shapes organizational fields.” This study also tries to explain the many 
changeables during institutional continuity.  
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Theoretical Approach 
       My analysis focuses on the three core components that make institutions: the rules 
of the game, the legitimacy of rules, and a system of incentive distribution (North 
1990). Alba and Nee (2003), point to mechanisms at the individual, primary-group, 
and institutional levels. They also highlight the importance of “incentive structure” 
embedded in the institutional environment for social actors. I argue that it is primarily 
through the institutional mechanism that rural migrants’ pathways to assimilation are 
determined. Tilly (1998: 8) also claims that “durable inequality depends heavily on the 
institutionalization of categorical pairs”, and more specifically, through social 
processes of “exploitation” and “opportunity hoarding” (Tilly, 1998: 9). Although 
“ruralness” may not be an identifiable trait as distinctive as race, it makes a quasi-
ethnic distinction with deeply entrenched norms of socialist categorization. How 
“ruralness” becomes an institutionalized distinction requires a historical analysis. 
       As legitimation is key to institutionalization, I study the sources of legitimacy for 
these institutional changes. Among existing literature on the Chinese hukou system 
(Lu, 2003; Wang 2005), very few scholars examine the sources of its legitimacy of 
changing institutions. According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is a ‘perception that 
actions of an entity are desirable or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” With its coercive origin, hukou, as a 
system of social distinction, continues to rely on a general recognition of its 
legitimacy, as Weber put it, “custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal 
motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination” 
(Weber 1978[1921]:213). Scott (1992) also demonstrates that it is the aura of 
impregnability, rather than of moral superiority, that is essential to the durability of 
power. Weber stresses that it was primarily those who were involved in the 
administration and enforcement of a system of power who had to be convinced of its 
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legitimacy. During my ethnographic fieldwork, I not only interviewed individuals who 
are subject to this systematic domination, but also talked to actors of administration 
and enforcement to shed light on this issue. 
       The study calls for a return to Weber’s social closure thesis—which entails rich 
institutional and process analysis—to formulate an institutional theory of social 
distinction. Weber (1978[1922]: 342) theorizes that resource scarcity and competition 
for “remunerative opportunities” first build into a certain group’s incentive structure to 
take some “externally identifiable characteristics” (e.g., residence) for installing a 
social boundary. This jointly acting group of individuals forms into an “interest group” 
toward out-group members. When this high-status group gains access to political 
capital, a tendency for rational regulation appears, which logically results in a “legal 
order that limits competition through formal monopolies”. This interest group then 
evolves into a “legally privileged group”. A social closure enforced by formal 
legislation is set in place.  
       Closure may assume various forms, from a caste, a guild, a membership club, a 
secret cult, to a monopoly, or the right to a particular job.  Take the caste system in 
India, members of the society claim over opportunities for business or for life on a 
hereditary basis. In China’s two-tier hukou system, because all administrative 
positions are filled by individuals with urban residence status, there’s an inevitable 
tendency to form a common interest group to enforce the borderlines of enjoying such 
privileges, through techniques such as enforcing entry requirements, licensing through 
permits and legal papers, eligibility by birth, acquisition of an appropriate right, etc. 
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       Later inequality theorists elaborate on this Weberian concept (Collins, 1979; 
Murphy 1988; Parkin 1979; Tilly 1998; North et al. 2007), and claim that similar 
systems persist with the incentive to generate rents through limiting entry of all to 
“valuable political and economic functions” (North et al. 2007). These systems exist in 
various forms, such as occupational licensing or certification (Weeden 2002), 
segmented labor market (Doeringer and Poire 1971), and more extreme forms like 
apartheid segregation and the caste system. 
       Yet why is China the only country that has instituted a system of social distinction 
based on residence for over fifty years? Although the Soviet Union was the earliest 
regime to design such an internal passport system in 1932, ‘the propiska’, it abolished 
such distinction and extended privileges to rural residents in 1974. Is this social 
Figure 1-1.Weberian Conceptualization of Social Closure Formation 
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distinction causally related to the Soviet-type development strategy? What are the 
social constituents for its persistence in the Chinese society?  
       According to Parkin, the criteria and strategies for closure depend on the 
distributive system of that society (Parkin, 1979). Likewise, Sen emphasizes the 
mechanisms of redistribution as the culprit for large-scale famines in non-democratic 
societies (Sen 1982). I examine two central meso-level institutions that determine the 
basic redistributive system in China: the fiscal system and the administrative 
bureaucracy of urban governance.  
       In addition, how the excluded social group responds to their status as outsiders of 
privileges, according to Parkins (1979), is also a key factor in explaining the self-
reinforcing processes of social exclusion. Ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative 
interviews assist me to examine the ongoing blending and segregative processes rural 
migrants experience in the city, and how their responses challenge or reinforce these 
structural forces.  
 
The Rural Migrant Experience in Shanghai 
       Shanghai, as the exemplar port city of China marketization and modernity, ranks 
highest on China’s rural-urban hierarchy. Empirical evidence shows that over time 
rural migrants experience positive changes in the opportunity structure when 
compared with the early stage of the reform. Demographic changes reflect this 
integrating trend in Shanghai’s landscape. In 1990, non-hukou population numbered 
over one million, about 5 percent of Shanghai’s total population, and it increased to 
over six million, which is over 31 percent of the total population of the city (Shanghai 
2000 Population Census).13  
                                                 
13
 In 2008, the total number of migrant population reaches 6.42 million (Shanghai 2008 Statistics 
Yearbook). 
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       However, when permanent residence in the cities is concerned, segregative 
processes outweigh blending processes in creating a pattern of limited upward 
mobility for them and their descendants. The municipal government’s policies towards 
migrants from other cities have been fluctuating over the years too. Below are a few 
examples: 
 
• After the State Council encouraged Shanghai government to invest in 
infrastructure-building in Pudong and granted the city government 10 
preferential policies and 6 capital investment plans (Pudong Development 
Plan in 1990, PRCSC), in 1992, Shanghai government sped up the city 
expansion. One measure was to deregulate labor control and allow rural 
migrants to enter into construction projects including railways, express 
ways, and airport projects (Shanghai General History 2005, p1624-1626). 
The total number of rural migrants employed increased by 16 percent from 
1990 to 1997. Shanghai also mandated a policy of “Three 
Concentrations”: to accommodate these rural migrants into concentrated 
lodging, concentrated services, and concentrated management.  
• In December of 1997, the Shanghai City Government mandated its 
“Regulative Measures for Enterprises’ Hiring of Nonlocal Labor”, making 
it mandatory for industrial enterprises to apply for quota of migrant labor 
before hiring. Article Four of this legislature states that the city 
government adopts a “Total Volume Control” (zongliang kongzhi) 
approach to limit the number of in-flowing migrant labor. This legal 
document was a breakthrough from restrictive entry to “quota 
management.”  
• In April of 2001, according to the Shanghai Labor and Social Security 
Bureau, a series of government policies would be released on restricted 
entry against rural migrants to certain job positions. The first document 
listed five types of jobs: (1) all staff positions in party and government 
work units, public institutions, and social organizations; (2) jobs in social 
charity organizations including cleaning, environmental protection, 
maintenance, and security staff; (3) all positions in property management 
enterprises; (4) all salespersons in shops and department stores; (5) 
cleaning staff in airports, railway stations and other ports.  
• In July of 2004, the Shanghai government abolished the legal mandates 
requiring hiring enterprises to apply for work permission for rural 
migrants. Rural migrants can enter into the local labor market with their 
Resident Permit. 
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       Formal institutionalized closures facilitate a binding social norm that sees rural 
migrants as “not entitled” to equal job opportunities, even given equal stock of human 
capital. The majority now still work in the shadow economy as casual laborers on 
construction sites, temporary assembly line workers, street peddlers or live-in maids. 
A quantitative study by Knight and Yueh (2009) shows that segmentation outweighs 
competition between rural migrants and urban workers, and urbanites dominate formal 
contractual jobs. The majority of rural migrants enter into the “shadow economy”, and 
accompanying the growth of this sector was the emergence of informal economic 
clusters: jobs in vegetable production, construction, recycling, domestic services, 
renovation, and wholesale are typical niches for rural migrants. Occupational 
clustering by native-place is relatively a less salient pattern in Shanghai than in 
Beijing. For almost three decades, the growing “grey zone” of China’s informal 
economy has offered not only opportunities for migrant entrepreneurship, but also 
risks and continued vulnerabilities.  
       Rural migrants’ economic incorporation is largely determined by the “degree of 
closure” in the specific industry. State enterprises (guoqi) and public institutes (shiye 
danwei) hired only a small number of rural migrants on low-skill job positions such as 
public canteen cooks, janitors, and cleaning staff, usually through strong personal 
referrals. Getting a job in this relatively more closed sector offers rural migrants 
regular work hours and relatively higher prestige. But it is the norm that as “temporary 
residents” of the city, they enjoy a lower pay packages with no contract or welfare 
benefits.  Staffing positions of authority with urban workers only, factories set up their 
internal segregative regimes. They name urban workers as “contractual workers” 
(hetong gong), and rural migrant workers as “labor workers” (laowu gong). Factory 
dorms are also turned into highly politicized “segregative regimes”, resembling a 
“mini-paternalistic state” (Lee 2007). 
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       Competition between regions also exacerbates the suppression of industrial wages 
for informal laborers. Decentralization and deregulation in wage-setting policies has 
made local authorities to turn a blind eye to labor exploitation, because “the China 
price” is key in attracting foreign investments (Chan 2003). Chan (2003) argues that 
hukou also functions as the “by-default” system legitimating enterprises to “drive 
down wages and other labor standards.” A recent study compares such wage 
differences, showing that rural migrants’ wage increases since 2001 had been minimal 
and unstable, compared to their urban co-workers in Table 1.1. (Bai 2007).14 
       Hukou distinction still constrains the labor mobility of rural migrants. In 
institutionalized workplaces, long working hours, rigid workplace regimes and 
literally no unionization makes “job-hopping” a coping strategy among rural migrant 
workers. 
 
Table 1-1.  Comparison of Wage Increases 
 
 Rural Migrants Urban Workers 
Year Population Avr. 
Annual 
Income 
(yuan) 
Annual  
Growth 
Rate 
Avr. 
Annual 
Income 
(yuan) 
Annual  
Growth 
Rate 
2001 8961 5502 - 10870 - 
2002 9400 5597 1.7 12422 14.3 
2003 9820 5279 -0.57 14040 13.0 
2004 11823 6471 22.6 16024 14.1 
2005 12578 6577 1.6 18405 14.9 
        
       Cumulative migration, network reliance, low income and haphazard demolition 
restricted most rural migrants into four types of housing situations: (1) on-job 
                                                 
14
 This table is taken from a secondary source, calculated by Bai (2007). Bai’s calculation iss based on 
data from China Statistics Yearbooks (2001-2005), Rural China Statistics Yearbooks (2001-2005), 
Chinese Economy Statistics Yearbooks (2001-2005), 2005 Survey of Rural Policies and Regulations, 
2001-2005 National Statistics Bureau Surveys. 
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dormitories (on construction sites or in gated manufacturing factories), (2) old slum 
neighborhoods in inner-city districts, (3) villages vacated by Shanghai rural residents 
in suburban areas, and (4) residential apartments shared by two to three migrant 
households collectively. The 2000 Population Census shows that 63 percent of rural 
migrants living in temporary and precarious accommodations (including dormitory 
and rent spaces). Out of a hundred and more rural migrant informants I interviewed, 
only a handful of individuals afforded real estates in Shanghai. One migrant did it 
through the “blue stamp hukou” policy (1994-2002), and three to four “spatially 
upwardly mobile” migrants were “bosses” of informal migrant schools.  
       Statistics from the Shanghai Population Census show a clear trend from 1990 to 
2000: newly arrived rural migrants tend to cluster in central districts, but with the 
passing of time, they tend to gravitate to suburban areas (Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook 1991, 2002). Urban renewal projects aggravated suburbanization of this 
group. Despite the city government’s demolition projects, still less than ten 
concentrated “penghu” (shantytowns) areas exist in Shanghai’s central landscape 
today. These areas later became migrant-concentrated neighborhoods for their cheaper 
rent and easier access to service jobs. But more and more have gradually relocated to 
more suburban districts, primarily the three areas of Pudong, Minhang and Baoshan.  
       Migration bridged the physical distance between the urban and the rural Chinese, 
but there persist a salient yet invisible social distance among these two groups. A 
survey reports that 74 percent of local Shanghai residents held rural migrants 
responsible for emerging urban problems such as crime, overcrowding in transport, 
employment, and environmental pollution (Solinger 1999:101). A survey in 2004 
shows that 79.5 percent of rural migrants develop friendship ties only with their in-
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group members, and 67.9 percent of rural migrants experience disrespect from urban 
residents (Horizon Research Group 2004).15  
       Many surveys show that rural migrants’ primary concern in life is their children’s 
education. As a result of more liberal policy making since 2000, Shanghai’s public 
primary schools now receive half of the school-aged children from rural migrant 
families. Statistics show that the percentage of migrant children enrolled in public 
schools (both primary and secondary levels) has increased from 44 percent in 2002 to 
54 percent in 2007. Now a significant proportion of rural migrant children are enrolled 
in Shanghai’s 200 “informal” migrant schools. The fact that Shanghai Education 
Commission is determined to close down all migrant schools by 2010 has made the 
legalization of these schools a highly contentious issue (Shanghai Daily, Jan 22, 
2008). 
       Exam closure forms another policy barrier, as the Chinese education legislatures 
require students to take their key-point exams only in their hukou registration. By 
September of 2007, according to the Shanghai Education Bureau, over 80 thousand 
migrant students who are enrolled in Shanghai’s junior middle schools are faced with 
the prospect of returning to their rural high schools for qualifying exams and further 
education. This policy greatly disrupts migrant children’s education trajectory. Many, 
having actually grown up in the city, are now faced with family separation and 
difficult adjustments to rural life. Consequently, the number of dropouts from junior 
middle rose steadily. The China Children Center conducted a survey in 2004 showing 
that rural migrants’ children receive less than average education than the rest of the 
country, with a dropout rate as high as 9.3% for children from age 8 to 14.  
                                                 
15
 The survey was conducted by China’s earliest independent survey company, Horizon Research 
Group, in four cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan) in 2004, with a sample of 1000. 
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       Moreover, disadvantages in educational attainment perpetuate patterns of labor 
market segmentation along the hukou line. A survey by the China Children Center 
shows that in 2004, 60 percent of dropout students from rural migrant families (aged 
12 to 14) took up informal jobs in the city. According to a survey conducted by the 
China Youth Development Foundation in 2005, over 60 percent of rural teenagers 
enter into the labor market after junior middle school. A report from the Ministry of 
Education in the same year confirms a close estimate of over 35 million rural youth 
entering into the segmented labor market (2005 China Education Development 
Statistics Report).  
 
An Institutional Theory of Social Distinction 
     This study examines the institutional processes by which an individual’s identity as 
a rural or urban resident became the most salient site of social distinction and persisted 
during China’s market transition. I construct an institutional theory of social 
distinction rather than a systematic study of the hukou system because after decades of 
institutionalization, in everyday social interactions, salient hukou identities have 
evolved into identifying the social distinctions of “ruralness” versus “urbanness” 
symbolizing backwardness and modernity respectively. Individuals take the status 
hierarchy behind these distinctions as “the way it is.” It is only in areas of 
administrative governance when rigid categories of hukou re-appear as the social 
reality for individuals. Neither do I downplay the role of formal institutions (e.g. 
hukou and its variants), because these “rules of the game” forcefully constrain 
individuals’ choice making.  
       When investigating every social aspect of rural migrants’ experiences in 
Shanghai, I specify the mechanisms through which regulatory institutions shape their 
choices. These include (1) formal rules and binding organizational practices, (2) 
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informal beliefs, ideology, values and prejudices of members from different social 
groups, and (3) the processes of how individual actions mold these institutions into 
new forms. I also analyze the sources of legitimacy for these institutions, and discuss 
how incentives for changes are played out. In every section, I attempt to integrate 
some historical analysis.   
       To explain the resilience of status hierarchies, a researcher needs to tap deeper 
into the informal beliefs and value systems of the Chinese, whose lifestyles have 
turned towards free market and individualism but whose mindsets are still half-
encaged in the “plan”. Most Chinese bureaucrats, in particular, still hold on to the 
belief in “differential entitlements” for those who are “outside of state plan.” To them, 
things “outside of state plan” are likely to be “out of order.” Rural migrants, especially 
the first generation, on the other hand, tend to defer to authority in an unquestioning 
manner. Exceptions include high-risk industries where exploitation was too 
widespread (e.g. construction), and city-born second generation of rural migrants. 
They develop a range of strategies to cope with discrimination. In 2004, public media 
exposed that wage arrears for rural workers reached an astonishing total of 100 billion 
yuan in the construction industry alone. The pervasive labor abuse caused notable 
cases of “suicidal appeals” by rural migrants in several cities.16 Media played an 
important role in bringing the plight of rural migrants to wider visibility. Since early 
2000s, the emergence of non-government organizations and advocacy of independent 
public intellectuals directly challenged the legitimacy of these practices.  
       Rural migrants’ struggle for long-term settlement in the city has challenged 
China’s existing legal frameworks and governing ideology. It is important to discuss 
                                                 
16
 According to estimates from the state-affiliated All-China Free Trade Union (ACFTU), wage arrears 
for rural migrants in year 2004 reached a total of 100 billion yuan. Legislative costs for claiming back 
this amount is estimated to be close to 300 billion yuan in total. And it usually takes one 15 to 25 days 
to file one claim of this sort. 
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the dominant ideological infrastructure of a society, as Alba and Nee (2003) highlight 
that the constitutional rights in the US functioned as legal safeguards that backed up 
the opening up of upward mobility channels for minorities before the Civil Rights 
Movement. Although I do not consider the Chinese state as a unitary actor without 
internal fractions, I think the party-state has a coherent “paternalistic” conception of 
social justice which is not much changed from its socialist state: the sacrifice of 
individual pursuits can be justified if collectivist ideals are achieved. The post-socialist 
central state itself remains the most potent institutional force shaping individuals’ 
choice making. The local government, although structurally situated in some conflict 
of financial interests with the central state, shares the core of such an ideology. I 
analyze migration related policies, legal documents and their implementation in reality 
to support this. 
 
Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Motivation for Using Mixed Methods 
       According to Weeden (2002), social closure theorists have paid inadequate 
attention to the mechanisms “through which closure is translated into rewards” (or 
absence of rewards) during context-specific social processes. I use mixed methods to 
investigate these social processes and mechanisms, including archival research, 
quantitative surveys, ethnographic observation, and in-depth interviews. My fieldwork 
in China included three stages: a 2-month pilot observational study in Beijing and 
Shanghai, a six-month participant observation in one migrant community in Shanghai, 
and months of archival research.  
       From June to September of 2007, I visited over 15 sites in Beijing and Shanghai. 
The purpose was to get a larger and comparative picture of what life circumstances 
rural migrants in large cities face. Local NGOs provided resourceful perspectives into 
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the historical development of these neighborhoods, city policies, and their surrounding 
industrial environments. These two months of pilot study was fruitful in observing 
general patterns in term of rural migrants’ living conditions, job opportunities, and 
demographic make-ups in these neighborhoods. This period also prepared me stronger 
connections in finding a long-term research site in Shanghai.  
       From October 2007 to November of 2008, I conducted my fieldwork in two 
migrant-concentrated districts of Shanghai: Xuhui and Minhang. I finished a six-
month participant observation in the Pond, a rural migrant neighborhood in Xuhui, and 
another six-month of interviews and follow-up interviews with my pool of over 100 
rural migrants through referrals.  
      The selection of a rural migrant neighborhood is done after great deliberation. 
During my pilot study, I have observed and recorded a variety of migrant 
neighborhood, with different degrees of market activity and local mobilization. It is 
impossible to locate one community and take it as the typical one. But in order to 
avoid selection bias, I chose one neighborhood that contain a relatively vibrant self-
made market which allows upward mobility for migrant tenants there. With the help of 
a local NGO inside that neighborhood, I was able to gain trust from the street 
committee. This is an essential process because in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, 
the presence of a researcher in a rural migrant neighborhood can easily invite the 
prohibition of street committee cadres who served as the eyes of the communist party 
in neighborhoods where the “floating population” inhabit. I had a British photographer 
friend who ventured with his camera into a similar community in Beijing without 
befriending the street committee first. The police showed up within an hour while he 
was taking pictures and asked him to delete all digital images he made. 
        I was personally involved in the Pond as a NGO volunteer and researcher. This 
period contributed to a real life understanding of the living experiences of rural 
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migrant families in these communities. Over a six-month period, I frequented the 
neighborhood everyday and visited the families with whom I built up trust. 
Meanwhile, I gradually set up a snowball sampling procedure to recruit additional 
respondents. Realizing the importance of the education issue, I later extended my pool 
of interviewees to outside of that particular migrant community. I interviewed major 
stakeholders of this social problem, such as rural laborers in different lines of work, 
local administrators, urban residents, public school principals, and principals and 
teachers at “informal” migrant schools.  
 
Cluster Snowball Sampling 
       I attempted to use snowball sampling both inside the Pond and in other localities. 
But the method was less effective than I expected—respondents often tell me that their 
close contacts have relocated to another district. Following the long-distance referrals 
can be very time-consuming. I then switched to “cluster snowball sampling”, i.e. first 
select a sample of clusters (a neighborhood group, a NGO group, a church group, and 
a school group) and then, use initial contacts from these clusters to recruit and refer 
additional contacts. Referees receive a small compensation of 20 yuan for every 
referral they provide me with. 
       The contacts in these cluster groups proved critical throughout the process. They 
are (1) street committee staff members, (2) NGO volunteers and founders, (3) church 
leaders, (4) school founders and teachers. I used the neighborhood group located in the 
Pond to sample and study neighborhood effects. Respondents from other clusters live 
in different parts of the city, but they serve to diversify the sample into including a 
range of jobs, socio-economic statuses and life circumstances. 
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       My fieldwork produced over 130 in-depth interviews (two thirds taped with 
interviewees’ informed consent), a community survey, and a four-school survey.17 The 
pool of in-depth interview respondents included around twenty families in the Pond, 
and eighty interviews with rural migrants from other neighborhoods. The community 
survey sampled 51 households in the Pond. The four-school survey was conducted in 
two other districts of Shanghai. I discuss the findings of these two surveys in Chapter 
4 and 5. 
       Among the 130 in-depth interviews, there are one hundred and seven interviews 
with rural migrants, five with urban administrators, five with NGO staff and 
volunteers, five with public school teachers and principals, six interviews with migrant 
                                                 
17
 A 51-household community survey (2008) was conducted in collaboration with a non-government 
organization (ROOT) in a rural migrant community. A four-school survey (2008) was conducted in 
collaboration with the Survey Research Center, Institute of Advanced Studies, at the Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics. 
Figure 1-2. Cluster Snowball Sampling Processes 
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school principals, eighteen interviews with migrant school teachers, three interviews 
with teachers from a private junior middle school which receives migrant students, and 
lastly, eighteen informal interviews with second generation migrants in their late teens 
or early twenties.  
 
Table 1-2. Summary Statistics of Rural Migrant Respondents (N=107) 
 
Variables  Percentage 
Gender               
 
 
Age                    
 
 
 
 
Marital Status    
 
 
Employment       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly Income  
(yuan) 
Male 
Female 
 
Under 25 
26 ~ 35 
36 ~ 45 
46 and above 
 
Single 
Married 
 
Manufacturing 
Construction/Renovation 
Service sector 
Self-employed 
Jobless 
Agriculture 
 
Less than 1000 
1001 ~ 3000 
3001 ~ 5000 
Above 5000 
50.9 
49.1 
 
16.7 
31.6 
39.5 
12.3 
 
14.0 
86.0 
 
18.4 
6.1 
26.7 
40.2 
7.9 
0.9 
 
39.5 
48.2 
10.5 
1.8 
 
        
       The interviews with migrant teachers, in particular, are useful in two ways—I 
asked these migrant teachers about changes in their own life trajectories as rural 
migrants themselves, but I also asked them about the educational resources available 
to second-generation migrant youth. Casual conversations and chats with volunteers in 
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some migrant NGOs (or named “NGOs serving rural migrants”) are also beneficial for 
making sense of the changes in these neighborhoods over certain periods of time.  
 
Reliability and Validity 
       Reliability, internal validity and external validity of the data used here need to be 
discussed. After all, I was intruding into the lives of individuals asking about their 
daily routines and migratory experiences. How could it be in their best interest to give 
me the accurate narratives about their life in Shanghai? The legitimation I received 
from both the street committee and the service NGO was critical in securing both 
access and trust. I generally start with casual chats about issues they are most 
concerned with in the first interview, then pay another follow-up visit a few days later, 
with the request to do a taped interview. If hesitation is sensed, I will postpone the 
interview to a later visit.  
       To determine intersubject reliability and internal validity, my informants were 
asked the same questions, and their responses were systematically checked against 
each other across other knowledgeable respondents. In addition, the nonobstrusive 
participant observation I engaged in over a period of time confirmed many of the 
issues. It was around the 60th interviews when I sensed that responses from the pool of 
informants began to show repetitious themes, which indicated sufficient topical 
covering. Some repetitions certainly had much to do with the artifact of the sampling 
and interview outline (see Appendix).  
       As for external validity, the representativeness of this sample, as I explained 
earlier, cannot be determined conclusively. Rural migrants have been a largely hidden 
population in census data or large-scale surveys. The parameters of the rural migrant 
population in Shanghai were unknown, except an estimate of 6.24 million in total 
number. Unspecified parameters of the migrant population have always been the 
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major difficulty for researchers in this area because the demographic and 
socioeconomic compositions of this group are always changing. My strategy is to 
diversify the pool of informants as much as I can, on the demographic basics, such as 
age groups, gender, jobs, income levels, education levels, etc. 
 
Secondary Materials 
       The study also draws on extensive search in scholarly Chinese journals. I have 
reviewed a massive number of news reports and academic papers in Chinese and 
English on this issue. I have also studied NGO reports and analyses where they have 
been relevant. Though Chapter One is devoted to the historical legacies of rural-to-
urban migration using around 50 complete oral histories dating back to the early 
1980s, my primary interest is to study the life of rural migrants from late 1990s to the 
present. During the 10 months of fieldwork in Shanghai, I was witness to life’s 
vicissitudes of these rural migrant families. I also refer occasionally to field notes from 
my visits to several rural migrant communities in other cities like Beijing. However, 
my primary interest is in no way of comparative endeavors.  
 
       These methodological details aside, I also consider my own life experience to be 
another source of interest and inspiration on this topic. I have grown up in a rural 
setting in China, and then migrated to the city with my parents. Ever since, I’ve made 
trips to visit our rural hometowns where I still felt emotionally attached. I personally 
experienced the drastic difference between getting an education in rural China and in 
the cities. The acute rural-urban inequality was part of my own experiences as a youth.  
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Organization of Chapters 
       Chapter 2 offers a historical account of China’s internal migration as an instituted 
process during and after central planning. I examine the political, economic and social 
dimensions of such institutionalization using archival data and oral histories of rural 
migrants. Chapter 3 zooms in to examine Shanghai’s changing labor market structure 
and rural migrants’ pathways of integration into the urban economy. I survey a range 
of occupations rural migrants concentrate in, and generalize how workplace 
socialization contributes to the formation of social distinction. I also present the rise of 
migrant entrepreneurship with implications for institutional change. In Chapter 4, I 
present a thick ethnographic study of one rural migrant community in Shanghai—the 
Pond. Rural migrants’ communal life in metropolitan Shanghai involves their active 
agency in redefining and negotiating the group boundaries with the locals and between 
different native-place groups. Chapter 5 analyzes rural migrants’ active engagement in 
negotiating a space for their children’s education in Shanghai. While presenting 
education as a key mechanism reproducing social distinction, I analyze how social 
interactions in the process of “contentious education” directly contribute to rural 
migrants’ changing identity formation. Chapter 6 draws conclusions from comparative 
and institutional analyses based on previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SHADOW OF THE OLD REGIME 
 
 
China had a very Chinese way of rebelling against itself. Even when seeking to 
break with its past, it plumbed that past for precedents to grasp in asserting its own 
invariance.  
                                                               --Peyrefitte, The Immobile Empire, 1992, xix 
 
 
       Resonating with Tocqueville, the French historian Peyrefitte identifies a pattern 
familiar to students of institutional change—the ruins of the old regime were often 
reused as materials for the construction of another “new-born” social order. 
Institutional change throughout the world can be “overwhelmingly incremental” 
(North 1990: 89). It applies to a country like China where traditional ways of 
governance and collectivist norms are stronger than in other cultures. When the fate of 
the peasantry is concerned, such an institutional continuity is even more obvious.  
       “Institutions,” according to new institutional economic sociologists (Nee and 
Brinton, 1998; Nee and Ingram 1998), are defined as “a system of interrelated 
informal and formal elements—custom, shared beliefs, conventions, norms and 
rules—governing social relationships within which actors pursue and fix the limits of 
legitimate interests.” They are the “rules of the game in a society” (North 1990:3) that 
individuals play by.  Institutions allocate information and opportunities, influencing 
the distribution of power in that society. These functions gave rise to mechanisms that 
contribute to institutional persistence, or “path-dependency”. When some structural 
changes take place, the discrepancy between what is permissible within the old 
institutional framework and what is necessary to cope with pressing problems grows 
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large. This leads to a “structural misfit” which is often corrected by the creative 
destruction of the old system.  
       This chapter examines how hukou (or huji), a complex traditional system of state 
domination in ancient China was developed and consolidated under socialism. This 
system generated a spatially structured hierarchy of economic and political power, a 
system of social distinction based on inherited status. I analyze the institutionalization 
of migration-control system (known as hukou or huji) during socialist restructuring 
(1949-1978), the deinstitutionalization of this system after market reform (1984-2003), 
and its current developments and social complexities (2003 to the present).  
       China’s history shows that an invisible wall existed long before socialist era and 
integration into the global economy. Today, individuals’ hukou identities continue to 
be one of the most salient sites of social distinction in China. The core question is to 
ask why migration-control institutions (hukou and its varriants) demonstrate strong 
path-dependent characteristics. I begin with analyzing the sources of its stability at the 
system’s legitimation. Institutionalization, by definition, implies a high degree of 
legitimacy; and legitimation is often used as a signal or a stage of institutionalization. 
As Greif (2007) claims, legitimacy is “crucial to the institutionalization of 
intentionally created institutions.”  
       How was the system forbidding peasants’ out-migration established as a quasi-
legal order in the first place? What are the sources of inertia which make it durable 
over time? One obstacle to study the Chinese hukou system is the lack of access to 
pertinent information, due to the low transparency of the system under the direct 
surveillance of China’s Ministry of Public Security. Hukou archives still belong to the 
“sensitive” category kept by the public security bureaus in China.18 I draw from both 
                                                 
18
 At the beginning of my fieldwork in China in 2007, I made two attempts to approach the public 
security bureaus who are in charge of hukou registration through internal contacts. At the time of 2007, 
the public security system just proudly announced its “digitalization” of hukou documents. My requests 
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secondary sources and qualitative interviews to restore its historical evolution by 
patching up pieces of its legitimatization, enforcement, and partial disintegration. 
 
The Origins and the Evolution of Hukou 
Inherited Origins: Imperial Taxation and Bureaucratization 
       Systems of household-based registration originated in the Xia Dynasty (21st -16th 
centry B.C.) along with a population census, according to Shiji. When Qin unified 
China (221 B.C.), a baojia system (sometimes spelled as pao-chia) was adopted 
nationally, and its functions in taxation and conscription were expanded and 
reinforced. Individuals were required to report residence, age, gender, and profession 
to the ruler, who verified such information three times a year. A functioning system of 
population registration identifies a person as a resident of an area and includes his or 
her basic personal information into document files. Usually a household is registered 
into one document (huji), later known as “hu-kou” (literally referring to “household” 
and “mouth”). Lu (2003) argues that historically, given the vast farming population 
among the Chinese, the system was a product out of the marriage between totalitarian 
politics and agrarian order. The dynasty cycles after the Qin brought changes to the 
huji system, but its functions in tax collection and law enforcement persisted. 
       Despite the presence of social control, internal migration of peasants persisted. 
Even with legal prohibitions, local enforcement by the gentry class was weak, so such 
regulations only led to inaccurate hukou records (Wang 2005: 36). Some scholars trace 
it back to even earlier times as the Sui and Tang dynasties, when bureaucratic 
appointments were made through the imperial exam system (keju), which was linked 
up with household registration.  
                                                                                                                                            
to visit their office and to talk to their staff members were immediately turned down when they learned 
that I am a sociologist from an American university. I was told that the hukou issue is classified as “top 
state secret,” and a recent interview by a Chinese journalist over this issue was frowned upon.  
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       It was not until the Sui and especially the Tang Dynasty (581-907 A.D.) when the 
hukou system was incorporated as part of the imperial political apparatus. 
Bureaucratic offices were set up, and master hukou files were created and maintained. 
Individuals were classified into four main categories: military, peasants, merchants, 
and handicraft workers. They subjected to different tax burdens. This highly 
bureaucratized feature was passed on to subsequent regimes, including the rulers of 
the Republic China and the PRC.19 Maintaining the huji records was incorporated into 
the evaluation criteria of government officials. Reforms in the Ming and Qing 
dynasties severed the traditional links between taxation and the huji system. A baojia 
(or pao-chia) system replaced huji, and it incorporated even stricter forms of social 
surveillance (Kuhn 1980).  
       As a result, the traditional Chinese society has displayed a highly hierarchical 
structure with individuals falling into “san liu jiu deng” (various ranks). The Chinese 
have become habituated to such “differentiated citizenships.” As Fairbank (1986) 
notes, the Chinese people have long developed a belief which takes the ruler as the 
“dispenser of justice” who has “inherited control” over the peasantry: 
 
“In China’s inheritance was the tradition that the state authorities had 
unquestioned control over the populace in the villages (e.g. the pao-chia 
system, li-chia system). Using these structures, emperors from early times 
had pursued public works using labor conscripted from the countryside. 
The ruling class in short could tell the peasants what to do with himself and 
his belongings at the same time they taxed him. … Part of China’s 
inheritance was that their state of morale, their loyalty to the center, was a 
key determinants of the results achieved.” 
 
      China’s rural-urban gap had a long history. It did not start from 1949. The 
historian Mote (1970: 42-49) notices “a cultural continuum of country and city” 
                                                 
19
 In today’s China, computer-aided record keeping has transformed the system into a highly 
sophisticated and secretive data system managed by the Ministry of Public Security. 
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discernible in traditional China. Skinner (1977:267-69) observes a complex web that 
includes “markers of economic, political, and cultural divergence” between villages 
and cities. Rural-urban gap persisted as a result of modernization.20 The majority of 
the Chinese lived on farming land, but rural migrants were also common scenes in 
cities. Cohen (1993:151-30) points out that urban intellectuals “invented” the cultural 
category of Chinese peasantry in the early twentieth century. Mann (1984:94) claims 
that an “urban bias” was emerging in the 1920s and 1930s, as urbanites developed 
different views on “rural roots.” 
       Surprisingly, the “great demarcation” of rural from urban society happened only 
after 1949. Although the Chinese peasantry has long been considered as an inherited 
social status (Lu 2008), peasants were free to enter into mercantile trading or the 
political elite group through the keju exam system. It was during the communist Great 
Leap Forward that China made a qualitative transformation into a “spatial hierarchy” 
alone hukou lines (Cheng and Selden 1994). Communist collectivatization enforced 
inherited status, place-based identities, entitlement to necessities, and collectivist 
norms. Never before had hukou control penetrated to such a totalitarian degree in 
China. How did it happen?  
 
Conditions on the Eve of Chinese Communism 
       During the Chinese civil war, food scarcity was widespread. When rice provision 
fell short, the Republic China government enacted food rationing. These became 
important episodes heightening village-city relations. For the first time in China’s 
history, political actors allocated food rationing based on hukou registration. In 
Shanghai for example, rationed rice gained the name of “hukou rice” (hukou mi), as 
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 During the Republican period, some major port cities developed into modernized connectors with the 
outside world. 
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only Shanghai hukou-holders were entitled to it. By such stringent rules of food 
provision, the government “successfully” discouraged rural migrants seeking urban 
shelter. This “temporary” wartime policy was a crucial development because it 
reshaped the entitlement hierarchy among people. “Institutional genesis” like this left 
unintended consequences. Such design can be “tentative” at the time of urgency, but it 
often produced lasting ramifications (Anderson 1943:23-33)—state power penetrated 
the society with new techniques of social control.  
       Rationing requires uniformity and elaborated checks against evasion. These 
transform political structures, social relationships and attitudes. If the design of a 
rationing system fails to neutralize the existing privileges by giving more to 
advantaged groups, or if it was based on criteria other than the basis of nutritional 
need, it tends to twist the redistributive system towards injustice. Instead of using 
rationing to alleviate the effects of class lines, it was twisted into strategies of 
exclusion. New categories of social status were invented, which conveyed a sense of 
“unworthiness” attached to the excluded. Furthermore, scarcity also creates a panic to 
guard one’s membership among the privileged. As Weber points out, resource scarcity 
and competition as the preconditions for closure-formation based on “externally 
identifiable characteristics” (1978[1922]: 342). Under these conditions, although the 
institutionalization of certain exclusive strategies was clearly not the optimal choice, it 
can be considered as “temporary” and legitimate. 
       In other social contexts, famines and plagues sometimes gave rise to similar 
processes of institutional genesis. At the end of the seventeenth century, France 
adopted methods of registration in some plagued towns to discourage internal 
migration (Foucault 1975). The “momentary” nature of this form of social control only 
functioned for that period of time. Temporary sacrifice of fair distribution is 
dangerous, but it would lead to more damaging effects if such a rationing system were 
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enacted for a prolonged period of time. Unfortunately, the food shortage crisis and 
urban unemployment lasted for an even longer period of time after the civil war, and 
throughout communism. The Chinese civil war and the subsequent regime change into 
communism in the 1940s created a historical opportunity for the new regime to launch 
for large-scale social engineering.  
       After 1949, high unemployment and inflation plagued the country’s war-battered 
economy. The number of unemployed and refugees amounted to 1.66 million in nine 
large cities. Shanghai alone had 150,000 urban residents without jobs (Zeng and Lin 
1990:19). In 1949 and after, the communist state pressed massive wartime refugees 
and jobless migrants in large cities to resettle in the countryside. A news editorial 
asserted that “Shanghai can only maintain a population of three million” (Workers’ 
Newspaper, August 11, 1949).21 In the early 1950s, Shanghai administrators urged 
jobless family members of hundreds of thousands of residents to return to the 
countryside.  
 
Socialist Collectivization as “Internal Colonization” 
       After 1958, migration-control developed into a full-blown system which forbids 
freedom of movement. It was the main component of the Chinese Communism 
project, which we later viewed as disastrous. Scott (1997: 3) explains why some full-
fledged statecraft fail with four factors: the administrative ordering of nature and 
society, a high-modernist ideology, an authoritarian state that is willing and able to use 
the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being, 
and a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans. He points out 
that wartime shortages and revolution make “the most fertile soil” for the state to use 
its coercive power to realize its designs: 
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 Cited in Gaulton (1981).  
 38 
 
“In such situations, emergency conditions foster the seizure of emergency 
powers and frequently delegitimatize the previous regime. They also give 
rise to elites who repudiate the past and who have revolutionary designs for 
their people.” 
 
       The evolution of hukou was an inevitable outcome of a central planning system 
towards heavy industrialization, which required meticulous planning and control of all 
resources, especially labor flows. The Soviet Union initiated the archetypical internal 
passport system, “the propiska” (1932-1974), to separate the rural population from the 
urban. Propiska quota was used to control the influx of non-native residents into a few 
major cities. The system was not abolished until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Similar systems existed in other communist societies, such as Vietnam (ho khau) and 
present-day North Korea (hoju). These societies share common experiences in 
resource scarcity, and the influence of the Soviet economic model.  
       Hukou, China’s No. 1 document and its backbone institution, affected 
fundamental aspects of life for millions of Chinese, especially during the central 
planning era. How the “iron curtain” of hukou control was institutionalized, and how 
the hukou order retained a lasting grip of hukou order on social stratification in the 
post-socialist era require a re-examination of that history.  
 
Instituting Hereditary Inequality 
       At the founding of PRC in 1949, China was predominantly an agrarian society. 
Driven by their ideological zeal to eliminate class differences, communist leaders 
pushed for violent forms of land reform. The early 1950s witnessed the largest land 
reforms in world history (Perkins, 1994). Reclassification (jieji chengfen huafen) of 
the people was aimed at elevating the oppressed over the privileged class. Wealth gap 
was artificially equalized and the old landlord class was wiped out by force. To a large 
 39 
extent, these political movements helped the communist party gain nationwide 
allegiance from the large base of peasants.  
       Reclassification reinforced the social boundaries by wealth and class. More 
tragically, it legitimatized the social classification of inherited status. The children of 
poor peasantry were considered politically upright, while the descendents from 
wealthier families had to bear a lasting stigma. This gave rise to a birthright 
stratification mentality among all Chinese. This inherited feature of class stratification 
has had lasting impact on how the Chinese view each other in terms of relative social 
standings during the socialist era. This contributed to how people received the 
inherited characteristic hukou status as an “appropriate” social distinction.  
       Ascribed status is the social standing an individual is assigned at birth or assumes 
by tradition or by law. Lower strata of such a status hierarchy are often inseparable 
from the negative stereotypes that associated with them. All societies display such 
practices of assigning statuses based on sex, gender, race, family origins, and ethnic 
differences. The Chinese hukou system imposes a unique type of status by parents’ 
place of residence to individuals, a structural rarity across cultures. Over time, hukou 
has become a deeply ingrained socio-cultural identity people use in constructing 
stereotypes. Before the late 1980s, a person’s hukou membership could only be 
“transferred” through marriage, military service and entering a college. In some 
situations, being denied a previously held urban hukou status was used as an additional 
punishment for imprisoned criminals. 
  
Anti-Urbanization Campaigns 
       Hukou-based identities took shape well before the formal installation of system in 
1958. Over the course of the 1950s, influxes of peasants into cities were common, and 
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efforts to restrict such out-migration revailed. An article on the People’s Daily urged 
provincial governments and party officials to “take measures” to “persuade” peasants: 
 
“The majority of these peasants carried “reference letters” from the 
township governments of their registration origin, or permits for 
transferring hukou. Some party members among them even carried 
reference letters for connecting with party organizations. But local 
governments did not contact with administrative departments in the cities. 
Currently all construction projects and factories demand very few laborers, 
so they cannot accommodate so many people. These peasants cannot find 
jobs in the cities, nor do they have places to live in. This would not only 
affect themselves negatively, but would also bring difficulties to urban 
employment. During this time for spring cultivation, such massive out-
migration would undoubtedly detriment agricultural production.”22  
 
      An article like this delivered “directives from the top” (shangji zhiling). In China, 
policy-making follows a regular flow: top officials discuss and express their directives 
in documents, which are formalized into a political document, then it passes through 
the stages of initiation, drafter selection, and final release through external or internal 
publications. “Decrees” (tiaoli), “notifications” (tongzhi), “documents’ (wenjian), 
“suggestions” (jiangyi), and “measures” (cuoshi) publicized through the People’s 
Daily have quasi-legal effects. In real implementation, however, conflicts of interests 
between the state and local governments, or between various bureaucratic agencies, 
sometimes result in delays or other local rhetoric which obfuscates the original 
purposes of these policies (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; O’Brien and Li 1999). 
       Reading between the lines, this news, in particular, has several implications. First, 
it shows that after four years of economic rehabilitation and rural collectivization in 
preparation for central planning, labor allocation remained an unresolved key issue. 
Initial plans were not successful in keeping peasants inside rural collectives (e.g. 
                                                 
22People’s Daily, April 17, 1953, 1.  The People’s Daily is the official mouthpiece of the communist 
party in China. 
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mutual aid teams or advanced collective forms). Secondly, peasants’ out-migration 
was not seen as politically incorrect by rural local governments at that point. It was not 
evidently forbidden by the state either. But this news report also captures a critical 
moment for impending institutional change. In the same article, more specific 
“measures” were suggested to solve the problem of peasants’ migration: 
 
 “… all levels of governments and cadres should correctly propagate 
(xuanchuan) and explain to peasants about the relationship between 
agricultural production and industrial production, and about the detriments 
they bring by blindly entering into cities both to themselves and to the 
state. There must be strengthened guidance on handicraft and sideline 
industries, in order to incorporate a part of the rural labor surplus. All work 
units (danwei) in factories, mines and infrastructure construction must 
apply to labor departments in the local governments when they need labor. 
After these applications are granted by the government, they can start a 
well-planned and organized mobilization and recruitment. Private 
recruitment or recruiting through personal connections are strictly 
prohibited.”23 
        
       The goal was to make employment “well-planned and organized.” Any movement 
outside the framework of central planning was considered as “blind”. It was also the 
first time when peasants’ out-migration was politically defined as “blind”, implying 
state-regulated labor regimes to be the only rational and efficient way. Howe (1971) 
documents how the sanfan (Three-anti) and wufan (Five-anti) campaigns influenced 
the ebbs and flows of rural-to-urban migration. The 1950s witnessed a series of 
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 A danwei is a work unit in China’s urban multi-tiered pre-reform infrastructure. They are basic units 
to implement party commands to workers, offer life-long employment and other services and welfare 
benefits for urban workers, such as housing, education, pension, schools, clinics, shops, etc. The 
privatization of many state-owned danwei in mid 90s has been an effort to detach these benefits from 
the urban labor market infrastructure. But the state continued to subsidize the urban population, only not 
by lowering food prices or in kind food provisions. Take education for example, the state continue to 
fund urban basic education, while leaving rural basic education for other sources of funding. Rural 
communes are grassroots units to mobilize peasants’ economic activities. There rural households were 
organized into “production teams” to earn “work points” as their collective wage units. 
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cyclical policy changes at tightening and loosening controls on migration. 
Inconsistency and ambivalence caused great institutional uncertainty.  
       As early as in 1953, the state implemented a “Unified Purchase and Sale” (tong 
gou tong xiao) policy to eliminate market mechanisms in determining prices. Only the 
state has the power to purchase and sell grains, and private market activities were 
prohibited. The state used “price scissors” (jiandao cha) to artificially lower the prices 
of agricultural products and keep industrial goods at higher prices. By doing this, the 
state was able to transfer resources within a short time. 
       Another goal of this policy was to restrict food consumption into central plans. 
Rural and urban collectives were supposed to provide food on a rationed basis. When 
both food allocation and pricing mechanisms were used as legitimate means to achieve 
planned goals, a vast chasm was drawn between agricultural production and industrial 
production. Politically, it was a clear-cut resolution to separate the two classes. A 
central directive in November of 1955 titled “Criteria for the Demarcation between 
Urban and Rural Areas” officially imposed a spatial hierarchy.24 
           Of all public policies, Lipton (1977) argues that the “price-twists” hurt the 
interests of the rural class most. It tends to result in the overvaluing the currency in the 
rural economy, and also in the loss of competitiveness of their agricultural products in 
international markets. 25 Similar measures to distort the pricing mechanisms have been 
used in many other developing countries in 1950s. When nations adopted this ideology 
of urban-industrial developmentalism, unequal exchanges between rural and urban 
residents led to a social norm of “urban bias” in these societies. Lipton (1977) explains 
how this happens: 
 
                                                 
24
 See Cheng and Selden (1994), p659. 
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“The rural sector contains most the poverty, and most of the low cost 
sources of potential advance; but the urban sector contains most of the 
articulateness, organization and power. So the urban classes have been able 
to ‘win’ most of the rounds of the struggle with the countryside; but in 
doing so they have made the development process slow and unfair.”   
(Lipton, 1977:1)  
        
       Usually, this tendency of urban bias shows most evidently in the provision of 
education and other public welfare spending decisions (Lipton, 1977). In China, 
administrative authorities set up urban danwei systems and rural communes as units 
for production. Prices for raw materials and labor were pre-set. From the beginning, 
these two groups were given different entitlements. Urban residents were seen as 
contributing directly to industrialization. Their political loyalty was to be secured with 
stable rewards. In contrast, the needs of rural residents were less urgent. 
       In their efforts to make the central plan work, communist leaders constantly 
feared political sabotage. This fear drove them towards a system of identification 
proving political loyalty whenever mobility is concerned. Even for cadre-party-
members who traveled to places other than their danwei, they were expected to carry a 
stack of reference letters with them, including proof for party membership, 
administrative references, food and oil references (liangyou guangxi), etc. A People’s 
Daily article illustrates the importance of hukou identification to “socialist stability”:  
 
“When class conflicts are becoming increasingly sharp these days, we must 
improve hukou management, in order to fill up the cracks that may create 
opportunities for hidden enemies to use legal identities for sabotage.”26  
        
       Rational planning in grain allocation did not stop peasants’ out-migration through 
personal connections. In coping with the limited food distribution problem, a “grey” 
labor market emerged in eastern Beijing in 1955 when a group of cooperative cadres 
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 People’s Daily, September 11, 1955, p6.   
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and members managed to find work for the Social Welfare Bureau (People’s Daily, 
September 3, 6). They traded their own grain with other food items, which “greatly 
disturbed the food distribution policies.”27 The next day, the State Council reinforced 
its “Measures for Food Rationing in Cities and Townships” (People’s Daily, 
September 4, 1). More contentious forms of resistance persisted. Qin (2005) finds 
from archival research that peasants’ anti-collectivization movements peaked in 1956, 
resulting in widespread violence in rural areas.  
 
Political Persuasions and Mobilized Immobility 
      Official documents show that starting from 1953, the central government issued 
decrees to “persuade” peasants not to “blindly” flow into cities. They used several 
techniques to prepare for the total abolition of population movement through hukou 
legislation: “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo), role models, and mobilization for send-
down (dongyuan fanxiang). Persuasive methods were developed by the communists in 
Yan’an. There they had set up a Stalinist command economy where peasants were 
ordered around according to their economic plans. The communist propaganda 
machine played a significant role in their persuasion campaigns. Firstly, it successfully 
elevated the Soviet-type state socialism to a “modernization” blueprint. Secondly, 
reports, pictures, and stories were produced in the massive scale to transmit social and 
political values that fundamentally changed people’s thinking and behaviors.  
       Ironically, the idea of “worker-peasant alliance” propagated by the communists 
served to lock peasants into a second-class membership. Schwartz (1961:192-193) 
claims that the rhetoric was used to “conceal by every device possible the actual 
severance of the ruling party from its proletarian base.” Despite their realization that 
the communist party should never distance itself from the peasants, at the same time, 
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 People’s Daily, 1957, Feb 19, 1. This news article pointed out the same persistent phenomenon.  
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communist leaders also reckoned that the party should not allow “ignorant and 
backward” peasants to lead the revolution, a similar term to Marx’s “sacks of 
potatoes.”  Kelliher (1994:390, 393) points out the essential tensions built into the 
party’s assessment of peasants’ “dual nature”: peasants were seen as having 
revolutionary impulses, but as private property holders, they were also inclined 
towards wealth hoarding, which is contrary to socialism. That peasants need to be 
educated and regulated formed an underlying principle for policy making.  
       A letter appeared on the People’s Daily served a most evident example. The 
article was titled “I Am Still Determined to Return to the Village.” It was acclaimed to 
be a letter written by an “enlightened” junior middle school student who wrote to 
challenge her peasant parents’  “backward political attitudes”.  
 
“Dear father and mother,  
I have received your letter. You asked me to secure a city hukou, so that I 
could find a job in the city. But I disagree with you. Our principal and 
teachers taught us about issues of further education and employment, 
which helped me immensely in understanding things. I now realize that our 
motherland has cultivated us to better participate in the labor force, and 
there is no difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. All jobs are to serve 
and construct our socialist motherland. So I am prepared to enter into 
agricultural production after graduation, and surely I would bring back my 
hukou to the village. 
… 
Your daughter,  
         YANG Wenhua 
         
       Peasants seeking support from urban relatives in various cities were “mobilized” 
(dongyuan) to return. In Taiyuan city, for example, 56.6 percent of the total resident 
population belonged to the “fostered population” (bei fuyang renkou) in August of 
1957. The city government determined to “mobilize” ten thousand “nonproductive 
individuals” (fei shengchan renyuan) to return to rural areas. These people included 
not only temporarily hired workers, rural migrants from famine areas, and 
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homemakers and dependents of urban workers. Even some individuals working in 
service sectors were included. These linguistic terms pictured rural migrants as 
dependent, nonproductive, and directly made a causal connection between their 
presence in the city and the deterioration of city infrastructure and worsened food 
shortage (People’s Daily, August 16, 1957, p4).  
       Non-coercive and “voluntary” programs were designed to achieve such 
reallocation, including persuasion and positive incentives for return.28 There was little 
resistance because few people foresaw any barriers for them to re-enter the cities in 
the future. In 1957, Xinhua News applauded the return of over eleven thousand 
spouses of military officials to rural areas after successful thought work: 
 
“During the mobilization of dependents in the military, all levels of 
officials paid much attention to good thought work, in improving the 
socialist awareness of military and their dependents, and in helping them 
willingly and gladly leave for the rural areas. … All danwei had Party 
Committee meetings to make the plans and design all kinds of measures to 
ensure the implementation of this work. Many military banches used big-
character posters (dazi bao), or special meetings (zuotan hui), family 
meetings, and individual meetings (gebie tanxin) to xuanchuan (propogate) 
the meaningfulness of returning to rural areas. These all helped to solve 
their thought problems (sixiang wenti).”29 
        
       All levels of party organs, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of 
Labor, the Ministry of Food, and the Communist Youth League, and the Women’s 
Union formed work teams that specialized in “persuading” peasants to return. The 
goal was to “compress urban population.” This mass mobilization movement not only 
implied the state’s determination to implement the plan in strict labor allocation, but 
also that urban employment was in a crisis too deep to accommodate any labor input 
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 The state provided each urban-to-rural migrant five to six mu of land, monetary loans, and free 
transport. Most importantly, few people foresaw any barriers to re-enter the cities in the future. 
29
 People’s Daily, December 14, 1957, p4. 
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from rural areas. Policy makers assumed that labor reallocation to the countryside 
could work, because rural lands could provide at least basic living necessity at cheaper 
costs. Urban employment was considered a top priority because urban industries were 
the engines for China’s economic growth.  
       Lin (2004) recently argues that the central state was faced with a critical decision 
of whether or not to follow a “comparative advantage strategy” that’s prevalent in 
most western economies, or to choose a more daring “Great Leap Forward” strategy. 
The two differ in their ideological definitions of what are considered as “socially just”. 
While the comparative advantage strategy admits differential endowments in natural 
and human resources, the Great Leap Forward strategy is inclined to rush into a target 
“plan” impatiently through the monopoly of resources. The latter ultimately risked 
sacrificing personal freedom.  
      Hayek (1960) explains that because socialist planners do not have feasible clear-
cut plans to realize their grand picture of a utopia, they usually “manipulate the 
economy so that the distribution of incomes will be made to conform to their 
conception of social justice.” As illustrated before, the Soviet central planning offered 
a strategy for rapid economic growth independent of market economies, which seemed 
a successfully model for Chinese communist leaders. Unfortunately, few policy-
makers were equipped with enough social science knowledge to foresee its disastrous 
social outcomes in the future.  
 
The Politics of Hukou Institutionalization 
       The pre-1949 regime of Republic China legally promulgated Hukou Law in 1931, 
for the purposes of taxation and economic restructuring.  From 1911 to 1949, it 
created over three dozen laws and regulations governing the hukou system (Wang 
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2005).30 Internal migration was allowed, except in regions where anticommunist 
campaigns were waged. After the communist take-over, existing hukou records were 
kept and used. An additional category of hukou files was created (category C) for 
individuals who were considered threatening (zhongdian renkou, i.e. targeted persons) 
to the new regime. The need to “weed out hidden enemies” remains a key motivation 
for police forces to use the hukou as a screening tool. In the 1950s, these potential 
enemies were referred to “antirevolutionary elements,” while today they are likely to 
be runaway out-laws. This belief motivated the technological upgrading of hukou 
registration in recent years. But the mentality of treating rural migrants as potential 
criminals is still present. 
      The first population census of the PRC in 1953 strengthened the urban hukou 
system and created new rural hukou files. In 1955, the state commanded local 
governments to “formally initiate a full-blow hukou system on the eve of China’s 
imposed collectivization” (Cheng and Selden 1994: 655). Shortly later in 1956, the 
power of implementing was handed down to the state’s police system, the Ministry of 
Public Security (gong’anbu). Ever since then, its local branches (Public Security 
Bureaus) and grassroots offices (Police Dispatch Office) were given legal rights to 
administer the registration of Hukou. But since the police system were also given 
legitimacy to arrest or detain anyone who migrate outside of his or her residence 
origin, this was the beginning of the criminalization of migrating peasants throughout 
two decades. Peasants were gradually downgraded to a new social category as 
“potential law-breakers”. This exclusive tendency was so obvious that even some rural 
migrants who settled in cities before 1958 were persuaded to return to their 
                                                 
30
 The Nanjing Government promulgated Hujifa (Hukou Law) in 1931 (revised in 1934 and 1946), 
Detailed Regulations on the Implementation of Hukou Law in 1934, Regulations of Hukou 
Verifications in 1941, Regulations on Temporary Resident Registration in 1942 and 1943, and 
Regulations on the Registration of Migrating People in 1943 (revised in 1946). 
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hometowns of origins and wait for “further notices”. But most of them never saw the 
cities again.31 Also from that time on, the Ministry of Public Security became the 
primary government body to design guideline policies regarding rural-to-urban 
migration. Until today, MPS continues to justify the system by emphasizing its 
“merits” in helping to maintain social order (shehui zhixu) and to provide important 
information on “targeted persons.” 
       A top decree was passed down from the combined authority of Central 
Communist Party and the State Council in December 1957 to strictly “forbid the out-
migration of rural population.” In this document, it was recognized that many regions 
were suffering from a famine, but emphasis was laid again on “the detriments of blind 
out-migration to both the nation and peasants themselves.” Refugees from famine 
areas (zaimin) were asked to organize for self-help production (shengchan zijiu), 
instead of moving elsewhere. Repatriation shelters were set up in all transportation 
nexuses, staffed with work teams who specialized in conducting “persuasions”. 
Begging and vagrants were forbidden and must be sent back to their hukou origins 
whenever observed on streets. The rationale of “planning” was repeatedly stressed: 
 
“Forbidding rural population from out-migrating is of primary significance 
for our nation. On the one hand, this will greatly relieve cities from 
economic burdens. Once peasants enter into cities and consume food there, 
it will surely demand increased allocation of food to these cities, and add 
onto the already shortage and overcrowding issues. When the rural 
population enters into cities, they come to look for jobs. But urban 
employment must proceed according to our plans, and in measured steps. 
So this kind of blind out-migration, which happened outside the plan, is 
impossible to accommodate. The presence of some backward elements 
(luohou fenzi), especially some landlords, rich peasants and ex-convicts 
who migrate to the cities, would definitely engage in private money-
making, gambling and stealing to make their livings. This greatly damages 
the social stability of cities. … It is true that life in rural areas is still 
difficult, but a better life comes after hard work. With the economic 
development of our nation and peasants’ hard work, rural life is improving. 
                                                 
31
 From fieldwork interviews with rural migrants who are in their fifties or sixties. 
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It is expected that with the fast development of agriculture and lower living 
costs in rural areas, peasants’ income level will soon catch up with that of 
industrial workers. But when many people leave their villages, this lack of 
rural labor would certainly harm this prospect.”32 
        
       On January 10th of 1958, the state passed the PRC Hukou Registration 
Regulations, a formal legislation separating rural and urban boundaries (geographical 
and occupational) was officially established. Until today, it had been the only 
legislation by China’s highest legislative body, the People’s Congress. It required that 
rural peasants need to obtain legal papers before out-migration, and the legalization 
process was tightly controlled. Articles 15 and 16 stipulated that rural residents need 
to go through legal procedures if they plan to stay for more than three days in cities: 
 
“PRC citizens who intend to migrate from rural areas to the cities must 
have several certified documents, including hiring letter from the city labor 
department, or admission letter from one’s academic institution, or a letter 
of permission from city residence registration offices. With one of the 
above document, one could apply to the residence registration office at 
his/her original residence place for out-migration.” (PRC Household 
Registration Regulations, 1958) 
       
        Enforcement offices including public security, food bureaus, and public 
transportation were all assigned different roles to impose strict hukou control. 
Meanwhile, food rationing was strictly enforced in the cities, so anyone with no legal 
registration cannot obtain such subsistence necessities. The over-arching goal was to 
deter rural-to-urban migration. Interestingly, a news article on the same day of this 
legislation provided a justification to the socialist hukou: 
 
“These functions of hukou registration system in our country fully reflect 
the superiority of socialist institutions. It is inherently different from the 
ancient hukou systems in China’s ancient antirevolutionary regimes and 
other imperialist countries. The old hukou system in ancient Chinese 
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 People’s Daily, 1957, December 19, p1. 
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regimes served the class interests of landlords and capitalists, and was in 
nature oppressive devices against the working people. They used hukou to 
extract labor, to tax, and to suppress patriotic movements and revolutions 
among the people, in order to maintain their antirevolutionary rules. The 
hukou systems in other imperialist countries, no matter what type of forms 
they take on, they all serve the purpose of strengthening antirevolutionary 
rule by the exploitary class. But our hukou system serves one important 
measure for socialism and for serving the people. … As a socialist country, 
our goal is to build a happy communist society. But in order to make this 
ideal come true, many matters of livelihood of the people must be entrusted 
to the state to make proper arrangements. Hukou registration is in 
accordance with this guideline. … By limiting these inappropriate actions 
[out-migration], this does not mean that we deny citizens’ freedom to 
choose residence and to migrate. This is because the freedom of our nation 
is a disciplined freedom (you jilv de ziyou). It does not equal absolute 
personal freedom. It is not anarchy. But the blind migration of a small 
number of people acted out a type of absolute individual freedom that 
refuses to be disciplined.”33 
        
       This rationale was repeated again on the same issue by Luo Ruiqing, the then 
minister of the Ministry of Public Security. Luo quoted a verse from Mao as the 
“guiding principle” in drafting the hukou legislation: “Whenever we make plans, do 
things and think about issue, we should always think from the starting point of our 
nation’s 0.6 billion people.” Individuals’ migration without central directives, Luo 
emphasized again, should be considered as “contradictory to national interests and 
collective interests.” He admitted that freedom of movement is one part of the Chinese 
constitution, but this freedom should be interpreted as “freedom under leadership” and 
“freedom of the people,” rather than anarchy or the freedom of a small number 
(People’s Daily, 1958, January 10, p4). 
       Following the 1958 legislations, even transfer of hukou status from the 
“agricultural” category to “nonagricultural” was strictly prohibited. The only few 
legitimate mobility channels are through attending universities, joining the military, 
and marriage migration. Visitors and temporary migrants were required to register 
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 People’s Daily, 1958, January 10, p4. 
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with the local hukou police for permission to stay. In 1964, the Ministry of Public 
Security issued a “decree” (tiaoli) forbidding peasants from migrating into townships. 
In the 1975 constitutional amendment acts, the People’s National Congress, China’s 
then legislation body, historically eliminated the “freedom of residential mobility and 
migration” from the Chinese Constitution. In the subsequent constitutional 
amendments (1980, 1982 and 2004), this part has never been restored. Over time, the 
Household Registration System has increasingly evolved into “an internal de facto 
passport mechanism”, blocking peasants from upward mobility (Knight et al., 1999), 
creating a pattern of “internal colonization” (Solinger, 1999) within one country.  
 
State-Directed Migrations during the Cultural Revolution 
       During China’s socialist experiment, the state nationalized key resources such as 
land, capital and even labor. Economic activities were coordinated by a 
comprehensive plan toward a collectivist ideal of social justice (Hayek, 1960:256). 
However, with no civic participation in the decision-making process, political actors 
manipulated and implemented regulations to their own interests. The downward 
penetration of bureaucratic structures produced a great mass of loyal local cadres in 
charge of agricultural production and social surveillance. In other words, the 
bureaucracy of China’s imperial times, which reached down to the village levels 
through the lower gentry, after the gentry class had been struck down, had then been 
inflated to control the grassroots levels. History proved China’s central planning to be 
a disaster. The rigidity of forced rural collectivization culminated in the greatest 
famine in human history with a death toll of over 30 million during the years between 
1958 and 1961, historically known as the Great Famine. Statistics show that most 
death tolls were reported by rural areas, where peasants were forced not to move 
outside their failing communes, even including begging. Fairbank (1986: 282) argues 
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that “this organization of the countryside was far more complete than anything 
previously attempted in Chinese history.” He further states, 
 
“It can also be argued that the imposition of the Chinese communist party 
cadres and government as a new ruling class was hardly anything new in 
the Chinese experience except for its much deeper penetration and tighter 
control over everyday life. Experience suggest that regimentation was 
counterproductive in producing economic development, so all that 
happened in the Chinese revolution was the getting back to the structure of 
the late empire with a modernized technology and mass patriotism. … we 
are left with the platitude that the Chinese communist revolution was 
bound to be in the Chinese style. It accomplished tremendous changes but 
along lines that showed some continuity with the past.” (Fairbank 1986: 
284) 
        
       Hirschman (1970) theorizes that individuals resort to two behavioral options when 
responding to dissatisfactory organizational performance: exit and voice. When they 
perceive that the organization or nation is declining in its provision of benefits to its 
members, people can either withdraw from these relationships, or they can attempt to 
improve the relationships through communication, complaints, or grievance for 
change. Emigration and protest are two exemplary forms of such responses. However, 
in socialist China, due to demands for ideological loyalty and stringent restrictions 
against free out-migration of peasants, “voice” and “exit” were politically incorrect 
practices. Migration in itself would signal “political disloyalty”. As a result, 
individuals’ natural initiatives for collective action in any form opposing the 
totalitarian ideology of communism were completely stifled. In recent discussions on 
the cause of the Great Famine, Lin (2000) refers to peasants’ lack of “exit right” out of 
communes, and Qin (2008) directly points out “the right to migrate” as the causal 
culprit. Li (2008) points out the direct causal relation of absence of freedom of 
movement due to hukou control with the predominant death rates in rural areas. The 
urban population, in contrast, was doing relatively better because they were entitled to 
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rationed amounts of food consumption. Sen (1981) argues that such large-scale 
famines point to a major cause other than just lower food productions due to adverse 
climate—lack of equal “entitlements” in society. 
       The subsequent political movements in 1960s and 1970s reinforced the rural-
urban closure. In 1961, with urban economic crisis and unemployment becoming more 
intense, the state directed an anti-urbanization movement, known as the “send-down of 
urban educated youth” (shang shan xia xiang).34 It was also aimed to ease urban 
unemployment and increase agricultural productivity. But communist propaganda 
idealized this movement as a collective effort to smooth out “three major differences”, 
namely the differences between agricultural and industrial production, between rural 
and urban, and between manual and non-manual work. This movement had lasting 
social impact on the Chinese society by sharpening the status differences between 
peasants and urban workers. It continued during the most turbulent years of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, and over 20 million urban secondary school graduates 
were “exiled” to poor rural areas during these years. Real life experiences show 
clashes between these sent-down urbanites and villagers, intensifying the relationships 
between these two groups. 
       Almost every urban family suffered the trauma of long-term separation. Because a 
small number of urban elites secured the quota for returning youth, those with weak 
political connections had to endure years of exile in remote rural areas. An urban 
hukou was considered as a passport out of exile and misery. Many sent-down youth 
committed suicides after they failed to get urban hukou quota. Although the state 
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 Although small scale send-down movements started around 1955, it was in 1967 when large scale 
migration appeared, and in Dec of 1968 when Mao officially stipulated that “it is very necessary for the 
urban educated youth to go to the countryside to be re-educated by poor peasants.” (People’s Daily, 
Dec 23, 1968) It is estimated that over 16 million urban youth were forced to migrate to rural areas, 
accounting for one tenth of the total urban population. In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, 
these urban youth were named the “Red Guards”. 
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propaganda promoted this movement as “re-education by peasants,” in reality, it 
created a large chasm between the rural peasantry and urban citizens.  
       After the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, millions of sent-down youth 
requested returning to their urban homes. However, over the course of intensive 
political movements, the state, as a social control machine, has gained considerable 
power in selectively recruit politically loyal members. They enforced difficult 
“screening” procedures to check the returning flows. Some made it back to colleges or 
the military through personal connections. Some returned to join the urban labor force. 
Special policies were made to allow those needing medical treatment to return. Almost 
twenty years after the send-down movement, another “returning to the city” (hui 
cheng) appeared, although in much smaller scale. The increased costs of return, to a 
large extent, reinforced the superiority of an urban residence status. One of my 
informants, 65-year-old Lin, was originally a Beijing resident. He was sent down to 
rural Heilongjiang in 1963, but it was not until 1998 when he finally returned to the 
city after retirement. He recalled the stringent rules “sent-down youth” had to pass 
before getting the permission to return to the city of their original residence: 
 
“During the ‘back to the city’ wave, you were not allowed to return with 
just any excuse. You could use some hospital’s proof for a certain serious 
disease to get the quota. And even if you could return, no job or housing 
was arranged for you in the city. They would even make you write and sign 
a promise letter saying that you would not request the government for 
housing. … I started a family in Heilongjiang, so I waited until my son 
reached the age for taking the college entrance exam. Since there was only 
one Beijing hukou quota for each family, I gave it to him. He did not get 
into any Beijing university, but worked here ever since. Then I waited till 
1998 when the state had a policy allowing old-age dependents to return to 
Beijing.” 
     
       Merit-based college entrance examination resumed by the end of 1977. It offered 
a relatively “fairer” opportunity for many sent-down youth to return to urban areas. 
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Getting higher education gained popularity among rural young people too, because it 
was one way to obtain urban residence after graduation. According to Tang and Parish 
(2000), the socialist state of China have used four major administrative measures to 
institutionalize the rural-urban closure: the making and enforcement of the 1958 
regulations forbidding free rural-urban migration, removal of revenue from townships 
and small cities since 1963, sending down of 16 million urban youth to the 
countryside, and mobilized rural industrialization since late 70s. They claim that the 
overarching goal of these policies was to secure urban residents’ political loyalty by 
maintaining their entitlements without sharing the gains of industrialization with the 
rural.  
       “Continuous revolutions” during the Cultural Revolution allowed urban students’ 
free movements across China, but such mobility was mainly confined to the red 
guards as a political privilege. Factional politics also produced changes to the hukou 
system. For example, a few years after Liu Shaoqi engineered a peasant-workers 
(yinong-yigong) program to encourage urban enterprises to hire peasant workers on 
temporary basis and lessen rural dissent, Zhou Enlai and Mao strengthened hukou 
control to alleviate urban economic difficulties. Keeping the system means cutting 
down on labor costs for the rural majority. Such internal colonization brings economic 
benefits, to an extent that with the help of state propaganda, this type of “limited 
access” social order gave rise to a quasi-equilibrium.  
 
The Explosive Age  
Rural Decollectivization 
       In 1978, eighteen peasants in Xiaogang village of Anhui province risked signing a 
secret agreement to re-divide the collectively owned farmland. Agricultural production 
went up in the area. The Xiaogang model, later promoted by the state as the 
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Household Responsibility System, was replicated by rural collectives nationwide, 
leading to the dissolution of rural communes. Individual households regained 
autonomy, and peasants started to sell surplus food at unregulated prices. Free markets 
for food and crops revived. Productivity increased by 61% from 1978 to 1984 
(McMillan et al, 1989). The reemergence of trading markets accumulated momentum 
for peasants’ entry into non-farming jobs. In 1979, some peasants from Hebei 
swarmed into Beijing selling various agricultural products on the streets. The scale of 
street vending grew to such a large size that the Industrial and Commerce Bureau and 
Public Security Bureau of Beijing city decided to set up 10 marketplaces in Beijing’s 
suburbs for them (Xiang, 1998). Street vending was prohibited since.  
       Far-reaching social changes are often accompanied by ideological shifts (Schatz 
and Gutierrez-Rexach, 2002). According to Wen (2002), the high-rank communist 
leader Du Runsheng recollected that, in early 1980s, the Central Party Political 
Research office did submit a proposal to grant peasants the right to migrate. They did 
reach a consensus during that meeting. Soon afterwards, many central departments 
voiced disagreements against this proposal, arguing that the change would stir up 
“social instability”.35  
 
Hukou Trafficking and Illegitimate Migration Flows 
       Between the onset of economic reform (1978) and the legal relaxation of 
migration control (1984), peasants’ out-migration existed at small scales. Transfers of 
hukou status were made possible only through local governments’ application. During 
this time, some rural cadres engaged in “hukou trafficking”, as a few articles on the 
People’s Daily exposed: 
                                                 
35
 Until today, “securing social stability” is often used as the justification for the state’s continued 
legislation on rural-urban closure. 
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• Yan’an administrative area, in transferring agricultural into nonagricultural 
population, abused the hukou quota by 16.1 times in 1979. Some cadres and 
public security police faked documents for their relatives to apply for 
township hukou. (People’s Daily, 1980, July 16, page 3.) 
• LI Fengzhou, the vice party secretary of Linxiang County in Hunan 
province transferred his 28 relatives from agricultural to township hukou 
status through misappropriating the special hukou quota for this area. 
(Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, 1981, July 18, page 1.) 
• Two high-ranking party officials in Xiangtan city of Hunan province 
misappropriated 11 hukou quotas for private revenues. (People’s Daily, 
1981, December 27, page 3.)   
• Three party cadres in Wen’an county of Hebei province faked documents 
for their 69 relatives to migrate out of rural areas in the name of returning 
young intellectuals (zhiqing). (People’s Daily, 1982, January 11, page 4.) 
• Within six months, Anhui province mobilized 102.4 thousand peasant 
workers to return to their villages. Most of these peasants were relatives of 
cadres in urban party organs and public institutes who “walked through back 
doors” (zouhoumen). It was estimated that this would save the city 72 million 
yuan and four million jin grains. (People’s Daily, 1982, January 31, page 1.) 
• Two hundred and seventy-five “wailaihu” (people of other hukou origins) 
were repatriated by the public security departments in Wuxi city of Jiangsu 
province. (People’s Daily, 1982, July 21, page 3.) 
• One thousand five hundred and twenty-five “agricultural-to-
nonagricultural” (nongzhuanfei) hukou documents were considered as “not in 
accordance with policies” (buhe zhengce) in Anxiang county of Hunan 
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province. Most of these applications were filed by party leaders in the county 
and cooperatives who had relatives in rural areas. (People’s Daily, 1983, 
January 8, page 5.) 
• Since 1979, Jianli county of Hubei province had faked hukou transfers for 
979 people. 483 party cadres were found responsible for such power abuse. 
(People’s Daily, 1983, February 2, page 3.) 
• Two high-rank party officials in Chongli county of Hebei province were 
involved in misappropriating hukou quota. (People’s Daily, 1983, February 
25, page 4.) 
• Three officials from the Labor Bureau, Public Security Bureau and a 
leather factory misappropriated 39 hukou quotas for their relatives through 
bribing cadres in 22 coordinating units in Fengtai district of Beijing city. 
(People’s Daily, 1983, May 10, page 4.) 
• From 1975 to 1980, Li Qinghai, former chief of the public security banck 
office in Fenghe county of Inner Mongolia, colluded with members of a rural 
cooperative in selling over five hundred township hukous. (People’s Daily, 
1983, July 4, page 3.) 
 
       Common peasants also made efforts to escape rural. My fieldwork interviews 
show that some pioneering rural migrants were vegetable-sellers from Shandong, 
domestic maids from Anhui, cooks from Sichuan, etc.  
       To socialist legislators, uncontrolled population mobility represents disorder and a 
potential threat to regime stability. Lu (2004) argues that this view was so widely held 
in the 80s and 90s that it almost becomes “a legal culture” which takes any 
“individual” action as irrational. Even today, “mangliu” is still a term often used by 
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local administrators. A Shanghai street committee staff member, Song, age 38, openly 
expressed objections to the relaxed regulations on rural migrants: 
 
“How can people run around in such a metropolitan city like Shanghai 
without their IDs and permits? That’s totally mangliu! For a rural migrant 
without legal papers [in the old times], how could he have come here? But 
now they can… They act, they come and go, as if there’s no law. Now 
when you check on him, and even if he does not have a residence permit, 
you can’t do anything about that!” (Song, male, age 38, Shanghai native) 
        
       The five years between 1978 and 1983 have seen streams of “illegitimate” rural 
out-migration. These collective memories of labeling, channeling, and hiding around 
still haunt the older age groups of rural migrants nowadays. Unlike the experiences of 
the educated youth (zhiqing), who tasted the banishment of downward hukou mobility, 
migrants in these years faced a consistent form of legal punishment to keep them 
“disciplined.” Such types of discipline develop a hidden order of social surveillance. 
When their intention to escape the misery of socialist planning conflicts with the 
motherland’s “expectation” for them, a sense of disloyalty and guilt was internalized 
into their self-identity.  
 
Lifting Up the Flood Gate 
       Six years after the economic reform, with forces in the economy pushing and 
pulling for its disintegration, the rural-urban closure started to shatter. It was the 
“internal opening-up” process for China. In 1984, the state formally relaxed the 
Household Registration System, by legally permitting peasants to freely move into 
townships with self-provided food (zi li kou liang).36 These deregulated policies 
conveyed the old tone of political persuasion: “leave soil without leaving the town” (li 
tu bu li xiang), “enter into factories without going to the cities” (jin chang bu jin 
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 But by this time, many items other than food provision have been closely tied up to hukou. 
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cheng).37 Nevertheless, it marked the end of Chinese peasants’ serf-like ties to land 
duing the Mao period (Fairbank and Goodman 1998). Since migration tends of follow 
a cumulative process, with a small dent in the dam, it could draw in a flood, especially 
when the water level became high a long time ago. It is roughly estimated that from 
1984 to 1986, 4.5 million peasants moved from the countryside to townships (Zhao, 
2004). Jobs, housing and public facilities became increasingly accessible to whoever 
could afford them.  
       A few administrative changes improved migrants’ life chances. In 1989, the PRC 
Personal Identification Card (shenfen zheng) system took effect, which was created to 
partially replace the registration functions of the old hukou system. This largely 
dispensed the discriminatory presentation of individuals’ status using household hukou 
booklets. Since then, the verification of hukou data was greatly simplified. Another 
reform was to allow children to inherit either the father or the mother’s hukou status in 
1998.  
       Also in 1984, rural communes were dismantled and restructured into rural 
industrial units. Peasants were incorporated into non-farming jobs. The years between 
1984 and 1994 were the golden time for village and township enterprises (TVEs). The 
number of employees grew from 28 million in 1978 to 135 million in 1996. When 
privatization was still frowned upon as “politically incorrect”, these TVEs served dual 
interests, both as private economic initiatives and as political entrepreneurship in the 
growing product market (Wong, 1988). Fiscal decentralization in 1983 created strong 
incentives for local political entrepreneurs to promote this model (Oi, 1992). By 1996, 
these enterprises employed 135 million rural labor (Li, 2006). An interviewee, 43-
                                                 
37 In Oct of 1984, the State Council publicized “Announcements about Peasants’ Entering into 
Townships.”  It was stipulated that peasants who take up non-farming jobs in business and services, if 
they have stable residence in townships or if they are employed as full-time staff at township 
enterprises, they and their relatives can move to townships with self-provided food.  
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year-old Hong, who worked as an accountant in a township enterprise, recalls the 
failure of this “one-hit wonder”: 
 
“I worked as the accountant there for ten years. It was funded by our 
township government, and our manager was assigned by them. It was a 
‘welfare’ workplace, because they had their own hotel, restaurant… but 
poor management… I think it was because our manager had some plan for 
himself, and our township government was not happy about it. So they 
decided to close the restaurant. Then [business] it just got harder and harder 
later on… We switched to making tea, but later had some huge problem 
with funding. You see, the funding did not belong to the government, it 
was bank loan. The day I entered into that factory, I just knew that the 
money in our account would not cover the debts, even if they’d sell 
everything, it would still not be enough to cover! The costs were too high! 
So obviously it wouldn’t last for too long. But what else could I do? I was 
assigned to that post by township government too, so I just did what I was 
supposed to do.” (Hong, female, age 43, from rural Jiangsu) 
       
       Just like Hong’s township plant, most TVEs operated with massive loans from the 
state-monopolized banking system, creating a kind of “soft budget constraint” that was 
similar to China’s money-losing state-owned enterprises. Economic retrenchment 
around 1995 caused about 30 percent TVEs’ bankruptcies (Saich, 2001). With 
increased market competition and the growth of private firms, the TVE sector shrank 
into recession. After her factory went bankrupt, Hong came to Shanghai and found an 
accounting job in a private company.  
       State-directed migration of peasants into townships was not a once-for-all 
solution. With rural recession hitting most TVEs, like Hong, many rural migrants 
ventured into the cities. At first, most of them were only able to migrate and then 
return on a short-term basis. Because with the old food ration system was still present 
in many cities, when these migrants ran out of their own provisions, they had to 
purchase daily necessities with higher price from native residents. It was not until 
1993 when the food ration system was abolished.  Jiang (35) came to the city when 
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food ration was still enforced, and he remembers the difficult time for them to live and 
work in the city without food coupons: 
 
“It was almost impossible to come out before 1984. So [the first time] I 
followed others to the city to my uncle’s. He was a director at a state-
owned factory in city X. [When I came out] I had to bring my own food, 
like rice. [At home] we still used food ration coupons with specified 
amount of food for each family member. [Because I had to bring food] It 
was hard at the beginning.”  (Jiang, male, 35, from rural Anhui) 
        
       The years between 1978 to 1994 was a time during which state officials wavered 
and delayed making public policies concerning rural-urban migration (Zhao, 2004). 
Although the 1984 regulations did legally relax constraints on labor and residential 
mobility, the mainstream public attitude towards rural migrants was still criminalizing 
and exclusive. After all, the 1958 regulations had been enforced for sixteen years, and 
over time, discrimination against the floating rural poor has become a “sticky informal 
institution”. Like in Mei’s oral account, when urban residents or administrators met 
rural migrants in the city, they tend to accuse them of abandoning their “socialist duty” 
of farming in the countryside. The general public was intolerant of breaking down the 
rigid social categorization inherited from the planning era.  
 
“Administering” Identities and the Commodification of Hukou 
       After the state made a progressive move to allow rural peasants legally transfer 
their residence status to the township “non-agricultural” category, local governments’ 
rent-seeking using “green card systems” appeared.38 Actually in as early as 1986, the 
local township government of Qinlan in Chuzhou city, Anhui province, set up the first 
internal “green card system” (Liu 2008). Then Wenzhou city of Zhejiang province 
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 See “Announcements on the Policy and Management On Agricultural to Nonagricultural Transfers”, 
from the State Council to multiple central ministries such as the State Planning Committee, Ministry of 
Public Security, Ministry of Commerce, 1990.  
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followed suite in 1992, Shanghai city in 1993, and Shenzhen city of Guangdong 
province in 1995. These residence regimes shared one thing in common: they 
selectively incorporated new migrants (both rural and urban) with capital or with 
technical skills. The emergence of these local residence regimes was rooted in China’s 
fiscal decentralization. Meanwhile, a shadow market for “hukou” also emerged. In 
many places, a township hukou was overpriced from 4000 to 10000 yuan.39  
        Despite the state’s continued campaign against these underground activities, 
some hukou markets are still active even until today. According to the China 
Newsweek, a Beijing hukou was priced to 150,000 yuan for someone with a Master’s 
degree and double major certificates. “Because it’s easier to get Beijing Hukou for 
people with science degrees and other urgently-needed majors, but not arts”, 
responded the seller (China Newsweek, May 17, 2008).40  
       Since the plight of rural migrants was brought to wider public attention, some 
conscientious intellectuals and civil rights activists advocated for legislative changes. 
Whether or not the caste-like residence regime should be completely abolished 
became widely debated in the late 1990s. Some local governments did respond with 
“timelines” for abolition, but no implementation.41 Hopes were stirred up, but then 
new policies always fell short of the expectations of the majority, because cities tend 
to welcome the “haves” (the rich and educated) than the “have-nots”. Across China, 
every city-level government has used hukou to “handpick” a small number of migrant 
                                                 
39
 In 1992, the average annual income for a Chinese peasant was 877 yuan, so an urban hukou on the 
black market was equal to 4 to 11 years of a peasant’s labor. Black markets for hukou still existed even 
until today. Now a Beijing urban hukou costs about 150 thousand yuan for a non-Beijing urbanite with 
a master’s degree (China Newsweek, May 09, 2008). 
40
 This news reported a finding from a survey on hukou market conducted by China Youth Newspaper 
in 2008. It showed that seventy percent of buyers wanted Beijing hukou for its “access to value added 
resources”, such as health care, housing and education. 
41
 From 1993 to 2003, major cities like Beijing and Shanghai witnessed intermittent policy fluctuations 
to reforming their local hukou regimes. The local newspapers occasionally release news about relaxed 
legislations in the making. 
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applicants into its system (Wang 2005). To some extent, such selection of new citizens 
strengthened the bureaucracy. Below is a quotation from an internal handbook (Wang 
2005):  
 
“[We should] make it easier for high-quality people to relocate, but harder 
for low-quality people; easier for professionals to relocate, harder for 
general laborers; … [We should] work especially to prevent the blind 
floating of low-quality people from rural areas.” 
        
       Meanwhile, the scale of rural-urban migration soared each year, as statistics 
shows that the number of rural migrants in Shanghai has been increasing by 31% 
every year since 1988, and reached 4.98 million in 2003. 42Cities and urban residents 
develop a stereotype of “low quality” rural migrants who “shouldn’t be here”, and thus 
“a source of danger and pollution” to the host society. Rural migrants’ mobility, 
rootlessness, displayed “ruralness” and their “craze” for monetary gains appears to an 
average urban resident as a potential for criminality (Zhang 1998).  
       It was among such a hostile environment that urban administrators’ rent seeking 
on low-status rural migrants turned into a combination of arbitrary fees collection and 
violence. On April 25, 2003, South Metropolitan News reported the death of Sun 
Zhigang, a 27-year-old college graduate Sun Zhigang, who was mistaken for a 
“peasant-worker” and detained at a deportation center. Sun was detained for carrying 
no “temporary residence permit” and was beaten to death This news story caused 
public outrage on the internet. The Custody and Deportation System, established since 
1982, has gradually changed into a rent-seeking and rapacious system for urban 
administrators to target rural migrants. In May, three independent legal professionals 
submitted a petition against the Detention and Deportation System. On June 20, 2003, 
he State Council announced the abolition of this system.  
                                                 
42 Shanghai Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
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       This incident and the abolitionist efforts marked the watershed of the 
government’s attitude towards rural migrants. Since 2003, China’s media turned to a 
sympathizing tone towards their plight, from wage arrears, slave labor, to hate crimes 
committed by rural migrants due to marginalization.43 It was only since recent years 
when issues of social justice and equal rights for rural migrants entered into public 
discussions. In early 2005, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security abolished the 
existing “Interim Stipulations on Interprovincial Rural Migration” (enacted since 
1998), the institutional foundation for fee collections from rural migrants. The state 
has publicly addressed the inadequacies in social services as well as the unfairness of 
their distribution among the urban and rural. Announcements to provide rural health 
care, free compulsory education and rural minimum living stipend are yet to be 
implemented (Xinhua News, May 24, 2007). 
       In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security announced a legal review of the hukou 
system, but later decided that changes be made by local governments. However, it is 
precisely among local governments that resistance against further reform is strongest, 
because granting equal rights to rural migrants would mean much more public 
expenditures and additional funds to provide education, health care and other social 
services. Under the current system, urbanization becomes another opportunity for 
local governments to exploit the utility of hukou (see Chapter 3).  
 
                                                 
43
 In 2004, public media exposed that wage arrears for rural workers reached an astonishing total of 100 
billion yuan in the construction industry alone. The pervasive labor abuse even caused notable cases of 
“suicidal appeals” by rural migrants in several cities. In May of 2007, two breaking news about human 
trafficking of rural migrants from Henan TV News made national headlines. 400 migrant children from 
rural Henan were trafficked to Shangxi coal mines as child laborers. 32 rural migrants were trafficked to 
forced labor for 20 hours a day in a Shangxi brick kiln. All of them suffered violent physical abuse from 
beatings and fierce dogs. The issue was first noticed by the central government as early as 1998, but 
things have not changed much since. Many of these rural migrants were lured by human traffickers 
while wandering for jobs, and sold for 500 yuan. In June of 2007, BBC News reported in June the 
rescue of 550 “slave workers” and up to 1000 enslaved migrant children in Shanxi.  
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Institutional Continuity 
       Examination of the social dilemmas in China’s rural-to-urban migration naturally 
starts with a historical question: why was hukou instituted as a legal order in socialist 
China? What were the sources of its legitimacy and stability? As Cheng and Selden 
(1994) argue: 
 
“The origins of the hukou system lie embedded in the baojia system of 
population registration and mutual surveillance perfected over millennia. 
But its antecedents also lie in 20th-century techniques of social control that 
were perfected in areas under Kuomintang and Japanese rules, and in the 
communist-led revolutionary base areas. Equally important is the direct 
influence of the Soviet passbook system and the role of Soviet advisers in 
creating a social order that could be mobilized in the service of socialist 
developmental priorities. … It emerged as a critical state response to 
dilemmas inherent in China’s development strategy under conditions of 
high population density, labor surplus and capital shortage in a 
predominantly agrarian society.” 
        
       Hukou is not an invention by China’s communist leaders; nor is it entirely new to 
socialist China. It had historical roots in ancient Chinese regimes. During central 
planning, it was formally institutionalized as a major part of the planning apparatus. 
Both traditional values of state domination and communist ideology facilitated its rigid 
hold on the social structure from 1958 to 1984, giving rise to an ever-stronger system 
of state domination. The state had strong capacity to intervene into key resources such 
as labor, land and capital transfers. Interpersonal connections also depend on the 
distribution of those resources according to state-designated entitlement system (Tilly 
2007:16).  
       The use of violence was also a theme running through the institutionalization of 
hukou by the powerful yet secretive public security agents. What exactly happened to 
peasants during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution remained largely 
a mystery, as we can only piece together parcels of the story using available sources. 
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Deprivation of exit right among peasants is pointed out as being associated with the 
Great Famine by Chinese scholars (Lin 1990). Tragic movements of send-down and 
the Cultural Revolution throughout the 1960s and 1970s produced social 
consequences that again reinforced the institutional power of hukou distinction. 
        During these political processes, an urban elite class formed into an interest 
alliance. Bureaucrats, politicians and even intellectuals controlled tools for ideological 
indoctrination and for resource allocation. According to Weber, since resource scarcity 
and competition are ubiquitous, all societies have the tendency towards constructing 
such closures. He points out a historical regularity:  
 
“Usually one group of competitors takes some externally identifiable 
characteristic of another group of competitors—race, language, religion, 
local or social origin, descent, residence, etc.—as a pretext for attempting 
their exclusion. It does not matter which characteristic is chosen in the 
individual case: whatever suggests itself most easily is seized upon.” 
        
       After forming an “interest group” towards outsiders, there is a “growing tendency 
to set up some kind of association with rational regulations … a legal order that limits 
competition through formal monopolies”. Then certain public “organs” are 
institutionalized to protect the monopolistic practices with force. According to Weber, 
such is the “ever-recurring process” of how institutionalized closure is socially 
constructed and gains legitimacy. The durability of power in systems of domination is 
primarily determined by those who were involved in the enforcement of power.  
 
“A system of domination may be so completely protected, on the one hand 
by the obvious community of interests between the chief and his 
administrative staff as opposed to the subjects, on the other hand by the 
helplessness of the latter, that it can afford to drop even the pretence of 
legitimacy” (Weber 1978:214). 
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       A totalitarian regime can become so strong that the oppressed quit challenging the 
legitimacy of an imposed institution. Weber claims that the first step to lessen the 
effect of such closure in the labor market is to “prohibit the dismissal of a worker 
without the consent of the workers’ representatives.” Knowing that individuals have 
the tendency to construct closures and to monopolize interests, primary social groups 
that are organized around their own immediate interests can be seen as key “buffer” 
devices towards segmentation.  
       We need to analyze the internal structure of this regime to understand its 
complexity of centralization. Wu (1995) argues that “centralized government” and 
“centralized administration” in the pre-reform Chinese bureaucracy caused a highly 
centralized system of domination.44 Tocqueville (2002[1865]: 108-114) also analyzes 
the mixture of two layers of centralized bureaucracies as a strong “union of power.” 
       The wish to establish an omnipresent apparatus which controls all the details and 
movements of individuals’ lives, according to Tocqueville, “exceeds the power of 
man.” This system of domination subjects spontaneous movements as “defiant”, “rule-
breaking” elements that require coercion and even criminalization. Furthermore, such 
rigid social categorization tends to create “impersonal” and “legitimate” labels for 
bureaucrats to manipulate. Their activities gave rise to “increasing returns 
mechanisms” that perpetuate social distinctions.  
       Marketization inevitably challenges such rigid social distinctions, because it 
requires more economic autonomy. Economic restructuring in China transformed the 
authority relations between classes. Inflows of displaced socialist peasants into the 
cities challenged the old “public goods regime” of the socialist social contract 
                                                 
44
 Tocqueville (1865: 108) defines the two terms: “when the power which directs the former or general 
interests is concentrated in one place or in the same persons, it constitutes a centralized government. To 
concentrate in like manner into one place the direction of the latter or local interests, constitutes what 
may be termed a centralized administration.” 
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(Solinger, 1995). Hukou as a price mechanism for labor is not complimentary with 
market mechanisms. However, China’s landscape of rural-urban inequality is not 
getting clearer. Urbanization with partial market reform created both assimilating and 
segregating mechanisms for rural migrants’ integration into the urban society. The 
social distinction based on hukou continued to allocate certain resources (e.g. 
education, health, housing, etc).  
       Can China, a former socialist nation, overcome its legacies of differential 
citizenship and transform into an open system? According to North et al. (2007), this 
path is difficult because even in such a society, it has a set of mechanisms that sustain 
an equilibrium: because rule-makers in the political system are the key stakeholders, 
and they are equipped with power to tap into political, economic and ideological 
resources, these actors tend to create rents and secure elites’ loyalty to the current 
system. This is why “rent-creation through the assignment of exclusive rights and 
privileges” lies at the heart of this type of social structure (North et al. 2007). The long 
tradition of hukou stratification has accumulated into a cultural belief that individuals 
are born with differential entitlements. As Greif (1994) claims, “past cultural beliefs 
provide focal points and coordinate expectations, thereby influencing equilibrium 
selection and society’s enforcement institution 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BEHIND THE CHINA PRICE 
 
       Socialist collectivitization instituted a bifurcation of countryside and city in 
China, as members of rural and urban collectives lived and worked in mutually 
exclusive domains. Marriages between the two categories were rare throughout the 
collectivist era. As the basic institution for procurement and redistribution of food and 
necessities, hukou gradually became a status hierarchy, a system of social distinction.  
       Market transition since 1978 in China ended peasants’ serf-like ties to Maoist 
village communes (Fairbank and Goldman 1998: 414). With mass out-migration, the 
typical rural family has adopted a “one household, two systems model”, that is, some 
family members (usually women, children and the elderly) stay put while a few others 
venturing into the city for jobs. These rural migrants have powered China’s soaring 
economy—it is estimated that rural migrants have contributed to 21 percent of China’s 
GDP growth since the reform (Cai and Wang, 1999); due to their participation, 
China’s informal sector has grown by 22.2% each year (Wei, 2007). In economic 
terms, rural migrants generally experience upward mobility compared to their pre-
migration living standards. 
 
Breakdown of the Rural-Urban Closure 
       Market transition brought about multiple venues for peasants’ mobility: 
employment, marriage, and education. As social interactions increased between the 
rural and the urban, inter-marriages between the two social groups became a less rarity 
and an admired means of upward mobility. College education offered an even more 
efficient stepping stone for the better-educated peasants to “jump over the rural-urban 
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threshold” (tiao nongmen). The previously caste-like system strictly separating the 
peasantry from the working class seems to be breaking down, if not in its entirety. 
Several forum reports in 2003 show that rural migrants made 57 percent of the 
manufacturing sector, 80 percent of the construction sector, and over 50 percent of the 
service sector (CCP Forum, 2004). While the old working class—urban workers—is 
being unmade in the state sector since the massive layoffs in the mid 1990s, another 
working class is being born in the booming private economy. 
       Meanwhile, reality also presents another side of the story—to break with the 
inherited identity of “peasants” remains a formidable goal, especially under an 
incremental reform and the continued registration by hukou. Formal legislative 
barriers channeled rural migrants to unskilled jobs in industries such as manufacturing 
(25.8%), construction (19.6%), trade (13.9%), agriculture (7.3%), delivery services 
(6.9%), catering services (6.6%), and others (Shanghai Population Census 2000). Only 
3.8% were employed as skilled workers.  
       Despite increased social mobility, the “urban bias” imprinted by collective 
socialism remained strong. The social prejudice has not been resolved. This stark 
reality lies behind the China price, as over 200 million rural migrants (or “peasant 
workers”, nongmingong) continue to work as a cheap reserve army of labor who, 
despite long-term settlements in the cities, are only considered as “transients” 
unentitled to equal citizenship. 
       Previous studies on inequality in post-socialist states either probe into the 
mechanics of stratification (Bian 2008), or offer inconclusive theoretical claims 
(Walder 1986) by drawing upon large data sets on the gradational distribution of 
inequality. In this chapter, I use ethnographic fieldwork data to focus on the texture of 
inequality—What does it really mean to be a rural migrant in post-socialist China? 
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How do rural migrants actually perceive themselves and their work? How do 
workplaces become sites for the reproduction of social distinction? 
       I first bring together two opposing trends experienced by rural migrants in urban 
China —upward economic mobility, and yet concomitant structural disadvantages. I 
do not intend to offer any simplified generalizations about whether rural migrants have 
become losers or winners of China’s partial reform. Rather, by laying out the 
integrative and segregative processes they encounter as individuals in a post-socialist 
context, the goal is to present how institutional change shapes the contours of social 
inequality. By connecting their private orbits to the larger social context, I analyze 
how institutional dynamics produce these diverse trends of social mobility among this 
group, and how the system of social distinction based on rural-urban identity 
differences is remolded during this process. 
 
Market Transition and Peasants’ Upward Mobility 
       At the age of eighteen, Cheng finished junior middle school in 1993 in rural 
Anhui. But with seven siblings, Cheng’s family could not afford his education into 
senior middle school. After the family’s financial situation worsened, Cheng’s two 
elder brothers followed their father in taking up the carpentry profession in their 
village. At that time, a village carpenter made 6 yuan a day, a much admired job 
among peasants. But Cheng’s heart never settled on becoming a carpenter like his 
father and brothers. Later that year, news came that someone from outside the village 
had gone there to find workers for some factories in Shanghai. Cheng was excited, 
because it sounded like an opportunity to escape from his aimless life at that point, and 
to “see the world” for himself. His restlessness turned into fresh hope. But it took a 
teenager some courage to actually come out of the village that was still bound by the 
stigma of leaving the farmland: 
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“Very few people from my village had even seen the city by 1993. When I 
was in school, I remembered hearing people talking about someone who 
had gone to Shenzhen or Guangzhou, to ‘dagong’ (work informally under a 
boss). But when they mentioned the word ‘dagong’, they said it with much 
contempt. To the villagers, it almost meant that person was so poor that his 
family did not even have any food to survive. So ‘dagong’ was a shameful 
thing in our village, almost like… begging. Although there were people 
who came back from Shenzhen or Guangzhou without a lot of money, the 
older people in our village still thought of it as ‘loosing face’. At that time, 
the best job a young man could get, was a formal job though good 
connections.” (Cheng, male, age 34, from rural Anhui) 
       
        To Cheng’s fellow country folks, “leaving the village” meant going on an 
unknown journey, to an unknown territory—the city, with no one except oneself to 
rely on. And it was a terrifying idea to many of them who were still holding onto the 
“security” and stability in socialist communes where everybody was “taken care of” 
by the collective. In these peasants’ minds, to make a living with just one’s two hands 
and no connections was simply unthinkable, risky, and very likely to end up in 
begging.  
       Cheng did not paint such a picture in his mind. Like many junior middle graduates 
of his age, Cheng barely had any knowledge about farming, although their parents 
toiled on the soil all their life. Nor did he have much emotional attachments to the land 
like his parents. From some homecoming migrants who went into the cities in as early 
as the late 1970s, Cheng heard about the “exotic” urban way of life, and it appealed to 
him as a more fulfilling world. So Cheng made a decisive step forward.  
       He followed the contact person, and entered into a shoe-manufacturing joint 
venture in Shanghai. It was in the early 1990s. The pay was 60 yuan a month, about 
ten times the wage for a carpenter in his village. His job was mainly to attend the 
boiler room, and it was entrusted to him as “a very special position that guarantees 
recognition from the leaders”. It certainly involved some techniques of operation and 
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potential danger, but most of the time, he just needed to keep an eye on the 
barometers. He now jokes about that job, “I worked as a meter-watcher for five years, 
and all I did was watching the boiler thermometers!” In these five years, his wage 
increased to around 450 a month. Meanwhile, Cheng felt his ambitious heart grow 
restless again. 
       Cheng’s good work attitude and agreeable personality won him many local 
friends. In 1998, his native Shanghai friend introduced him into a computer hardware 
store, working as a salesperson for 700 a month. The IT industry was just burgeoning 
in China. This job was an eye-opener for Cheng about the market. Since then, Cheng 
started his job-hopping journey. After seven months in his first job, he changed to 
another IT company for a monthly 1200 yuan package. There he learned about how to 
run this business, so six months later, he quit and started his own hardware retail 
business. However, his first entrepreneurial effort did not last for too long before 
Cheng found himself in huge risk of losing revenues: 
 
“I thought it was easy to make money by just buying low and selling high. 
I did make a lot of money for the first two months, mostly from my old 
clients. But after I used up my contacts, business became very hard. 
Besides, the market was becoming more and more saturated…” (Cheng, 
male, age 34, from rural Anhui) 
        
       Around 2002, Cheng got married and started to settle for more “practical” life. He 
had then become an experienced trader, but self-employment posed higher risk than 
other regular jobs. Eventually he settled with a stable job in a foreign trade company. 
The pay was only around 1000 yuan, but Cheng’s boss was open-minded enough to 
allow non-natives into the managerial level. Cheng was soon promoted to manager 
position. 
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       So far, Cheng’s experiences show that the opening up of market opportunities did 
incorporate rural migrants into private businesses. The importance of human capital 
accumulation and networks is affirmed too. Through hard work and network building, 
Cheng secured a career for himself. However, Cheng’s mobility path came to a major 
hurdle when his daughter becomes old enough for school in the city. “This is now my 
biggest headache,” says now 34-year-old Cheng. If his previous 16 years of 
entrepreneurial experiences have brought some possibilities, the education issue for 
his daughter now only brings to him a hard “ceiling”: 
 
“Although [the city government] they’ve abandoned the ‘temporary 
residence permit system’, and allow anyone with a ‘residence permit’ to 
send his child to public schools, it worked differently in real life. I do have 
a ‘residence permit’ now, which my company applied for me. It is the 
‘work type’, starting with ‘cw05’ in the serial number, but the education 
bureau asks for a ‘talent type’ residence permit (headed with ‘cw09’). I 
called different government departments, but every one of them just kicked 
the ball around. The policy does not apply to us! Although it is repeated 
again and again in the news that anyone with a residence permit for over a 
year could send the child to a public school, it’s not true in reality!” 
(Cheng, male, age 34, from rural Anhui) 
       
       Since June of 2002, Shanghai changed its “temporary residence permit” system 
into a new “residence permit” system with three main categories: “skilled/talent” 
(rencai lei), “work” (congye lei), and “dependent” (toukao lei).45 It does differ from 
the old “temporary residence permit” in two ways: it’s cheaper and voluntary. But 
when it is applied to the real life of rural migrants, it’s a mere name-change. 
                                                 
45
 In spring of 2009, Shanghai released a public policy to relax its residency application, but only to the 
“talent” category of incoming migrants based on education, income and taxes paid in Shanghai. It 
implies the continuation of the city’s long-held strategy in handpicking those who make greater 
“contributions” to its economy. According to Shanghai’s new policy, non-locals need to have held a 
permanent Shanghai residence permit and lived in the city for seven years before they qualify for a 
Shanghai hukou. In addition, they must also abide by local rules, such as paying social insurance fees 
and taxes on time, and with no criminal record. The city government openly claimed that this policy 
aims to give priority to scholars and talents (Caijing, 2009).  
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Compared with the overt forms of hukou discrimination before, the current system has 
become more discrete in categorization—Rural migrants now can obtain a “residence 
permit” (juzhu zheng), but a small serial number makes all the difference.  
       The creation of official categorization for policy implementation and census 
purposes are prone to institutionalize discrimination. Once created, these 
classifications become impersonal labels indicating different entitlements to those who 
use them. The political institutionalization of race in the United States serves an 
example of how institutions confer identities that composes a powerful force between 
different status groups. In the Chinese context, the hereditary nature of this type of 
identity makes certain disadvantages (e.g. lack of quality education) more structurally 
imprinted.  
       Cheng is determined to get a quality education for his daughter. He used personal 
connections and paid extra fees to get his daughter into an elite school for children in a 
nearby state-owned enterprise. But there are long-term worries. With the current 
policies unchanged, there is very slim chance that Cheng’s daughter will get into a 
good elementary school. A smooth transition into Shanghai’s middle school is even 
more unlikely. The education system still highly discriminates on the basis of hukou 
registration. This means that the child needs to return to rural Anhui for the key-point 
exams, a place she never lived in. Cheng sees his family and his career “stuck” with 
this ceiling: 
 
“Whenever I think about this, I felt trapped. Once she starts primary school 
here, she’ll someday need to return to our rural hometown, and you could 
imagine what kind of adjustment that would be to a little girl. I am fine 
with spending more money to get her into public primary school here, 
money is not the issue, but in the future, every money cannot buy her a 
chance to take the exams. … I felt worried, but there’s nothing I could do. 
We’ll just wait until things change by that day.” (Cheng, male, age 34, 
from rural Anhui) 
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       Whenever Cheng conveys a pessimistic attitude about future changes in the urban 
residence regime, he tends to rationalize it as “understandable.” He expresses an 
understanding of the difficulties with the system and comments, “if everyone could 
come to Shanghai and settle down, what would the city become?” This rationale is 
very in line with the official rhetoric in the Chinese media whenever it comes to the 
problem of checking immigration. To Cheng and many other migrants, the delayed 
adjustment of these policies is “understandable” because the rural-urban disparity just 
seems too large to be mended overnight for a populous country like China. Now 
Cheng’s future career depends on where his daughter could go to a quality school. “It 
is possible that I might return to Anhui and do some business there. At least that way 
our family can stay together. It’s all for our daughter.”  
       Cheng’s life trajectory is typical among rural migrants who ventured into private 
entrepreneurship. After the reform, private businesses were no longer penalized as 
“the tail of capitalism” (ziben zhuyi weiba). Millions of rural migrants switched into 
non-farming jobs, first from villages to small townships, then into small cities, then 
into large cities. Their job choices also follow an upward trend, from handicrafts or 
low-skill work like domestic services, to skilled jobs such as trade or factory blue-
collar work. Cheng was lucky to be among the few who managed to get into the 
cutting-edge IT industry and international trade. His wage also “climbed up” year after 
year. They are witnesses to the gradual openness of China’s economy to include the 
rural surplus labor. On the other hand, however, their pursuit for equal citizenship has 
not yet fulfilled.  
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Towards “City-zenship”: A Grassroots Rebel 
       In 1982, sixteen-year-old Mei, an early rebel among her peers, was among the 
first wave of peasant girls who worked as live-in maids for rich urban households. 
Although there has been a scarcity of statistical research on rural-urban migration 
between 1978 and 1983, interview data show that spontaneous out-migration was 
present at small scale. The pioneering rural migrants were vegetable-sellers from 
Shandong, domestic maids from Anhui, and cooks from Sichuan. Mei recalls her 
motivation to leave the soil: 
 
“At that time we were just village girls, totally ignorant of what was going 
on outside, … I mean… the reform. That year the Household 
Responsibility System had not yet taken place at our village. We had to 
earn ‘work points’, and because I was too frail I could only make 3 points 
per day.46 I felt so ashamed and … I so wanted to go to the city, and … [I 
was] willing to take any kind of job as long as I didn’t have to work in the 
field any more. But back then there was almost no mobility, and peasants 
were tied to their lands. I did not have any clue about how to leave our 
village, even to the nearest town. … Then I heard someone come to our 
village in looking for housemaids (baomu)47.”   (Mei, female, age 42, from 
rural Hebei) 
      
       In the early 1980s, the official language used “mangliu” (blind floaters) to refer to 
“illegal” peasant migrants like Mei. This term first appeared in the “Communist 
Party’s Directives on Forbidding Labor Flows from Rural Areas” in 1959,48 referring 
                                                 
46
 Under the commune system, peasants were not paid with wages, but were organized into production 
teams with each member being assigned certain “work points”. A work point measures the work hours 
and efficiency of a peasant. But in real calculation, work points were not perfectly related to efforts, 
because it was not feasible to continually monitor one’s work (McMillan, 1996). 
47
 The early 80s witnessed the appearance of housemaids as a new profession in China. These are young 
girls, mostly rural, who keep the house and serve as day care for the elderly and children in urban 
families.  
48
 Official document on Feb 4, 1959, with quotations as “In the past two to three months, peasants’ 
blindly floating (mainly into cities) has become a serious social phenomenon. … With spring farming 
time arriving, if peasants continue to flow out blindly, this will certainly hinder agricultural and 
industrial production. And it will harm the consolidation of the People’s Commune, and leave loopholes 
for enemies to become active. On Jan 5, the Party has notified all enterprises and departments to stop 
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to the outflow of paperless peasants into cities as illegal activities against party 
policies. From the 80s, the term “mangliu” became widely used in public media when 
referring to rural migrants, with a strong derogatory connotation.49 To socialist 
legislators and administrators, uncontrolled population mobility represents disorder 
and a potential threat to political stability. Lu (2004) argues that this view was so 
widely held in the 1980s and 1990s that it became a legal culture which takes any 
spontaneous individual action as irrational or even criminal in its potential to “disturb 
social stability”. Actually, even today, “mangliu” is still a vocabulary occasionally 
used by local administrators. Mei recalls the widespread discrimination at her time of 
arrival in the city: 
 
“You see, nowadays it is very normal and acceptable for rural people to 
move into cities for jobs. But at the very beginning, in early 80s, you are 
considered as mangliu who should be sent back. Many government 
departments in the cities were constantly saying … “Get them back! Let 
them go back!… ” [At that time] you always heard such things. [For 
migrants themselves] nobody knew how long they could stay, one day, two 
days... Another things is, [even if you were able to stay] you could not say 
it was because you did not like staying in the rural villages. That would 
have been considered a shame on you. You just could not say that, as if that 
was something “illegal”… They thought rural people should return, sooner 
or later. Otherwise you would be condemned. … There is always someone 
looking at you as suspicious, about what are you doing here…”  (Mei, 
female, age 42, from rural Hebei)  
      
       Mei’s job as a live-in maid for a high-rank party official earned her opportunities 
to learn English. Three years later she earned a diploma from an academic institute, 
and her employer referred her into a cleaning job for the university press. She 
befriended a colleague in the same work unit who later became her husband. Mei did 
                                                                                                                                            
recruiting in-flowing peasants into cities.” (Central Commands on Forbidding Rural Labor Mobility, in 
1959) 
49
 The word conveys two layers of negative connotations. Firstly, its meaning “blind floaters” label 
rural migrants as an aimless, disorganized troupe. Secondly, the sound of this word reminds people of 
the Chinese term for  “sexual delinquents” (liumang).  
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not intentionally look for this type of upward mobility through marriage, instead, she 
stubbornly refused to be considered as some average village girl who just wanted to 
marry a city guy. Her future in-laws appreciate this genuine integrity in her, but they 
showed great concern for their future family in the future, because Mei’s child, by law, 
inherits her rural hukou status: 
 
“His parents said, ‘it is not you that we worry about, it is your hukou!’ 
They were simply worried that if we get married, our child would then 
have to inherit my Hukou status as a Hebei rural50. I felt so … helpless at 
that time, because this was something totally beyond my own efforts—it’s 
the whole system! Unless you go to get a city Hukou [from the black 
market]… but it was illegal and strictly checked on. If you use personal 
connections to get one, that was [politically] dangerous too!” (Mei, female, 
age 42, from rural Hebei) 
      
       Before July of 1998, residence status for a newborn child must follow his/her 
mother’s. This in effect has reinforced the birthright disadvantage of the rural 
category, because even among the small percentage of intermarried couples from both 
category, women tend to marry up in terms of social status.51 For Mei, this obstacle 
presented her with a deeper insight and indignation with the system.  Since that time, 
Mei became an activist in rebelling against the system, as she said, “I felt that I was 
tired of being treated as a ‘rural’, and I don’t want my child to live like this.”  
     In 1991, Mei heard that Shenzhen city was about to reform their hukou regime to 
make it available for qualified rural migrants. Excited by the news, she determined to 
part her fiancé and find a job in Shenzhen. Before she left for Shenzhen, the couple 
                                                 
50
 For a long time, hukou regulations stipulate that children inherit the mother’s Hukou status. This was 
only changed in 1998. Now Hukou status is still inherited at birth, but one could choose the father’s or 
the mother’s Hukou. 
51
 On July 22 of 1998, the State Council passed a policy decision made by the Ministry of Public 
Security, “Suggestions on How to Solve the Key Issues in the Current Hukou Management”. It 
announced that parents can choose for the residence registration of newborn children from that day, that 
is, the child can be legally registered at the local Public Security Office of the either the father’s 
residence of registration or the mother’s. 
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got married. Mei recalled with a glow of happiness, “my husband said that way it 
would show that he did not marry me because of my hukou, hah hah…”  
     Carrying her Border Pass and 600 yuan in her pockets, Mei entered into Shenzhen, 
the booming special economic zone of China. A born optimist, she thought to herself 
that this trip won’t be worse than the earliest one she made when she was only sixteen. 
“I thought the worst job would be to start as a live-in maid again, or selling vegetables 
on the street. I could do that!” 
     Mei tried her luck in restaurants, barber shops, and all job advertisements she could 
find. After twenty days of job search, when Mei was left with the last yuan in her 
pocket, she was offered a cleaning job at a sales company. Mei took this job very 
seriously and worked very hard for two years. Her efforts and work performance paid 
off—she was promoted to a sales representative position. Not long afterwards, she 
earned the largest bill of the year for the company, and as a reward, her boss applied 
for a Shenzhen hukou for her.  
     The reward came with a price, as Mei recalled, “this Shenzhen hukou did cost me 
dearly.” Because she had to work and travel so intensely that she accidentally aborted 
her first child. A year later, Mei returned with her new Shenzhen identity to stay with 
her husband. Two years later, she transferred the Shenzhen urban hukou into Beijing 
urban hukou. The early years of her adventures left Mei with bittersweet memories: 
 
“Sometimes my friend would introduce me to others, saying, ‘this is Mei, 
one of the first rural migrants in 1982, and… she is still alive today!’ But 
you see, this comment is what life has been like to me… I felt that all these 
pains [I went through] were just for an urban hukou, and for my child. 
After I gave birth to my daughter, I felt so relieved that my mission was 
completed. I have brought her to the same starting line with urban kids. I 
don’t owe her now.”      (Mei, female, age 42, from rural Hebei) 
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      To millions of rural Chinese citizens like Mei, “urban citizenship” comes with a 
high price. For some, it even took a lifetime to pay up this price. Mei sees her own 
experience as “very lucky indeed”. The struggles and experiences made her more 
conscious of social injustice, and she remained an activist for rural migrant women in 
China until today. 
 
Marry for the Better 
     The eldest of three siblings in a poor Sichuan rural family, Xiang “tasted 
bitterness” (a Chinese phrase referring to experiencing life’s hardships) much earlier 
than most of her peers. After second grade of junior middle school, Xiang decided to 
quit in order to help the family save up money for her youngest brother to go to 
college in the future. To supplement family income, Xiang’s father became one of the 
first migrants who left inner Sichuan for the more prosperous east coast. Xiang 
followed her father. It was 1989. 
      Xiang’s father had worked at construction sites for over 15 years since then, and 
she entered into a toy factory. She remembered the language difficulties and her 
shyness when starting the job. The earliest toy factories in east coast already installed 
rigid work routines and dormitory disciplines. “I grew used to the rural pace of life, 
you know, just working on some house chores and play around with other village 
girls, hehe…” Xiang giggled, “So life at the factory was a big change for me.”  
     The girl tried to adjust to industrial working environment, but her first job only 
lasted for six months before she felt hopelessly homesick. Xiang returned home for a 
year. When her younger sister also finished junior middle school, more and more 
young people joined the flux. They both worked in a few toy factories for over seven 
years.  
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      Like in most factories, young rural girls aged from 18 to 20 are highly favored by 
employers. They have nimble fingers to work on details, and more importantly, they 
easily comply to the rules. The job required workers to start assembling from six in the 
morning to ten at night, seven days a week, with one day off per month. Workers are 
paid by piece rate, and no overwork compensation is offered. Xiang recalls the first 
toy-making job: 
 
“I was only seventeen that year, too young to feel tired, I guess. The pay 
was three hundred a month, but it was considered as good at that time. All 
the workers were migrants. There were different job categories, but all 
were tiring and long hours.” 
        
       The several factories Xiang worked for are adjacent to each other. Many Shanghai 
people find employment there too. They are suburban Shanghai residents whose 
village land has been appropriated for industrial usages. Most of these local workers 
hold rural Shanghai hukou. It is considered as a category which is inferior to urban 
Shanghai hukou, but still much better than rural hukou from other provinces. Factories 
in this township of Shanghai are required by the city government to recruit a certain 
quota of local workers as a re-employment welfare plan.  
      When Xiang reached twenty-four, a friend introduced her to a Shanghai local 
young man who later became her husband. In this township, inter-marriages between 
“dagong mei” (migrant girls) and Shanghai local men are not rare. According to the 
law, it will take four years for Xiang to be issued a Shanghai rural hukou after their 
marriage. “I got it three years ago, just in time for my daughter to be enrolled into a 
public school.” Xiang adds. 
       With urban renewal and expansion, more and more arable lands there have been 
appropriated for non-farming usages. Now most factories only hire local workers, in 
order to fulfill the directives from the city governments. Rural migrants face greater 
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difficulty in getting into factory jobs. So a number of informal workshops appeared to 
hire migrant labor as seamstresses. Large factories out-source some work to these 
workshops at even lower prices. 
        Still living among her Sichuan relatives, Xiang now enjoy a complete welfare 
package besides a regular working schedule from nine to five. Just two years ago, her 
youngest brother, with whom the family has laid most of their expectations, had 
enrolled in one of Shanghai’s most prestigious universities. Xiang says proudly, “We 
just hope that after graduation, he can find a good job and become the first city person 
in our family.” 
 
A “Temporary” Danwei Man 
       When I first interviewed Qin (40), he has been working at H district’s Engineering 
Inspection Bureau (EIB), a public danwei (workunit), for over eleven years. Despite 
this high seniority among his colleagues, Qin has been referred to as the “temporary 
staff.” Being one of the two rural-status workers in this danwei, Qin belongs to the 
tiny fraction of rural migrants working in professional career tracks. 
       Wearing a blue technician uniform in his own office, Qin appears an experienced 
technician. When asked about how he likes this job, Qin says contently, “Now I have 
freed myself from manual jobs, so that counts as an improvement.” His routine job 
only requires technical inspections of ongoing construction projects in district H. To 
Qin, a promotion unto formal status for him sounds untenable—“it is already such a 
privilege to work here!” Working as a member of this formal danwei is already a 
dream job for him. 
       Growing up as a country boy, Qin never saw the city until he reached the age of 
twenty-four. He came with some relatives to work as construction workers in eastern 
Shanghai. He started the job in 1992, and for over five years Qin worked for twelve 
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hours a day, seven days a week. His brother Yuan later entered a prestigious university 
in Shanghai, and Qin supported his tuition expenses. By 1995, Yuan was about to 
graduate with academic excellence and a college degree in engineering. It was a time 
college graduates still enjoyed job allocations by the state, and engineers were highly 
desired by many research institutes. Yuan was assigned to be an engineer at EIB. After 
a year of work, Yuan turned in a request for a personal assistant, which created a 
temporary position there for his brother. That was how Qin first got this job. He later 
turned out a good fit for the tasks assigned to him, so this temporary worker stayed for 
the next eleven years. 
       Despite his seniority, Qin’s rural hukou status made him unqualified to be listed as 
formal personnel according to the legal regulations. So now Qin enjoys a much lower 
stipend on top of a minimum wage (840 yuan in 2007). With his wife working at a 
wool factory, the couple now makes around 3000 yuan per month, an upper-middle 
level income among rural migrant families in Shanghai. Qin kept telling me, “It’s so 
much better than when we first came to Shanghai.”  
       A decent job, a stable income and a stay-together family are probably the dream 
for many rural migrants. Qin seems to have it all, but life still has its frustrations. A 
major worry is his son’s education. To my surprise, the 15-year-old boy is still in Fifth 
Grade (normally students in this grade are 11 or 12 years old). Qin explains, “As the 
[migrant] schools he entered either moved or closed down, we transferred him several 
times. Every time the new school just required him to re-take first grade. So he has 
taken first-grade classes for three times.”  
       Like most rural migrant families, Qin is also greatly worried about where to send 
his son for secondary education. “If he has to return for middle school, then my wife 
probably will go back with him. I’ll stay here by myself. But I think I’ll return home 
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sooner or later.” Qin wishes to save around 100 thousand yuan to start up a small 
business at home, maybe a chicken farm, or a farming machine rental shop.  
       Qin’s future plans remind me of Cheng. Both entrepreneurial individuals from 
humble rural backgrounds who later, through their own diligence and luck, “made it” 
in the city. They both foresaw some type of invisible walls that will at some point 
bounce them back to their roots. Many migrants like them have returned and started 
small businesses in the towns near their native villages. Opportunities abound there 
too, they say. After all, this world is growing more globalized, and so is China.   
 
Migration as Entrepreneurship 
     Cheng, Mei and Qin are migrant-turned-entrepreneurs who, out of their own 
endeavor and luck, have circumvented the disadvantages attached to their inherited 
status as “peasant workers.” China’s booming economy offers plenty of opportunities 
for many rural migrants like them to carve out a niche in urban survival. As Cheng 
once remarked, “If one is not lazy or too stupid, this city is big enough to offer many 
opportunities for him to make some money.” If they enter into an industry that is less 
rigidly bound by hukou legislations, they can be lucky enough for promotion into the 
managerial stratum. This class of upwardly mobile migrants stands out as exemplar 
witnesses of the economic boom, attracting millions more peasants to follow their 
footsteps.  
       The nature of partial reform determines that China’s economic structures are still 
bounded by rules and legacies inherited from its old redistributive framework (Nee 
1991). This “structural imbalance” explains the conflicting patterns of both upward 
social mobility and relative deprivation among out-migrating peasants. Like other 
excluded immigrant groups around the world, they struggle through some 
institutionalized closures that are hard to penetrate all at once.  
 88 
       Despite these structural difficulties, self-made migrant businesses flourished, 
gradually forming into some sizable informal economic enclaves. Many self-organized 
small-scale operations are based on shared native origins, such as in garment-
manufacturing (Zhejiang), restaurants (Hunan, Sichuan), renovation (Anhui), 
recycling (Henan), doorstep delivery (Jiangsu), etc. For almost three decades, the 
growing “grey zone” of China’s informal economy has offered opportunities for 
migrant entrepreneurship and buffer for migrants’ survival. But over time, with 
blocked upward mobility for the younger migrants, they cannot escape the fate of 
continued marginalization, and vulnerabilities against economic downturns.  
 
The Reality of Just-Getting-By in the City 
Dagong in the Informal Economy 
     Even nowadays, the Chinese still greet first-time acquaintances with the question 
“where is your danwei (work unit)?” which simply means, “where do you work?” 
Although the socialist danwei system is no longer in existence today, to an urban 
resident, he would still answer this question accordingly. But when I addressed the 
same question to a rural migrant, the typical answer is, “I don’t have a danwei. I came 
to dagong (i.e. work for a boss).”  
      To them, dagong and danwei obviously are not interchangeable terms. When rural 
migrants themselves refer to their work in the city, the word “dagong” is used most 
frequently. It literally means working “informally” or “irregularly” for a boss. It is a 
state of work which differs from being affiliated with any work unit, entailing 
irregular work, unregistered status high job mobility, income insecurity, residential 
instability and, most of the time, hard manual labor. 
       Rural migrants set up a categorical contrast between “dagong” jobs from “doing 
business” (zuo shengyi, meaning private entrepreneurship). The latter is much desired 
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because it promises “being the boss of one’s own and enjoying more freedom,” as 
most of my informants explained. 33-year-old Wang, a former rural teacher, took up 
various “dagong” jobs in factories, shops, and restaurants during her ten years of 
living experiences in Beijing. Even as a migrant school teacher now, she sees the job 
as another form of “dagong”:  
 
“Dagong for someone else gives you little respect. I feel I’ve always been 
ordered around to do this and that. I’ve never gotten used to that… It’s 
even different from teaching in our rural village. There I worked for the 
Party’s course. But here, I work for some boss. It just doesn’t feel right…”  
       
       In Wang’s case, dagong for “some boss” even delivers “capitalist” connotations 
for a rural Chinese who remain clinging unto a political consciousness in the socialist 
era. In the pursuit for economic gains in the urban society at large, many rural 
migrants Wang feel at loss when relationships and careers are often commoditified in 
pure materialistic terms.  
       Rural migrants’ desire for economic autonomy through self-employment is driven 
by not only such ideological nostalgia and network over-reliance, but also by blocked 
opportunities and lack of cultural identification in the city. Take rural migrants from 
Henan for example. The widespread social prejudice against Henan migrants who are 
depicted as lazy and prone-to-theft has contributed to the group’s overrepresentation in 
the line of recycling. In suburban Beijing, many Henan villages have been turned into 
“trash villages.” There are clusters of recyclers who came from the same rural locality, 
such as Gu Shi in Henan province. Many other small businesses (such as street 
vending, repair, restaurant, and shops) are started up to serve in-group needs in 
migrant-concentrated neighborhoods. They offer affordable foods or grocery items at 
cheaper prices than other places. My friends and I always enjoyed spending only 16 
yuan on three nice dishes at a small Sichuan diner inside a rural migrant community, 
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which may be priced to over 60 yuan in another main street Sichuan restaurant. These 
businesses also attracted many students from nearby college campuses and low-
income urban workers from adjacent factories. 
       The opening up of these job opportunities are also closely linked with the public 
policy changes in the city. Take street vending for example. It was not until 2006 
when the Shanghai government issued policies endorsing “informal employment” (fei 
zhenggui jiuye) in its economy. Before then, street vendors led a “guerrilla” lifestyle. 
Conflicts between street venders and urban administrators (chengguan) abound in 
major cities. After the city government of Shanghai relaxed its “street code” against 
street vending in 2006, although haphazard confiscations still occasionally happen, 
street vendors are now more at peace. Some street committees (the urban grassroots-
level government organ) even actively rebuild and rent out spaces for migrant 
businesses in their neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Regional Diners Opened by Migrants 
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       In some other places, small businesses are less protected, and the presence of 
public authorities is more visible and dominating. There grassroots administrators only 
“loosely” play into facilitating market activities, so “unlicensed” migrant businesses 
are still viewed with suspicion. Registration is still used to as the tool for governance. 
Many small business owners enter into a dilemma like Zeng’s: 
 
“You see, this is something I don’t understand. I wanted to apply for a 
license. Those people from the Bureau of Industry and Commerce 
(gongshang ju) would come to check on us from time to time, whenever 
they have an order to do so from the top, I guess. I told them that I am just 
running a very small business here. I am not involved in other things. But 
they still check on you, this and that, very strict. They required a license, so 
I went to apply for one. But they turned down my application, because they 
say my shop is too small and informal. You see, here is the problem: They 
say my shop is illegal because I don’t have a license, but they wouldn’t 
give [issue] me a license!” (Shan, male, age 40, grocery shop owner, from 
rural Anhui) 
        
Figure 3-2. A Self-made Marketplace 
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       For some migrant entrepreneurs who are able to venture into more formal 
markets, they are faced with high rental prices, minimum earnings requirements and 
wishful collection of fees with all types of names. In some neighborhoods, street 
committees collude with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce in creating formidable 
rules for open rent seeking, as recalled by Zeng, the owner of a repair and locksmith 
shop: 
 
“I paid less than a hundred yuan for my first repair stand. In 1994, rent 
increased to over two hundred, then last year to over six hundred, including 
“market management fee” and tax. They [administrators] turned this 
market to a developer after some renovation, so now rent for this six square 
meters space is 1500 yuan per month. Now I have to open from 7am to 
7pm, working very long hours to pay the rent and market management 
fee… They shouldn’t be charging so much… We were asked to reach a 
minimum income of 3000 yuan per month, in order to stay in this market! 
So life is more intense than before. [In order to stay in this market] now we 
have to make a minimum of 3000 yuan a month. There’s good time and 
bad time [for business]. Sometimes we cannot even afford the rent. The 
central government has been saying that rural migrants are an under-
privileged group, so we should be given 20% off the management fee. But 
in reality, they still charge the same. All they did was that they just 
changed the name [of fee collection], and the amount is growing even 
higher now.” (Zeng, male, age 53, from rural Jiangsu, locksmith) 
      
       In the vocabulary of rural migrants, there is no “unemployment” to speak of. One 
either finds some casual work to do for today, or none. The latter is not considered as 
an unusual thing to happen either. This is because, to them, most accessible jobs are 
already outside the formal employment category. Jobs in certain formal danwei are out 
of their reach, because those spots are reserved for urban residents, according to the 
long socialist tradition. Although things have changed, they still hold unto a type of 
undeserving mindset in the way they evaluate career choices. So the most typical jobs 
held by rural migrants include those shunned by urban residents: construction, 
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suburban factory jobs, domestic service, security guards, and restaurants. Every sector 
has its distinctiveness in terms of economic opportunities and structural hurdles.    
 
Builders of the City 
     A male rural migrant, when he comes to the city, most likely ends up with a 
construction job. It is considered as the “entry level” job for most male newcomers. 
Almost all the males I interviewed had taken up construction jobs at some points in 
their city life, but very few stick to this job for too long. Construction is hard 
backbreaking work, and most construction workers are required to work seven days a 
week, over twelve hours a day. The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
recently announced that, according to the Fifth PRC Population Census, over 80 
percent of workers in the construction sector are rural migrants (ACFTU News, Jan 12, 
2010).  
     Liu, a 40-year-old man from rural Anhui, had worked on Shanghai’s arising new 
Pudong area since 1992, which left him proud memories as a contributor to a page-
turning moment for the new Shanghai. He first followed his relatives to the city, and 
started as a casual laborer at the construction team. The pay was low (6.5 yuan per 
piece, and each piece took about 8 hours), but Liu enjoyed learning the machine 
manuals when he was off shift. Liu worked and learned machine operation there for a 
year, then he decided that his body could not take it any more. Seeing a co-worker 
badly injured by the machine and then dismissed with some compensation, Liu 
determined to leave for other safer jobs.  
     Migrant workers like Liu have experienced and contributed to a world-class 
project—China’s unrivaled urbanization since the 1990s. From year 1992 to 1994, 
Shanghai’s new Pudong area, for example, have attracted growing foreign investment 
growing from $3.5 billion to $10 billion in just two years, pumping up the “largest 
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construction project the planet has ever seen” (Wall Street Journal, December 10, 
1993). Shanghai government started opening up Pudong New District for investment, 
so infrastructure projects including subway systems, highway and the international 
airport were being constructed52. The city becomes a gigantic magnet attracting 
hopeful rural migrants from neighboring provinces, especially Anhui. As a result, the 
number of migrants employed in the construction industry tripled around 199353.  
     Construction workers are a highly homogeneous group, mostly prime-age males, 
less educated, single or without dependents, living in over-packed and poorly 
renovated temporary dorms on construction sites. They are often recruited by “migrant 
contractors” (bao gongtou), who have worked in the cities long enough to have 
accumulated wider personal connections. This industry has become the most notorious 
industry for abusing rural migrant workers. First, very few rural migrants actually 
establish protected labor contract with employers.54 Secondly, the organizational 
structure overseeing a construction project is often so complicated that it’s beyond a 
rural migrant’s knowledge to address the due responsibilities. Over-reliance on native-
place networks surrender rural migrants to the willful manipulation of contractors they 
trust.  
       Due to these causes, wage arrears have been happening at an amazingly high 
rate—statistics from the Ministry of Construction show that in 2003, the construction 
industry alone has owed rural migrants 3.2 million Yuan in total (roughly 0.4 million 
                                                 
52
 From “Pudong Development Plan in 1990”, in which the State Council allowed Shanghai to invest in 
infrastructure-building in Pudong and granted the city government 10 preferential policies and 6 capital 
investment plans. But it was in 1992 when Deng’s remarks of “big changes in 3 years” sped up the city 
planning and expansion of Shanghai (From Shanghai General History 2005, p1624-1626) 
53
 But in 1996, Shanghai government started clearing up rural migrants again because of difficulties in 
the urban labor market. 
54
 A 2007 survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Tsinghua University 
shows that of the rural migrants working in construction sampled (N=5000) in a few major cities 
(Tianjin, Shanghai, Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and Chongqing), 53 percent did not sign any kind of labor 
contract, and only 17 percent of workers with contract understood their content. 
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USD). Considering the low level of wage these migrants usually get, one could 
imagine the scale of such labor abuse must be strikingly large. 
     In the spring of 2003, the public media in China engaged unusual attention in 
reporting the plight of migrant workers in this sector. Wage delays and arrears peaked 
in that year, causing widespread discontent and climatic cases of “suicidal appeals” by 
rural migrants. 55 Actually the situation became so serious that the new leadership put 
this issue on top of the agenda in the government report at the Annual Meeting of the 
People’s Congress in 2004. 
        The informal nature of construction jobs increased rural migrants’ vulnerability 
to external changes, making them a readily dismissible troupe in time of political 
sensitivity. The presence of more than six million rural migrants in Beijing before the 
Olympics became very sensitive during my fieldwork. On Sept 14 of 2008, the city’s 
Olympic Legislation and Coordination Committee publicized measures to regulate the 
rural migrant population by “encouraging” them to return home. Construction 
companies were urged to lay off migrant workers. Although this was released the next 
day on the People’s Congress news update, many officials denied the enactment of 
this policy two weeks later when inquired by foreign reporters. The city’s new policies 
also require incoming rural migrants to obtain county-level and above certificates for 
finding jobs in Beijing. Most of the builders of Bird’s Nest stadium and other Olympic 
venues had to disappear during the clean-up campaign before the Games. My field 
trips in July and October confirmed the reality of mass return migration due to closed 
down construction projects and migrant schools within Fifth ring Beijing.  
                                                 
55
 According to estimates from the state-affiliated All-China Free Trade Union (ACFTU), wage arrears 
for rural migrants in year 2004 reached a total of 100 billion yuan. Legislative costs for claiming back 
this amount is estimated to be close to 300 billion yuan in total. And it usually takes one 15 to 25 days 
to file one claim of this sort. 
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     With China’s real estate market booming, needs for manual labor have been 
increasing in construction and renovation. Renovation jobs are often taken by 
experienced migrant workers from contractor positions. Usually six or seven veteran 
migrant workers can form a renovation team. They sometimes find work through 
personal networks, or simply wait in the informal renovation marketplace for clients to 
find them.  
     Before starting his own renovation team, 35-year-old Sun had worked at a brick 
factory in Beijing, and then took up a painting job at a hardware factory in Hebei. 
Then in 2000 he came to Shanghai because his brother-in-law had worked at a 
construction site. He started as a “xiaogong” (minor labor), then became an apprentice 
for a boss in renovation. He learned to mend the bathroom facilities. A year later, he 
started his own renovation team.  
       Trust and network building are two important components for success in this 
industry. Even among rural migrants in this sector, they have split into smaller 
locality-based networks with different occupational prestige for trustworthiness. 
Although the majority of jobs are taken by Anhui natives, they have developed a low 
trustworthiness among urban clients. Sun, a Sichuan native, easily wins the favor of 
many, to an extent that he does not need to look for projects. His old clients would 
infer future contacts for him.  
 
“Some Shanghai people do not trust Anhui workers. They think Anhui 
people like to steal. … Sichuan people mostly work in construction. Not 
many are doing renovation. … So I don’t need to look for work. I have 
many friends, so they look for me whenever there’s work they know. I 
think it’s because I am not like other people [renovators]. Most of them are 
sly and hard to trust. But I take business for business, for the past ten years. 
I don’t take advantages of others, just rely on my skills.” (Sun, male, age 
35, from rural Sichuan) 
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       The “market” price for an experienced renovation worker is 100 yuan a day, and 
the client also provides two meals. Sun says that’s the norm in this line of business. 
The job has given Sun a very easy and comfortable life, with around 3000 to 4000 
yuan per month, and no overtime hours. 
      The fact that trust plays a sensitive role in the social structures of this sector is 
because since the entry level for renovation work is very low, so a few semi-skilled 
workers could start an informal “guerrilla renovation company” right away. Some 
low-quality teams use price competition to weed out others. Even some registered 
formal renovation companies start sub-contracting projects to “guerrilla renovation 
teams” in order to cut down on costs. Moreover, cheating on material costs is 
widespread. Some workers over-report the amount of wood or tiles that are needed, 
and hoard these extra materials for profits. These “guerrilla” renovation teams have 
formed into close collaboration with material providers in the marketplace. Often there 
is the norm to charge certain amount of kickback payments for securing a deal. These 
processes all contributed to the “chaotic” and trust-sensitive features of renovation 
industry.  
 
Manufacturing “New Industrial Workers” 
       China’s official labor union, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
released a report in Jan of 2010 that according to official statistics, the total number of 
rural migrant workers in industrial and service sectors has reached two thirds of the 
total labor force. In manufacturing sector, rural migrants take up 68 percent of the total 
labor force. They now make the main working body supporting the country’s 
industrialization, the main force of the contemporary Chinese working class. 
       After seven years of experience as a factory worker, 34-year-old Tang still cannot 
embrace the concept that she is truly one of the working class now. Tang first came to 
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Shanghai came with her husband Hui to find work to subsidize their families in rural 
Anhui. After Hui worked in a construction team for two years, he was diagnosed with 
liver disease and returned home for treatment. Tang found a factory job, the most 
common job for single girls or migrant women who work solo in the city. She moved 
into a crowded factory dorm, and started the typical life of a factory girl, working 
twelve hours a day, seven days a week.  
       Tiring as the job is, Tang sometimes think it a privilege to be a “worker” in this 
modern factory, something her mother would never have imagined. Sometimes she 
can even see some foreign visitors. The pay was 800 a month, relatively lower than 
other jobs. But since food and dorm are provided, and there is basically no time for 
going outside the factory compound, Tang never got to spend much. She saved most 
of them for her son’s tuition and her husband’s medical expenses. A year later, the 
factory was gradually running out of business. Tang and other workers started to look 
for other hourly paid jobs to fill in the workless days. Some hopped to other factories 
that were doing relatively better.  
       Factory jobs in the manufacturing industry have attracted millions of female 
migrants into the cities. Only a decade ago, rural migrants were not allowed to work in 
state and foreign enterprises. Now these factories have adopted outsourcing or 
informalized hiring strategies in order to reduce labor costs. They are not legally 
bound to provide insurance and other benefits to rural migrants. These “advantages” 
made the “China Price”. 
       Free meals and dormitories are attractive to many female migrants. Jobs like these 
seem to provide basic stability and a relatively protected environment from hazardous 
encounters in the city. But factory dorms are neither cozy havens for individual 
fulfillment, but rather highly “segregative regimes”, resembling a “mini-paternalistic 
state” (Lee 2007). The schedules and motions are highly routinized and rigidly 
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enforced. In South China, over 80 percent of assembly-line workers are female rural 
migrants who subject to this type of workplace regime. Apart from long working 
hours, workers are constantly under strict surveillance by video cameras or watchful 
managers. Their bodily gestures are tamed under specific terms of control. As Tang 
recalls, it was the factory rule that girls should not talk to one another at all except 
during lunchtime. Specific rules regarding the time for using the restrooms are also 
enforced.  
      Sometimes factory owners and managers deliberately paint an image of “insecure 
outside world” to migrant workers, bolstering the legitimacy of this manmade 
segregative regime. Although factory leaders use big slogans with “Love the Factory 
as My Home” (ai chang ru ai jia ) prints to encourage more loyalty and work 
commitment from workers. 
       To my surprise, “working overtime” often is not the cause for complaints among 
female migrant workers. Some of my informants actually prefer to enter into factories 
with “overtime work,” because that way they can earn more in a shorter time. When 
some factories have fewer orders coming in, some workers choose to quit because 
“there’s no overtime work”. 
       On their payrolls, rural migrant workers are classified into a different category 
than urban workers who are “contractual workers” (hetong gong), namely “labor 
workers” (laowu gong). These terms are intended to give certain legitimacy to their 
“equal work, unequal pay” policies.  
       At the age of thirty-two, Liu is already the father of three. He left the village at the 
age of fourteen, and worked first as a coal mine laborer, then a recycler, before a 
friend introduced him into a factory to work in the workers’ dining hall. He has since 
worked there for seven years, before this state-owned factory went bankrupt. Despite 
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his seven years of seniority at his job, Liu has stayed in the category of “labor worker” 
(laowu gong): 
 
“For the same type of work, hetong gong [contract workers] get 3000 a 
month, but we only get a bit over 1000 yuan. Besides, local workers can 
easily be promoted to leader positions. That’ll give them better benefits 
too. But we can be dismissed at any time without compensation.”   
       
       Second-generation rural migrants have grown more sensitive to the status 
inequalities than their parents’ generation. 22-year-old Lan is a second-generation 
migrant of rural Henan origin. In the early 1990s, after a big flood wiped out their 
crops, her parents packed all their belongings unto a tractor and drove a week to 
suburban Shanghai. Now Lan works in an electronics-manufacturing factory where 
she works on machines testing the quality of chips. She showed me some pictures in 
which she was dressed in a blue uniform and operated machines in a high-tech 
workplace. The job does not involve much skill, according to Lan, “just pressing 
buttons and watching over some indicators on the screen.”  
       Lan is well aware of the wage differences between local workers and migrant 
workers. Although she never lived in rural regions, not a migrant in the real sense, her 
hukou status says otherwise. Lan can operate the machine better than her urban peers, 
but in a hukou-segregated system, she is not entitled to equal benefits and promotional 
opportunities with others. Her parents were indebted to the factory for taking their 
daughter in, but to Lan, this payment policy is a stark inequality from the beginning: 
 
“Local workers enjoy three types of insurance. And their wage is twice 
higher than ours, we are paid 30 a day, they get 60, but we do the same 
work! It IS unfair. Why are we paid so much lower than them since we are 
doing the exactly same work? Not fair at all! … Actually we are the 
majority. There are only a handful of local workers here. When they have 
local workers signing a different contract, they kept it as some kind of 
secret around here. We are not allowed to know. … The only one rule in 
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our factory is, ‘You must obey commands from above’! That’s it. This 
simply left no room for you to negotiate about anything, whether it’s 
reasonable or not….”  
       
       Factories in Shanghai’s suburban districts resemble southern cities such as 
Guangdong and Shenzhen. Their assembly lines attract thousands of young girls in 
their late teens and early twenties, mostly newcomers to the city. Those who worked 
for years form into a pattern of job-hopping from one factory to another, seeking for 
better pay or better work conditions. Most of them only found out that these factories 
offer almost the same: arduous long hours, strict restrictions against talking or taking 
longer breaks in bathrooms, poor meals and overcrowded dorms.  
       It is not unusual to see graduates from some low-tiered colleges working side by 
side on the same assemble line jobs with semi-illiterate village girls who just stepped 
out of mountainous Sichuan. Manufacturing has attracted mostly single men and 
women who just graduated from secondary or higher education institutes. For young 
people from many poor rural families, failing the national college entrance exam 
simply means that they need to leave home to find jobs in the cities. Some better-off 
rural families rush to enroll their children into fourth-tier or fifth-tier private colleges 
that charge ridiculous tuitions, some amounting to 200 thousand yuan a year. But 
graduates from these low-quality colleges later proved to be uncompetitive in the labor 
market.  
 
Urban Housekeepers 
      Compared with factory jobs for women, life as a live-in domestic helper is 
considered having less workload. As early as the beginning of 1980s, live-in maids 
made the first wave of rural-urban migration into cities. Young and nimble girls from 
rural areas created a niche market and even some brand names (such as Wuwei baomu) 
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for domestic services. Later on, as this market differentiates, female migrants from 
different regions are labeled different traits and service qualities for middle-class 
urban families to choose from. These young girls, often in their late teens, cater not 
only to the daily routines of the families, but also function as a status symbol. So 
having a live-in maid to take care of household chores became a status necessity for 
many urban elite families.  
       The experiences as a live-in maid present paradoxical pictures. A strong status 
hierarchy sets up an unbridgeable chasm between the maid and her employer. But the 
maid is closely involved in the most private matters of the household, such as taking 
care of the children or elderly, and other daily chores. As Sun (2009) analyzes, the 
“intimate stranger” in the urban family “emerges as a deeply problematic figure, 
indispensable to the smooth running of the household and yet threatening her 
employer’s security and privacy.” These subtle social processes within the household 
are meaningful sites for sociological analysis using observation. My interviews only 
reflect a peak of such social interactions.  
       Tan, 32, wanted to escape from baomu jobs at her best: “This type of job is just 
not for me, … I just don’t know how to please these people…” She only had a brief 
experience as a live-in maid two years ago. Like factory jobs, maids are also under 
strict surveillance every day, but it involves more intense emotional stress. Since this 
type of employment relationships are only secured by verbal agreements, excessive 
demands from the employer frequently happen. Although many job service centers do 
function as mediating third parties between domestic workers and their clients, they 
play no larger role than matching job needs with demands in the searching process. 
Sometimes compliance to different family members’ different commands also places 
one in an awkward situation that results in emotional stress. Tang recalls her 
difficulties: 
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“That Shanghai family had too many people, three generations living 
together. The grandpa wants things to be done in his way, but the younger 
couple want it to be in their way… I did not know whom to listen to… In 
factories, you just do what’s in front of you, it’s that simple! They would 
not push you around…” 
        
       The only time of relaxation for Tan was when she spent time alone with the 5-
year-old boy of that family. He reminded her so much about her own 7-year-old son 
who is three hundred miles away in rural Anhui. Tan only got to see her son once a 
year. When she talked to her parents-in-law about the boy over the phone last week, 
they mentioned that a child from their village was found drowned. That boy’s parents 
were also off to dagong in the city. Tan grew restless at this news, and repeatedly 
warned the two elderly not to let the boy wander off after school by himself.  
       When Tan started the job, she was asked to put down a deposit of 2000 yuan. Her 
employer referred to it as a rule that everyone does things there, a mere formality. But 
to Tan, she felt that it was a sign of distrust. She paid reluctantly. After three months 
of excessive demands and stress, Tan was gradually losing her faith in working for this 
family: 
 
“I told them that I wanted to quit. At the beginning, they wouldn’t let me, 
and said that way they would not give me back my 2000 yuan of ‘deposit’. 
That was simply unfair! I was so upset, and that made me more determined 
to leave. But in the end, they did return the money to me.” 
        
       After quitting the baomu job, a relative introduced her into an electronics factory 
owned by a Hongkongese boss. Life goes back to another closed route of factory-
dormitory routines.  
       Survey results show that because of lack of legal protections, the pool of domestic 
maids in many cities is shrinking. Xinhua News report in early 2007 that in Beijing 
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alone, the market for domestic helpers have more than 100 thousand posts unfilled. 
Some urban residential areas start to organize collective searches for domestic maids 
through personal networks.  
 
Watchmen of Urban Communities 
        Having worked for seven years as a security guard for Cultural Garden, a high-
end residential community in central Shanghai, 26-year-old Hong is now promoted to 
be the “foreman” (banzhang) of 60 security guards. They take up three shifts a day in 
turn around the clock, and the main duties include registering for incoming visitors 
and checking into every corner of their assigned areas for any potential dangers. Hong 
says that the turnover is very high, because most young people leave for other jobs 
after several months. “After all, it’s a job requiring young age (qingchunfan), meaning 
that you cannot work at it forever.” 
      To rural migrants, this job exposes them to the most manifested “relative 
deprivation” in the city. In some gated luxury residential communities, they see the 
most extravagant expressions of urban consumerism and overt discrimination against 
their “ruralness”. Without any systematic legal protection for their rights, exploitation 
in the form of suppressed or withheld income tends to lead to eruptions of envy and 
hatred. Hate crimes between the gated class and the guards increased.  
       Beijing News reported a murder on Dec 9, 2007 that alerted all city dwellers of the 
hidden pathologies behind these gated communities. The convict is 23-year-old, 160 
cm tall, frail-looking Zheng, who has worked as a security guard for this residential 
area for a year. For his meager wage of 700 per month, he had to work eight hours a 
shift, sometimes overtime for another two yuan per hour. Like other young guards, 
Zheng seldom has time or money for sightseeing or recreation. Months of social 
isolation and discriminatory attitudes from the residents in this community eventually 
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led to an eruption of emotions when Zheng was humiliated and beaten by a local 
young man for the eighth time. After this event, all guards in Zheng’s team reported 
similar mistreatments and simultaneously quit their jobs. This incident exposed the life 
conditions of young migrants who work on these positions, and the prevalence of 
urban discrimination against these temporary workers. 
       Telling a less dramatic story of his experiences, 35-year-old Feng summarizes the 
eight years in a guard-dog security service company as a nightmare. He bitterly jokes 
that security guards there “were treated no better than the dogs they handle.” Feng had 
very complicated feelings for that job. As someone with a passion for reading, Feng 
liked it at the beginning because it offered him a place to settle down and a flexible 
schedule to read books. But he soon found out that the company was closely 
associated with gang activities. Their profits came not only from offering guard-dog 
security services, but also from cheating the wages of migrant workers. Every 
newcomer was asked to pay a 2000 yuan deposit, which always ended unrefunded.  
Wages are paid only once a year. Withholding workers’ personal ID cards, the 
employer turned the whole working crew into “slave laborers.” Some new workers 
could not bear with it any longer and left without asking for the deposits. Very few 
stayed long enough to earn back what they deserved to be paid, because company 
employers picked on everyone’s performance and deducted wags as they will. Eight 
years later, it took Feng four months to file a legal suit against his employer. He only 
got half of what was promised as his wage payment for these eight years. Fortunately, 
Feng earned his college degree through self-learning during this time, with which he 
hoped to find a job to use his talents.  
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Migrant Recyclers 
       Rural migrants who work as recyclers are easy to identify—he or she rides an 
empty tricycle cart with plastic ropes in it, ringing a bell when riding along the street. 
While doing this, most recyclers invent their own long, rhythmic “tunes” to remind 
familiar clients of their passing by the urban communities. A recycler often has his or 
her “territory” to keep, often a gated residential community or compound. He or she 
parks the cart at the side of the road, adjacent to the gate but not intrusively close to it. 
Some security guards may come up and inquire about him or her, if this is a new 
recycler in the neighborhood. But usually that works out all right, if the territory is not 
already taken. Residents of that community get used to the recycler’s presence 
everyday, and it takes a week for a client network to take form in that area.  
       Getting to know what it is like to be working as a recycler, or a “trash collector” 
in the more demeaning term, is not an easy task. It took me over a year to finally make 
the Zhangs comfortable talking about what they do every day. They have been 
recyclers in Shanghai for eight years. The first time I asked about what they do for 
living, they just shyly shunned it as “nothing to talk about.” 
       Later I learned more about the couple’s daily routine: after making breakfasts and 
sending their three children to school around 7:30 every morning, the Zhangs ride 
their cart along the river bank all the way to a more central district. The ride usually 
takes two hours one-way, and they collect trash and buy-in used items along the way. 
This route takes them pass an industrial zone with many gated factories, and then 
some wealthy residential compounds. They return around 1 or 2pm for lunch, then 
take a short nap at home. Another ride starts from 4pm in the afternoon, following a 
different one-hour route. Then they come back around 6pm to wait for the children 
and make dinner.  
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      The Zhangs did not work as recyclers when they first entered the city. It was in 
late 1980s and the city was Beijing. Mr. Zhang took up a job selling mushrooms by 
bike around Beijing’s maze of hutongs (lanes). He still takes pride in the fact that he 
used to know all the hugongs of Beijing. Later he worked on construction sites for a 
few more years. Although the pay was only a little above 100 yuan per month, that 
was already about one fifth of the annual income for an average rural peasant in 1989. 
In between 1989 and 1994, he returned home every year during harvest and got 
married. At home, they bore one daughter and two sons, and were heavily fined for 
violating the one-child policy. The amount of penalty for flouting the policy varies 
from region to region. But Zhang’s hometown charged peasants heavily for this. The 
incurred 20 thousand debts, about four years of income for a rural household in the 
early 90s, became the direct cause for the couple to leave for city jobs. 
       “Many people had no other choice but to leave the village to work in the cities, in 
order to pay back the debts.” Zhang explains to me. In some cases, people left the 
village with the purpose to escape such penalties from the family planning policy. 
Such practices became so common since the late 80s, that these families were once 
named as “out-of-family-plan guerillas” (chaosheng youjidui) and satirized by the 
state-controlled media.56 The word “guerrilla” conveys a highly mobile situation, 
moving from place to place in evasion of family planning officials’ inspections. 
       Like many jobs taken by rural migrants, recyclers provide a necessity service to 
urban residents, but the nature of their job gives shadow to their self-identity. Mrs. 
Zhang later explains to me: 
 
                                                 
56
 In the most popular TV show on Chinese Spring Festival eve in 1990, in a play “out-of-family-plan 
Guerrilla”, the famous Chinese comedians Huang Hong and Song Dandan played the roles of a 
“guerilla couple” who kept having more children on their migratory way from place to place, as a 
mockery of such patterns of family migration and propaganda for the implementation of the one-child 
policy. 
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“Recycling…people always say it’s not a good [decent] job, and I feel 
embarrassed to talk about it. Sometimes I use it to warn my son, ‘if you 
don’t study hard, you’ll eventually have to take up such a job and let 
people laugh at you’…”  
        
       During one of my last visits to their community one day, I found the Zhangs 
idling at home. It was the beginning of a recession, and with raw material prices 
dropping, most mobile recyclers in the cities lost their businesses. Only large-size 
recycling centers survived. The family’s income dropped to one third of a regular 
month. Mr. Zhang asked if I know the reasons and how long the downturn will last: 
 
“Before, we saw a few items’ prices dropped, but not like this time, this 
time it’s everything dropped! I heard it’s because a big listed company 
went bankrupt in the financial crisis, but I don’t understand why everything 
is now affected by that?!” 
        
       I said I also don’t know how long it will take for prices to go up again. A week 
later, recycling business has not recovered. I called and ask what their plans might be. 
Returning home was not an option to them because the three children are still in the 
middle of their academic semesters. Mrs. Zhang later found a moonlight job, as the 
cleaning lady for a night bar kitchen, from 7pm to 12pm every night. The time is 
inconvenient, but the pay is good: 1000 per month.  Mr. Zhang makes his usual ride 
every day, sometimes making 10 to 20 yuan a day. Good enough to buy some food for 
the family. In the end, they had to stay and find whatever job they could, until their 
oldest son finishes grade seven.  
 
The Disposable Mass 
       China’s official labor statistics count as unemployed only those who register for 
unemployment benefits with local governments, and are widely believed to have 
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understated the true picture, especially when the 200 million rural migrants are left out 
of most survey or census sampling frames.  
       Liu was among the refugees who made their trip to Shanghai for survival, after 
the flood in 1991 made thousands of Anhui peasants homeless. They worked and 
sometimes begged along the way. The new Pudong district was under construction, so 
many rural migrants from adjacent provinces swarmed in looking for jobs. With no 
familiar contacts to introduce them in, Liu and his fellow villagers did not get in. Not 
knowing where else to go, they decided to wait and plead with the contractor for work 
there. For a month, they turned the huge cement pipes into shelters and waited outside. 
Liu recalls it as the most miserable winter in his life.  
       Joblessness haunts not only new arrivals, but long-term settlers in the city too. 
During my 10-month fieldwork in Shanghai, two major structural changes affected 
rural migrants’ job situations most acutely. The first was the revision and enactment of 
the new Labor and Contract Law (Jan 1, 2008), which drastically changed employers 
hiring practices. The new law, from its onset, seeks to protect workers’ rights by 
enforcing real contractual relationships that employers cannot easily break from, and 
by increasing employers’ costs of haphazard dismissal of workers. It is stipulated that, 
when breaching a contractual relationship on the employer’s side, he needs to pay six 
months of wages to the worker.  
       However, this legislation was followed by the en masse layoffs before its 
enactment. Towards the end of 2007, more and more private enterprises reacted to this 
policy change by innovating ways to avoid the risks: layoffs, relocation, to create a 
separate category according to the “labor dispatchment” (laodong paiqian) policy to 
outsource.57 And lastly, because many factories don’t have the management systems 
                                                 
57
 “Labor Dispatchment” was a term invented for a separate group of temporary workers who sign 
another set of contracts and can be dismissed at any time.  
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established to operate in accordance with the new law, some simply chose 
noncompliance. 
 
“Despite the new Labor and Contract Law, many companies still avoid 
signing formal contracts with workers. The new law stipulates ‘no-fixed-
duration contract’, with the purpose to avoid haphazard lay off, to protect 
workers, but there’s an unintended consequence. Many companies rushed 
into cutting their labor force before Jan of 2008, or they would stop 
recruiting more workers. In the long term, I think this would lead to more 
unemployment.” (Dan, female, age 26, local NGO volunteer) 
 
“Some companies just responded directly, ‘the new Labor and Contract 
Law does not work in my factory!’” (Huang, male, age 34, from rural 
Anhui) 
 
“If we all adhere to the new law, I guess all of us will go bankrupt. As far 
as I know, most small factories are not conforming to the new law, at least 
they plan to wait and see. If the government use a stronger hand to enforce 
it, probably these factories will also close down. If not, they will just run 
them like before.” (Ma, male, age 45, factory manager) 
        
       The new labor law triggered a hidden crisis that has been long fermented by 
multiple causes in the past few years, such as rising raw material costs and China’s 
appreciating currency. Large-scale layoffs happened across major manufacturing 
cities. In Dongguan, the most booming manufacturing zone in Guandong province, 20 
to 30 percent of shoe factories closed down, according to the General Secretary of 
Asian Shoes Industry Association (ASIA), Peng Li. 58 ASIA estimated that around 25 
percent of shoe manufactures have relocated their factories to countries offering even 
cheaper labor than China, such as Vietnam, India, Laos.  
       The second wave of structural shock happened when I was wrapping up my field 
research in October of 2008. Media reports show an estimate of 600 thousand 
closedowns of small and medium-sized companies, leaving millions of workers 
                                                 
58
 News report from China Central TV, Dec 11, 2007. 
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jobless. Then in early December of 2008, report from the Human Resources and 
Social Security Ministry released a figure of over 4.85 million returned rural migrants 
in ten major agricultural provinces by end of November59. Ma Jiantang, Chief of State 
Statistical Bureau, admitted that this wave of return migration is an unprecedented 
historical high, over 100 million, with 20 percent due to factory closedowns.  
       Public media has started discussions on the precarious situation for over 20 
million jobless rural migrants since Feb of 2009, with titles like “Should Jobless Rural 
Migrants Stay or Return?” (Caijing, Feb 09, 2009). With this unprecedented scale of 
unemployment, “social stability” once again mounts to the state’s biggest worry.60 
This familiar rhetoric has a long history, as rural migrants have always been 
considered a threat to public order. With more and more workers increasingly aware 
of their fights, and also with labor-related lawsuits rose by 95 percent in 2008, it seems 
likely to the government that this group is likely to claim their rights. However, among 
rural migrants who have lost their jobs, very few express dissatisfaction against the 
authorities. The public media has done a good job of attributing unemployment to 
global economic crisis.  
      During this time, rural migrants’ access to basic social security (such as 
unemployment insurance) came to the spotlight. Although the state has promised and 
designed pension schemes for rural migrants, the real picture falls short of these plans. 
As job mobility is much higher for rural migrants, it is hard for them to stay in one 
location for quite a long time. But legal premises require pensioners to pay for 15 
years of premium in one location, and the designed pension accounts cannot be 
                                                 
59
 These ten administrative regions include Sichuan, Hebei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangxi, Gansu and the municipality of Chongqing. This release was publicized by Caijing Magazine, 
the top Chinese news agency in finance and economics, in its 229th Special Issue ,“Rural Migrants’ 
Unemployment”, on Jan 19 of 2009.  
60
 On Feb 17 of 2009, the vice president of ACFTU, Sun Chunlan, warned state union organizers of 
“potential sabotage activities into rural migrants by foreign forces.” This was reported firstly by Eastern 
Morning Post on Feb 18, 2009. 
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transferred either to their new workplace or to their rural hometowns. This means that 
social insurance benefits are not “portable” when they move. Some workers, fearing 
they will not be able to recoup their contributions, don’t bother to pay into the scheme. 
According to state media reports, of the small fraction (about 15 percent of the total 
migrant labor force) who did pay in, over 95 percent chose to cash in (tuibao) their 
contribution.61 Their employers’ contributions can only be left with the local 
governments. 62 Left out of the formal employment and social insurance system, rural 
migrants live like undocumented immigrants in their own country, and are more 
vulnerable during times of illness, unemployment or aging. 
      Similar public policy failures demonstrate that policymaking in providing social 
security has not taken rural migrants’ interests into consideration. In Shenzhen, for 
example, rural migrants are eligible to draw a retirement pension once they’ve made 
contributions in the city for 15 years and have reached the mandated retirement age 
(50 for women, 60 for men). But very few rural migrants would meet these conditions. 
For aging rural migrants, retiring in the city is virtually unimaginable given the rising 
living costs and slim job opportunities. Most middle-aged informants anticipate 
returning to their small patches of land.  
       Nowadays, rural China gradually see its villages “growing grey” with more and 
more old people. Rural migrants exchange their youthful times for living in the city, 
but when they grow old and dependent, there is no mechanism to protect their 
benefits. First generation migrants willingly return to the land with their memories and 
emotional attachments, but for second generation migrants, going back to the villages 
is simply “no way out.”  
                                                 
61
 News on People’s Daily, Jan 8, 2008. 
62
 Precise ratios of contributions differ by region. In Nanjing, for example, employees contribute 8 
percent of their salary to the premium, and employers contribute 14 percent. 
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       Meng, 42, a migrant-turned-NGO-staff, tells me that her biggest wish is to set up 
a nursing home which receives senior migrants in the city. “It took us two to three 
generations to make such a prosperous city,” Meng says, “why are migrants not 
allowed to stay when they get old?” Indeed, Meng’s question points out the core of the 
problem—rural peasants now are allowed to freely move and work, but the right to 
stay in the city has yet to be fulfilled for them.  
 
A Point of No Return 
       Being a rural migrant commuting between one’s home root and the host city is a 
hybrid experience that challenges one’s sense of self and belonging. The lack of 
formal rights deprives rural migrants of expectations for material and symbolic 
equality. Their vulnerable positions at the verges of the urban economy, coupled with 
widespread exploitation at workplaces, often shatter even the dimmest expectations to 
pieces.  
       Many rural migrants had home-return experiences during joblessness, work 
injuries, or other social traumas in the city. In early 2009, the economic downturn sent 
millions of rural migrants back to their villages due to job loss (The Washington Post 
Jan 2, 2009). Months after the massive return, social problems intensified in rural 
areas including land disputes and crimes. Some young people had enough of the 
boredom at home and ventured out again for opportunities. An informant told me, 
“when I idled in the city without a job, I felt so homeless; but when I went back to my 
home village, the longer I stayed, the more I hated it. I grew restless, so I had to come 
out again.”  
       Searching for a sense of “home” between the soil and the city, rural migrants live 
in a constant state of “transient-ness.” Such is the experience of Kang. Once again, 
Kang comes back to this oddly familiar neighborhood. He realizes that everything 
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needs to start all over again: finding a place to live, a job, and a life to get by, as a 
stranger in this city.  
       To save some money, this time he decides to share one room with a young man he 
just acquainted who is also looking for jobs in the nearby food factories and 
electronics factories. After getting some daily necessities, Kang starts making 
inquiries into the over 20 informal job centers there. These information letters usually 
place big black boards outside with job information from these factories. But for most 
update information, one is required to pay 30 percent of the indicated wage, as a 
commission fee for the job center to contact the factories. These job centers are 
opened by migrants themselves who are better connected with local businesses.  
        A week earlier, Kang went to the old food factory he once worked in, wishing to 
get back to his old job as a food assembler. In 2006, He worked there for more than a 
year, before his wife asked him to return home. The factory paid him over 1800 yuan a 
month. Kang liked it because it was good pay and familiar work. He was quite 
confident about getting the job again. After all, factories prefer returned workers 
because they are more “experienced” and “know the way of doing things there.”  
       The food factory mainly produces half-products, such as frozen fried chicken legs, 
for fast-food stores. Like many other factories, assembly lines jobs are dominated by 
rural migrants and a few Shanghai natives fill the office staff positions. Kang is 
content except for one minor complaint. Although meals and dorms are freely 
provided, the food factory enforces “food code”: workers are only given vegetarian 
meals, the norm in this factory. I ask why, Kang hesitantly says that because managers 
had the assumption that most workers are “consuming” their half-made chicken legs 
when assembling. I then ask if workers do actually “consume” these chicken legs. 
With some embarrassment, Kang replies, “with such light meals, who does not eat? … 
one has to watch out though, because there is a huge penalty on that.”  
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      Of all the random rules made by factories I heard from my interviews, this one 
sounds funny but yet humiliating at the same time. The factory’s food code only 
induces a norm of stealing by half-hungry assembly line workers.  
      Young as he is, Kang’s 27 years of life had let him tasted lots of despair and 
frustrations. Kang left rural Jiangsu when he was only 16, a few days before finishing 
junior middle school. School never appealed to him much. Village teachers were dry 
and boring. Besides, his family needed more hands helping out with the crops.  
       Kang’s parents divorced early, leaving an erasable impact on him. His father took 
up recycling as a sideline job apart from farming to support Kang and his younger 
sister. From an early age, Kang heard people joking about his father’s occupation—
jianpolan (trash-collector). “It does not sound good [decent], but many of our villagers 
make good money out of it.” Kang explains to me. The low prestige is 
counterbalanced by making quick money out of it.  
       In 1996, Kang made his first venture into the city of Nanjing. Not able to find 
other jobs, he used 30 yuan as “start-up capital” for his own recycling business. “Since 
all my folks work in this trade, it is most familiar to me.” 
       However, Kang’s first entrepreneurial trial only lasted for 20 days. Then he 
moved to the Northeast with a few relatives. Some relatives of his had worked as 
contractors at construction sites there. They allowed him to work as “xiaogong” 
(minor labor). Meals and accommodation were provided on site and for free, although 
the quality was poor for both. But Kang was content to get a more “decent” and 
“manly” job. He says he liked “a job requiring physical strength”; it made him feel 
good about himself.  
       Like most construction jobs, Kang was paid once a year. The boss did not cheat 
on them, which made him stay for two years. The only thing he grew dissatisfied was, 
for over two years, his wage stayed the same. When a few folks learned that 
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construction workers in Shangdong were being paid 30 yuan a day, they left. The 
following few years were constant job changes from one construction team to another, 
depending on the length of these construction projects.  
       In 2002, Kang got to the age of getting married, according to the customs in rural 
Jiangsu. He returned and got married to a girl from a neighboring village. In rural 
China, marriage and house-building are life-cycle events for an average migrant 
returnee, and these celebrated goals help achieve a counter-balance against one’s 
difficult existence in the city.  
       For over a year, Kang stayed with his new wife, and did recycling with his father. 
Wanting some changes in his life, he started a more risky business to recycle metal 
materials. Kang successfully secured a 200 thousand bank loan, and he made over 
eight thousand yuan in just a week. When everything seemed to be going the right 
direction, and the young man was getting excited about the future, one day he was 
visited by some cadres from the local industry and commerce bureau. It turned out that 
for recycling metal materials, one has to apply for a permit.  
 
“I told them that I did not anything illegal. I was not smuggling cables or 
anything, I was just collecting used bottles and pans. But they said that was 
already ‘illegal’. I asked, how can this be? People came and trade their 
used kitchen tools for money. They asked if I have a license for collecting 
these? I didn’t, and most steel and copper recyclers in our village did not 
have licenses, either. They drove a big truck, and loaded all my stuff on. I 
said I could apply for a license, if that was what they wanted. But they said 
a license cost 150 thousand yuan! … So I just watched them taking all my 
stuff away, worth of 40 thousand yuan. And I got fined 20 thousand more.” 
        
       This incident threw Kang into a large amount of debt—200 thousand yuan bank 
loan. Since then, Kang’s marriage life also started to show signals of crisis. His wife 
grew increasingly dissatisfied with his business failures. After their daughter was born 
 117 
in mid 2003, Kang decided to come solo to Shanghai for jobs. Like seven years ago, 
he came to the city with just two hands.  
       Kang experienced the lowest of his life in Nanjing. After he spent all the money, 
he was left to sleep on the streets, without food for several days. Later someone 
offered him a carwash job with food and dorm. This experience of hopelessness and 
homelessness left Kang so emotionally distraught that he only worked for ten days, 
then left for home with the 200 yuan wage he earned. 
      For many rural migrants, vicissitudes of life set their course into the unknown and 
changeable. They long for the city, but while being there for themselves, they long to 
return home. Life goes on in a circle. It took only a few months for Kang to feel the 
impulse to come out for work again. This is how his new search for jobs started at the 
beginning. Now to pay back the loan is the motivation for his perseverance in the city. 
He also holds onto another dream that one day he could bring his kindergarten-age 
daughter to attend Shanghai’s schools.  
       Millions of factory girls and boys live a similar life with Kang. To some, their 
despair can soon be comforted through spending what they have saved, on themselves 
and on relatives back home. Consumerism has become a defining characteristic, if not 
an ideology, of the current Chinese society. As in many other economies that are 
facing recession, the Chinese state encourages individuals of how important 
“consumer confidence” is for the national economy. Moreover, with the rise of 
nationalism, shopping Chinese brand names is associated with a sense of national 
responsibility or symbol of loyalty. “Chinese people should consume Chinese 
products” was the catchphrase among the young (Gerth, 2003). These are slowly 
impacting the consumption behaviors of rural migrants, especially the younger 
generation. To some extent, the high rise of modern consumerism reinforced urban 
bias.  
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Inequality after Bounded Transition  
       As Nee (1989) and Oi (1989) argue, if emergent market institutions remain 
bounded by political institutions of the state and by social networks linking state 
power to economic institutions, this “structural imbalance” tends to result in 
“conflicting institutional dynamics” (Nee 1991).  This chapter continues with this 
discussion concerning the relationship between institutional changes during China’s 
partial reform and patterns of social inequality for rural migrants. I argue that it would 
be asking the wrong question as whether market transition has improved or hurt the 
economic interests of peasant migrants, because empirical evidence show regional- 
and time-dependent variations. The complexity of changing social inequality under 
partial reform requires a closer examination on the social processes, including the 
incorporating and segregative processes, experienced by rural migrants in the urban 
economy.  
 
Wage Discrimination and Stagnation 
       While classical economists argue that rural residents are pulled to urban regions 
under the incentives of higher industrial wages (Berliner 1977; Spengler and Myers 
1977), other scholars claim that rural migrants do not just respond simply to the actual 
wage differential, but rather to the “expected” differential (Todaro 1977; Rogers and 
Williamson 1982; Stark 1982). Admittedly, wage differentials are still the primary 
incentive for Chinese rural migrants. Studies in late 90s show that rural migrants from 
the relatively poorer countryside generally experience at least a twofold income 
increase by their move (Wang and Zou, 1997; 1999). But other statistics also show the 
absence of a “trickle-down effect” for rural migrants since the 2000, compared to the 
double-digit increase among urban workers.  
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       A four-city survey collected income data of rural migrants in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Wuhan in 2004 shows that 67.5 percent earn less than 1000 yuan per 
month, and 21 percent make more than 1001 yuan.63 Another survey in 2006 shows 
that 50 percent of rural migrants make less than 1000 yuan per month, and 36.5 
percent make more than 1001 yuan.64 Take Dongguan, the manufacturing magnet site 
in Shenzhen economic zone, for a regional example. According to the Central Bank of 
China surveys, the minimum wage level for migrant workers was set at 350 yuan per 
month in 1994, which was adjusted to 770 yuan in 2008. This means that if migrant 
workers are properly and timely paid, their wage levels only increase annually by 5 
percent in the past 15 years.65 This period was a golden time for Dongguan’s 
manufacturing sector. The fact that over sixty percent of migrant workers spend over 
500 yuan every month on living expenses brings an even bleaker color to their 
circumstances. 
       Labor markets are seldom without barriers. Piore (1979) in his early work on 
migrant labor in industrial societies posits the existence of primary and secondary 
labor market: the former representing jobs offering relatively high wages, good 
working conditions, potentials for advancement, and protective working rules; the 
latter comprising work situations with few of these advantages66. This “dual labor 
market” thesis explains why discrimination persists in hiring and promotion practices. 
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 Four-City Survey on Rural Migrants’ Life Quality in 2004, Horizon Research Group.  
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 New Generation Rural Migrants Survey, Research Center for China’s Younger Generation. 2006. 
http://www.china.com.cn/gonghui/2010-01/12/content_19220422.htm  
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 “Rural Migrant Workers’ Monthly Wage Increased by 9.9 Percent,” Ministry of Labor and Social 
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 On the demand side, primary market is created with the growth of corporate capitalism, and later 
strengthened by increased unionization. According to Piore, another three conditions promote this 
dualism: (1) uncertainty and instability in the economy; (2) avoidable costs of recruitment and training, 
and the possibility of hiring transient workers for employers; (3) short-term jobs that match the work 
aspirations of migrant labor. 
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With structurally differentiated job tracks, he argues, factors like discrimination, 
inadequate education, and residential patterns work in combination to confine migrant 
labor to the secondary sphere. 
        My field interviews also show that rural migrants have low expectations for job 
placement and wages, given the much lower pre-migration rural income. For 
substandard wages to be acceptable to these influx workers, there needs to be a 
substantial gap between rural and urban incomes. China’s income ratio between urban 
and rural increased dramatically, from 2.36: 1 in year 1978, to 3.2: 1 in 2000. By 
2005, the real rural income per capita is only 39 percent of real urban income per 
capita. 
       For new arrivals, they tend to take any job available to recoup transportation 
expenses and money spent in applying for various permits in the city. Paying a 
substantial “deposit” at a new workplace has become a common practice, which 
obliges the new migrants to bear with even very exploitative work conditions. Some 
unscrupulous employers even withhold a portion of workers’ monthly wage, 
promising to pay it at the end of the year. Another most effective practice to “retain” 
rural migrants is for employers to take away their documents, as another form of 
“security deposit.” Without these documents, rural migrants cannot switch jobs even 
under intolerable situations.  
       Unable to bargain with the state-sanctioned rules of segmentation, most rural 
migrants “rationalize” their appropriate places being in the informal economy. Formal 
rules, social norms, and individual expectations together form an institutional barrier 
that led to the internalization of status inferiority. I argue that such internalized status 
inferiority discourages rural migrants’ economic aspirations, and weakens their power 
to make fair negotiations with private employers or urban administrators. 
 121 
       Chinese sociologist Sun Liping (2004) points out the relevance of a structural 
change in China’s urban industries since the 1990s—the replacement of intensive 
labor production by technology and capital. Rural migrants seeking factory jobs came 
untimely for jobs in labor-intensive sectors, but this type of jobs have been declining. 
In the 2002 CHIPS survey data, 41 percent of rural migrants changed jobs mainly 
because of low pay, 15 percent due to job instability and 8 percent poor working 
conditions.67 Other studies show that rural migrants have a much higher job mobility 
than local urban workers (Knight and Yueh, 2006), partly because they tend to 
concentrate in the unskilled sector where there’s strong competition and higher 
turnover rate.  
 
Regional Economic Inequality and Spatial Hierarchy 
       As Kanbur and Zhang (2001) show their study, early 80s actually saw some 
decline of regional inequality, but it soon rose up after 1984.68 It was not a mere 
coincident when regional inequality peaked at around mid 80s and residence control 
was officially relaxed around the same time. The two were causally related—the 
state’s strategic turn for prioritizing the development of coastal areas and financial 
transfers fueled up industries in these regions, demanding more cheap labor. The rise 
of coastal economies became a key inducing factor for rural-urban migration to rise to 
a historical high since mid 80s, leading to what was called the “tide of rural migrants” 
(min gong chao) into southeast Chinese cities.  
        Although the Household Responsibility System was considered a success for the 
reform in early and mid-1980s, some aspects of this system has hindered long-term 
rural growth. Primarily, by shifting the production unit from the collective to 
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the Cultural Revolution, and the opening up in the 1990s. 
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households, it reduced the scale of farming land, creating a pattern of fragmented 
lands especially after demographic changes. Census statistics show that the average 
size of household holding land is 0.67 hectares, compared to 1.55 hectares in India, 
1.20 in Japan, and 3.36 in Thailand.69 Land fragmentation and declined productivity 
motivated more rural labor to out-migrate in order to supplement household income 
through non-farming sources. The unique rural land tenure system made land transfers 
impossible, so for over a decade, rural migration has taken on a circular nature. 
       The 1990s were a significant period for China’s economic transition and 
institutional changes. One major institutional change was the state-imposed “dual-
track pricing system” (shuangguizhi). It was the product of gradualist reform. The 
purpose was to separate the still plan-directed economic sectors from the marketized 
ones, and “liberalize prices without eliminating preexisting rents of economic agents” 
(Lau, Qian and Roland, 1997; 2000).  Actually, such “dual-track logic” was inherent 
in the organizational form of TVEs from the very beginning where plan and market 
coexisted. This change had wide social impact because people later were gradually 
taught by out-of-plan market opportunities that for resources one could not obtain 
from within the old system, there are ways in the more liberalized sector of 
transactions. It paved the way for “out-of-plan transactions” of citizenship, both in the 
official realm and shadow economies.  
 
Interplay of Market and Redistributive Institutions 
       Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) argues that under partial reform, a shift towards 
market allocation would give rise to a “dual hierarchy” in which inequalities based on 
market and distribution principles coexisted, with political actors at the apex of both 
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 From 1997 China Agricultural Census statistics. www.fao.org/es/ess/census/default.asp   In 2002, the 
average household cultivated land per capita was 0.3 hectares (2 mu), according to China Statistical 
Yearbook of 2003, pp.366, and p424. 
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hierarchies.  Nee (1991) agrees that this “cadre-entrepreneur elite” may contribute to 
local alliance building, resulting in what Merton (1968) describes as the “Matthew 
Effect”. Partially reformed hukou distinction only allowed peasants to move into the 
city, but when it comes to long-term settlement and economic opportunities, these 
rural migrants are still bound by redistributive institutions that are segmenting the 
labor markets into two hierarchies.   
       Real efforts pushing towards redefining peasants’ citizenship in recent years have 
resulted in little effect. Admittedly, occupational restrictions on enterprises’ hiring 
rural migrants were greatly relaxed than before, but the majority of formal 
professional-track jobs are still inaccessible for rural migrants. The urban labor 
market, overall, continues to be highly segmented by residence. For the sake of 
economic development, local governments did make efforts to eliminate some 
restrictions on hiring rural migrants. But when local unemployment looked worrisome, 
they would resort to exclusive policies again. 
       Take Shanghai’s construction industry for example. At around 1990, Shanghai 
government started opening up Pudong New District for investment. Infrastructure 
projects including subway systems, highway and the international airport needed more 
labor.70 The city allowed construction companies to hire rural migrants. Consequently, 
the number of rural migrants in the industry tripled around 1993. But in 1996, because 
of urban labor market recession after massive layoffs from SOEs, the city government 
started a clearing up campaign. Another policy backlash was in 2000, when the city 
government required all hiring enterprises to go through the Job Service Network, a 
screening system for hiring urban workers only.  
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infrastructure-building in Pudong and granted the city government 10 preferential policies and 6 capital 
investment plans. But it was in 1992 when Deng’s remarks of “big changes in 3 years” sped up the city 
planning and expansion of Shanghai (From Shanghai General History Gazetteer 2005, p1624-1626) 
 124 
       Some Chinese scholar challenges this practice by proving that the two groups are 
not substitutable, because rural migrants can only access the undesirable jobs left by 
locals (Zhang, 2005). In reality, Shanghai’s local-protective measures failed to achieve 
its goal in allocating urban locals to certain low-prestige jobs as policy-makers 
intended. Later on, many enterprises turned back to their informal practices in hiring 
rural migrants.  
 
Commodification of Administrative Privileges 
       1993 and 1994 were years of transformation for China’s cities because of the 
housing reform.  A golden time for China’s urban real estate market began. China’s 
cities launched into “the biggest construction project the planet has ever seen” (The 
Wall Street Journal, 1993). However, the pace and directions of urbanization are 
largely determined by a small number of cadre-entrepreneur elites, who rapidly 
formed into strong coalition.  
       With this real estate boom, a new incentive was created for the “commodification 
of administrative privileges” (Szelenyi 1978), in the form of “green card systems” in 
different cities. In order to boost the real estate markets, many have allowed non-
natives to apply for an urban hukou along with their purchase.  
       Since the plight of rural migrants was brought to wider public attention, some 
conscientious intellectuals and civil rights activists cry out for legislative changes to 
fully incorporate rural migrants into urban citizenship. Some local governments did 
respond with publicized “timelines” for liberal reforms, but no real egalitarian policies 
have been enacted. In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security announced a legal review 
of the hukou system, but later decided that changes be made by local governments. 
However, it is precisely among local governments that resistance against further 
reform is strongest, because granting equal rights to rural migrants would mean much 
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more public expenditures and additional funds to provide education, health care and 
other social services. With the public finance system and legal informality unchanged, 
institutional inertia is likely to continue. I agree with Chan and Buckingham (2008) 
that these reform efforts have resulted in counterproductive effects. A few structural 
causes are discussed as follows. 
       First, there is a “first-mover disadvantage” for local governments. To grant rural 
migrants exactly the same rights with urbanites require tremendous organizational 
efforts for a local government, and most importantly, a lot of money. On the other 
hand, migration flows naturally gravitate towards “basin areas” (more receptive 
residence regimes). Under these two conditions, no local government is willing to be 
the first mover. Suppose one city starts while others stay unchanged, rural migrants 
will flow into that locality, to a point when costs of maintaining welfare for all 
members deplete its financial resources. Zhengzhou city served as an example. The 
city lifted residence restrictions in 2003, and within a year, its population increased 
150 thousand. In some elementary schools at Zhengzhou, the number of pupils per 
class rose as high as 90.71 Overcrowding and competition for public resources forced 
the government to turn off the reform a year later.  
       Secondly, interest conflicts between the central government and local 
governments are hard to resolve. For example, although the central government 
required urban public schools to “unconditionally accept” migrant children, but 
without public funding or stricter legal enforcement, only a small number of public 
schools complied. In many cases local education authorities responded with new 
discriminatory rules to disqualify migrant children who either return or enter into 
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relatives and friends in Zhengzhou become Zhengzhou citizens. But this policy stopped on August 20 
of 2004 (China Youth News, Sept 15, 2004).  
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substandard migrant schools. This resulted in an even greater number of “left-behind” 
children in rural areas.72  
       Thirdly, in China’s current political system, rural migrants themselves do not have 
access to any political resources to change the system. Ironically, China’s state council 
symbolically selected three rural migrants representing a 200-million-plus mass at the 
National People’s Congress in 2008. A small number of civil organizations (NGOs 
serving migrants) sprung up in recent years, but their efforts have been limited in the 
political arena.73  
        Weber claims that the first step to lessen the effect of such closure in the labor 
market is to “prohibit the dismissal of a worker without the consent of the workers’ 
representatives.” This requires the society’s recognition and protection of the “freedom 
of association”. But China’s polity does not allow any independent workers’ union to 
exist outside of its official “All China Federation of Trade Unions”. Unlike in other 
labor contexts, unionization movement has been absent. When rural migrants’ issues 
are brought to wider public awareness, the main concerns focus on unpaid wages, 
unpaid overtime work, or workplace injuries. What galvanized workers’ resistance 
against systemic exclusion in other countries fails to emerge in the Chinese context.  
 
Conclusion 
       Changes in the coordinating mechanisms of an economy tend to bring about 
changes in the structure of social stratification (Nee and Cao, 2002). 
Decollectivization of rural communes and the collapse of the urban danwei system led 
to an emergent labor market that relies less on administrative assignment of jobs. The 
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 On Feb 17 of 2009, the vice president of ACFTU, SUN Chunlan, warned state union organizers of 
“potential sabotage activities into rural migrants by foreign forces” (Easterm Morning Post, Feb 18, 
2009).  
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influx of rural migrants gave birth to the remaking of the Chinese working class, with 
the participation of an additional 200 million “new industrial workers” (xin chanye 
gongren) into China’s urban economy. Economically, many long-term migrant-
turned-industrial-workers have accumulated different forms of capital (e.g. human and 
social capital) during their years of work in the city. Some even made it up to the 
stratum of private entrepreneurs in different lines of work. In 2008, three 
representatives of this new working class were chosen to participate in the National 
People’s Congress. 
       On the other hand, China’s export-oriented economic growth after the market 
transition has provided the structure for a system like hukou to exist, because it 
legitimates the wage structure in the still segmented labor market, despite its 
incompatibility with free market principles. As a long-term consequence, it installs a 
ceiling effect on rural migrants’ path towards equal economic opportunities with urban 
workers. Firstly, the majority only managed to survive in the informal economy. They 
make a very vulnerable group to exogenous shocks, such as local discriminatory 
policies and economic downturns. It is hard for many to jump out of the “survival 
plane”. Secondly, their second-class citizenship makes permanent settlement in the 
city an unreachable goal due to the lack of education facilities for their second 
generation. This factor plays an important role in their career choices. Lastly, a least 
unionized group, rural migrant workers often withdraw from collective bargaining. 
Just like Lee (2007) writes, migrants’ class-consciousness seems “muted”, as they 
rarely speak of themselves as “workers” even when some have worked in a factory for 
years. Labeling themselves “peasants”, migrants unambiguously maintain such 
residence-bound, ascribed status. 
      Alexander and Chan (2004) compare the Chinese hukou with the pass law system 
of South Africa. Basically, the system helps reduce labor costs to a minimum, by 
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legitimatizing the second-class citizenship of a social status group. They quote 
Murray’s comment on the obvious contradiction in this type of economic exclusion: 
 
“the central contradiction in this whole system of segregating and 
regulating the movement of urbanizing Africans arose out of the 
unattainable objective of trying to secure a suitable supply of labor while 
minimizing the presence of Africans in the metropolitan areas.” (Murray 
1994: 42) 
         
       Like the pass laws, hukou classification also artificially created a segmented labor 
market. The costs for employing migrants, including urban living costs, education and 
health costs for migrants’ next generation, were offset by migrants’ low wage 
structure. When additional hours of overtime work are taken into account, wages for 
rural migrant workers are much lower than anywhere else in Asia (Ross and Chan 
2002: 8-13).  
        Market transition brought only partial reform to this system, leading to both 
integrating and segregating processes experienced by rural migrants. They 
unconsciously performed “institutional subversion” such as starting-up unlicensed 
small businesses, manipulating underground hukou market transactions, or faking 
documents. They acted this way either out of lack of knowledge, inconvenience, or 
incongruities in official rules. Their employers also engage in illegal techniques to 
extract more revenue from hiring cheap labor for long work hours. To analyze how the 
legitimacy and efficacy of these redistributive institutions (formal rules and informal 
norms) are challenged or maintained, one needs to examine a myriad of economic, 
social, and political factors (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). 
       Compared to the central planning era, the Chinese now certainly enjoy much more 
economic freedom than before. But forces of institutional continuity are strong and 
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present. Hukou-based identity still acts as a social force that stratifies individuals with 
inherited inequality, turning the urban labor market into a “market for social 
distinction” (Hanster 2008). It has cultivated a “structure of entitlement” that is found 
in official language, in job descriptions, and in more subtle social interactions between 
rural migrants and their working environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
CHAPTER 4 
 
IN SEARCH OF A COMMUNITY 
 
       What is social life like to rural migrants in China’s cities? Is there a typical 
community of their kind? To write about rural migrants’ communal life is no easy 
task. It would be simplistic to pass from one distorted view that these communities are 
places of despair, disease and distrust, to the opposite picture that people living in 
these densely-networked neighborhoods are bounded together to look out for each 
other.  
       Rural migrants in China, like immigrants elsewhere, cherish a “land-of-honey-
and-milk” illusion before migration. Many of them have had urban relatives visiting 
their countryside hometowns every summer during school breaks, telling them how 
different and great city life is. Early adventurers brought back pieces of modern 
electronics, and other symbols of urban comfort. TV programs are filled with well-
dressed people speaking standardized mandarin in shiny high-rises or shopping malls, 
setting in stark contrast with the slow and drab lifestyle in the countryside. Once in the 
city, however, life presents a chasm between the earlier fantasy and the later 
arduousness of daily survival, and between smiley faces on TV programs and the 
impenetrable apathy from people around them.  
       Furthermore, migration offers an experience of uprootedness and loss of social 
connections with one’s past. The rebuilding of social familiarity to one’s surrounding 
environment and to the less tangible social norms requires confidence, patience and 
techniques. Migratory experiences expose individuals to vulnerable situations of more 
uncertainty about established rules or implicit “codes of the street”, making self-
protection a primary concern in social actions.  
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       In this chapter, I examine the concrete experiences of rural migrants’ social 
integration in their neighborhoods. I attempt to get as close as possible to their 
everyday experiences by drawing on accounts or interpretations of what people 
actually lived, such as the history and dynamics of their communities, their 
interactions and identity politics with local residents and authorities, and their efforts 
in organizing self-help efforts. Drawing on these empirical evidences, I explore the 
social and political context behind their urban socialization. 
 
Invisible Walls and Identity Politics  
       A city of immigrants throughout its modern history, Shanghai has been associated 
with regional prejudice against waidiren (i.e. strangers). The economy’s opening up to 
the outside world has not ended the closedness nature of its socioeconomic system. 
Yatsko found recurrent scenes in Shanghai during the 1990s that were disturbingly 
reminiscent of the “old society” of the 1930s.  
 
“The city, like others in China, only allows migrants to do certain low-
status jobs, barring them from better jobs and kicking them out of the city 
if they cannot prove they are employed. Migrants mix little with the 
Shanghainese, who hold their country cousins in contempt and 
automatically blame them first when a crime is committed in the city. The 
majority of migrant workers are men who find work on the city’s 
omnipresent construction sites. They sleep at night in makeshift barracks 
on the site, rent cheap accommodation on the city’s outskirts, or grab a slab 
of pavement if they have not yet found a job. Migrant women sometimes 
work as maids for Shanghai families or in decrepit barbershops in bad parts 
of town, washing hair for 10 yuan (US$1.20) a head and, in some cases, 
providing sexual services for a bit more. Smudge-faced migrant waifs in 
rags, with or without their mothers, regularly beg for spare change outside 
popular watering holes, particularly those frequented by foreigners.” – 
Yatsko, New Shanghai, pp.120-21. 
        
       In its economy, the city always creates two categories of jobs for Shanghai natives 
and waidiren (strangers). The image of the non-native poor, living in shanty 
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neighborhoods and taking up menial jobs, has locked them deeper into structural 
poverty. When standing in comparison with urban Shanghainese, rural migrants are  
subject to the double inferiority of being a “non-urban” and also a “non-
Shanghainese.” 
       Treating local origins as “ethnic” identities in sociological analysis is rarely 
adopted, partly due to the overwhelmingly majority of Han in the population (Honig, 
1992). Since mass migration, ample images in newspapers or TV news present rural 
migrants as “others”, with different looks, wear, habits, and dialects. The public 
discourse has been creating a stereotypical rural migrant who is assumed to walk 
outside of the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Figure 4-1.   Warning Sign in an Urban Residential Area 
“Police Notice: Migrants Increased in Number before New Year, so 
please be Aware of Thefts of Properties such as External Parts of Air-
Conditioners. Please report to the Police when you notice anyone 
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       However, inter-group prejudice may go both ways. While rural migrants feel 
excluded from the mainstream life in Shanghai, they also tend to reinforce a 
stereotypical view of an average Shanghai native, which is characterized by, according 
to some rural migrants’ views, their lack of interests in “connecting personally”: 
 
“To me, Shanghainese people only take money seriously. If you have 
money, they’ll talk to you. Of course there are good people among them, 
but very few. So nothing else, no personal feelings. Not like we ‘waidiren’, 
we take personal sentiments as very important, like our neighbors between 
each other. But Shanghainese are not like that. They take personal 
relationships very lightly, in this way we are very different.” (Zhou, male, 
age 40, grocery shop owner) 
        
       Depending on their occupation and social experiences with Shanghai natives, 
rural migrants living in Pond have a variety of experiences with Shanghai natives. For 
first generation rural migrants who came from poor rural backgrounds, the city offers 
so much “work” opportunities to make them into firmly believing a good work ethnic 
of diligence and honesty will surely turn out to be rewarding. As the maxim goes, “as 
long as you work hard, there’s money, and that is something good about city life.” 
       Younger generation migrants with a different reference group than their parents, 
migrant workers who work in more competitive yet segregated workplaces or migrants 
who happen to have been exposed to more native place prejudices, are more prone to 
react with similar prejudices. Many younger migrants expressed more indignant 
feelings towards “unequal pay for equal work” and other managerial superiorities for 
Shanghai natives at their workplaces.  
 
“Shanghainese in general look down upon waidiren. It’s obvious from the 
wages. Our factory has a sign, saying ‘Be A Lovable Shanghainese’, and 
we would laugh at it. … I have friends who are Shanghainese. But I still 
feel many of them are holding something back from you, as if we cannot 
get too close. If you treat him, he would think that you are kissing his ass. 
If you don’t, he will say ‘You waidiren!’. I think waidiren are smarter than 
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Shanghainese. We used to have a few Shanghainese workers, and they 
couldn’t even write well. They haven’t got much education. But you see, 
they earn three times our wage. It’s so unfair!” (Jing, female, age 19, 
factory worker) 
        
       Trivial social encounters that randomly occur to rural migrants may heighten or 
ease such inter-group prejudices. Most rural migrants have limited chance to know 
Shanghai natives, so the social-psychological effects of these positive or negative 
incidents are usually can be critical.  
 
“Here I made friends with people from Hubei, Jiangsu, everywhere. We are 
the same, not much difference, except for dialects and some habits in what 
kind of food we cook, etc. But Shanghai people always think we ‘waidiren’ 
are bad in general. Whenever I hear this kind of comment, I will argue with 
them: not every waidiren is bad.” (Juan, age 31, female, live-in maid) 
 
“Some Shanghainese do not trust waidiren. They have a bad image of us, 
of Anhui people especially. They think that Anhui people like to steal. If 
you are looking for a job and say that you are from Anhui, some would not 
want to hire you. But that’s not true.” (Sun, male, age 31, renovation 
worker) 
        
       The distinctive Shanghai dialect serves another impenetrable barrier for a 
waidiren to assimilate into daily understandings in the city. It takes a long time for a 
waidiren to acquire this dialect (a formidable task to a waidiren myself during my 
one-year fieldwork in Shanghai), which gradually builds up its value of cultural 
capital, and then the choice of language becomes a symbol of local familiarity, thus 
superiority. According to Parkin (1979:5), the “language of closure” can be translated 
into the “language of power”.  
       Shanghai natives prefer to use their local dialect to get a good bargain, because 
both parties felt at easy and share emotional closeness when using it. An awareness of 
“otherness” brings about certain awkwardness to the bewildered waidiren in a 
conversation like this, reinforcing the boundaries of social categorization. As Honig 
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(1992) contends, “Shanghai identity can be understood only in contradiction to ‘the 
other’ against which it defined itself”, and in many ways, migrants represent that 
‘other’. For a non-native who diligently learns the language but grasps the nuances 
inadequately, he remains marked as an “other”. Here, the language itself functions as a 
powerful device to categorize.  
       Some point out the ironic and complex feelings of Shanghai natives, because they 
both “need” and “unwelcome” rural migrants. Some quote evidence that things have 
changed and model migrant entrepreneurs have earned “face” by their 
overachievements in the city.  
 
“Now even the Shanghainese have come to realize and admire that 
waidiren are hard-working, worthy people. We come and work for our own 
living. Some companies are no longer treating us differently than 
Shanghainese. Some waidiren are even making higher incomes. But for 
locals, they have housing from the state. Like local people here who have a 
few sets of housing, they could sit there and get rich from collecting rents. 
But we don’t have that.” (Hu, male, age 36, trade company manager) 
 
“Shanghainese are definitely not working as hard as waidiren. The 
difference is, he is already Shanghainese, and has a world here. We 
waidiren came here with nothing. We make a living here, and need to 
worry about how our children will turn out in the future, whether we can 
have some estate here, but it’s very difficult. How do we settle down for 
long term? We have to rely on ourselves to get a foodhold in the city.” (Du, 
male, age 33, factory owner) 
       
       An interesting change in 2008 took place when the government started to promote 
naming new migrants to the city, a large proportion being rural migrants, as “New 
Shanghainese” (xin Shanghai ren). It was an attempt to alleviate the discriminatory 
label of “nongmingong” (peasant-workers). This re-naming had little effect in 
improving the status of rural migrants than changing “temporary permit” into “resident 
permit.” Rural migrants’ identity as a distinctive status group is constructed through 
status-laden socioeconomic processes. 
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Boundaries of Distinction Sharpened by Urbanization 
The Rise of the Concrete Dragon 
         China’s urbanization began only “a while ago,” according to Friedmann (2006), 
who termed it as a process “hyperurbanization”. A comparison with other Western 
countries shows that, in China, this process lagged 150 to 200 years behind the growth 
of urban population in Europe and North America (Friedmann 2006). Weber (1958 
[1920]) also mentioned that traditional China was an empire without “true cities” that 
are governed by local citizens. The growth of cities had more to do with administrative 
decisions. After 1984, spontaneous migration flows set both top-down regulations and 
bottom-up movements in motion. Rural-to-urban migration has been the main source 
of urban growth (Lu and Wang 2006).74 Within just one generation’s time, China’s 
cities have experienced a process of urban transformation that took a century to occur 
in the US.  
       China’s urban expansion partially steadied the country’s economic growth, with 
the heavy investments into infrastructure development, and rapid inflation of housing 
asset prices in major cities. The physical scale of China’s urbanization is remarkable if 
we put it into a comparative perspective. Reconstruction projects in Shanghai in the 
90s alone displaced more people than 30 years in the United States (Campanella, 
2008:1, 281).  The four years after 1998 saw 162 million square feet of old 
neighborhoods cleared—20 percent of the city’s total residential area; and by mid 
2000s, urban renewal has covered an area equal in size to Venice (Campanella, 
2008:146). Since 2000, China alone has taken in nearly half the world’s cement 
supplies. More than a hundred cities now have more than one-million population, an 
unparalleled scale in the world. 
                                                 
74
 It was estimated that rural-urban migration accounted for 79 percent of urban growth from 1979 to 
2003 (Lu and Wang 2006).  
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       In Shanghai, the “great build” since 1992 launched over 21000 construction sites 
into full force operation twenty-four hours a day (Yatsko 2001). The city government 
invested seven times more in the next five years than the whole duration of 1980s. 
Huge sums of foreign financing were sucked into the economy. This gigantic “face-
lift” also created a dense network connecting politicians and developers. Public land 
ownership and venture capital entered into a honeymoon—Shanghai raised roughly 
100 billian yuan (US$12 billion) through selling land-use rights of old residential 
neighborhoods and factories (Yatsko 2001). A strong coalition of government 
officials, developers and even intellectuals was born, actively producing public 
policies benefiting their interests. Since early 2000s, this coalition pushed towards a 
“cleaner” inner city with full force. In my fieldwork, the top nuisance complained by 
rural migrants is being forced to move around due to demolitions. They had to 
normalize it as “the way of life” in a fast-developing city like Shanghai.  
       Demolitions have not deterred the inflow of rural migrants into Shanghai. 
Statistics show that the rural population reached 4.98 million in 2003 and is estimated 
to be over 6 million in 2008.75 Suburbanization has become the trend for rural 
migrants’ relocation. Suburbs offer lower living costs and easier adjustment than in 
city center, although jobs are fewer. Most informal migrant schools have relocated in 
suburban districts. 
       The expansion of urban space took place after the disintegration of the urban 
danwei system. Compared to western cities where residents self-govern, the cities in 
socialist China were turned into sites of industrial production that were austerely 
divided into small grids called the danwei system. Now, the only organizational 
infrastructure that is left is the “street committees” (juweihui). They are vigilant 
coordinators in the system of social control and the basic organizational form of party 
                                                 
75
 Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2003, 2008. 
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influence in the cities. By 1990, China had 5099 such units in 447 cities, each filled by 
a dozen full-time employees and half-time retirees (Li, 1994). These street committees 
function in enforcing family-planning policies, hygiene inspection, mediating 
conflicts, ect. Since the 1990s, as state budgets for street committees dropped, they 
were left on their own to generate additional funds through various self-initiated 
economic activities. This background information will be useful in later analysis.  
 
Citizenship, Space and Poverty in Shanghai 
       Shanghai has a long history of spatial segregation. Patches of low-rise “penghu 
qu” (shanty neighborhoods) inhabited by immigrants and the urban poor were 
spawned along two sides of the Suzhou River, and behind the back alleys in the 
commercial districts. These “poverty belts” surrounded Shanghai’s foreign 
concessions and urban communities since the 1940s. In 1949, there were still 1109 
square meters of “penghu qu” in the city accommodating a migrant population of 
around 1.15 million (Chen, 2006). There space and poverty reinforced each other, 
producing a type of chronic poverty for penghu qu residents. They made the bulk of 
Shanghai’s urban poor, with a unique lifestyle which formed an invisible wall against 
urban integration. 
       Some old inhabitants of penghu qu descended from subei migrants (people from 
northern Jiangsu) since the 1920s. Their ancestors were refugees from floods, famine 
or wars in neighboring provinces. Dwelling these damp valleys and taking up menial 
jobs that were least desired and respected by Shanghai natives, they remained at the 
bottom of the social strata for over a century (Honig, 1992). Until today, the term 
“subei people” is a metaphor for people of low birth and poor manners, just like the 
term “mingong” for rural migrants. Zhaibei district, the most concentrated area by 
Subei migrants, was given a derogatory name xia zhi jiao (“lower quarters”). These 
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expressions are more common in casual conversations than in interviews or surveys. 
Everyday life in these neighborhoods was captured in a famous movie The House of 
72 Tenants (1973): Usually the whole family had to squeeze into one room, and the 
hallway is then turned into a common space for cooking shared by a few families. 
People living upstairs could always tell what food is being prepared for dinner by the 
smell from downstairs. In the summer, benches and stools are lined up on both sides of 
the tiny walking lanes, dotted by men and women in their simplest tops and shorts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  An Old Penghu Area in Shanghai 
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       Since the 1980s, Shanghai’s penghu areas became destinations to rural migrants 
from Shanghai’s neighboring provinces, at first solo circular migrants, then long-term-
stay families. Some existing penghu qu became dominated by them, with only a 
handful of senior locals who are reluctant to move, breeding a unique mixing of locals 
and migrants. Subei people in these areas generally live in good terms with their 
tenants, who came primarily from Anhui, and Jiangxi. In the community where I 
conducted participant observation, some subei Shanghainese offered generous help in 
referring us to people they know. They tend to form some sentimental connection with 
rural migrant families, because the latter live in a way that is reminiscent of what life 
was like for Subei migrants several decades ago. At different historical conjunctures, 
both groups suffered from institutionalized inferiority and were pushed to the margins 
of the urban economy.  
 
The Pond: Ethnography of a Rural Migrant Neighborhood 
       Behind the façades of Shanghai’s glamorous Millennium Shopping Center, an 
area of one-story buildings lies in sharp contrast with its surroundings. A completely 
different world is concealed there, separated by just a thin brick wall. I name this rural 
migrant community “the Pond,” because its Chinese name contains a character “tang”, 
meaning “pond”. The name is fitting with the self-contained nature of lifestyle in this 
neighborhood, with a different ecology from the rest of Shanghai.  
       The Pond is not an area one could locate on the map, but with over two thousand 
households packed into a small area, it is not easy to miss either. It is located at the 
crossroads of Pond Street, a major road that cuts through a few districts, and a more 
narrow and unimpressive Northrain Street in M district. This area is well known as an 
“industrial zone” set up by the district government since the 1990s. So Pond is actually 
surrounded by a few factories manufacturing food and electronics.  
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Figure 4-3.  The Pond Community on Google Earth 
Figure 4-4.    Layout of The Pond Neighborhood 
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       The entrance to the Pond is a small gate in the wall that only allows pedestrians to 
enter. Inside the Pond, one will soon detect a web of half-hidden lanes intersecting 
with each other and dividing the area into ten living blocks. The total number of 
inhabitants, estimated by Zeng, the director of Pond street committee, has exceeded 
one third of the total migrant population in M district. 
       In collaboration with the research team of the local NGO ROOT, I conducted a 
household survey (N=52) in November of 2007. The fifty-two households were 
selected out of ten administrative teams (“blocks”) classified by the street committee. 
Questions concerning their basic demographic information (i.e. gender, education, 
hukou origin, jobs, income), family make-up, duration of stay in the city, number of 
children, parental involvement with children, presence of relatives in the 
neighborhood, etc. The purpose was to gain a broader picture of the neighborhood 
composition and family sizes. It was also a critical stage when I gained the trust of 
many families through this formal presentation supported by the street committee. I 
had the opportunity to go back and do in-depth interviews with over a dozen families 
covered by this survey. 
       The survey certainly had several constraints. First is the sampling method. 
Because the questionnaires were administered only during weekends, the sampling 
failed to include many rural migrants who work during that time. Since we only 
interviewed whoever is at home during the weekend in one household, unemployment 
rate is likely to be over-reported (11 percent).  So is the percentage of female 
respondents (60%). Secondly, due to time constraints, I excluded some variables on 
their work and neighborhood effects. With these limitations, however, the dataset 
serves its purpose in setting the broader demographic framework of this group of rural 
migrants I study. 
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       Where their hukou origins are asked, Anhui (45 %) and Fujian (23 %) migrants 
are the predominant two sub-groups.76 There are also migrants from Jiangsu (8%), 
Jiangsi (6%), Sichuan (6%), Henan (4%), Hunan (2%), and Guangdong (2%). I 
learned from the street committee and education officials that in Shanghai, over sixty 
percent of the rural migrants come from rural Anhui, and they tend to dominate a few 
lines of informal jobs: recycling, street vending, and interior renovation. The presence 
of business-making Fujian rural migrants made the Pond distinct from other 
neighborhoods that are predominantly inhabited by Anhui migrants. 
       In terms of how long they have lived in the city of Shanghai, 15.7 percent 
answered “more than ten years,” and 54.9 percent “six to ten years.” Less than ten 
percent of respondents belong to the short-term seasonal migrants. This trend of long-
term settlement of rural migrants in the city, a recent development since the late 
1990s, is confirmed in the Pond. 
      When asked about the size of their nuclear families, over half of the respondents 
reported having more than two children, and even 11.5 percent had three children. 
Compared to the average Shanghai urban family with one child, rural migrant families 
present the city with a baby boom. Survey results also show that 87.8 percent of 
families with children have brought their first-borns to attend schools in Shanghai. 
From casual conversations, I notice that families with more than two children 
generally face economic difficulties due to both education investment and the huge 
economic penalties for violating the one-child policy. In some areas of rural Anhui, 
such a violation may amount to 100 thousand yuan, roughly two to three years of 
household income for that family. 
                                                 
76
 Anhui province is one of the poorest provinces. Anhui migrants who move to Shanghai, the 
wealthiest municipalities in China, travel an overwhelming socioeconomic gap.  
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       Over fifty percent of rural migrants in the Pond received education equal or less 
than junior middle school. Compared to the average Shanghai resident who is more 
likely to enter into senior middle school and above institutions, the figure for Pond 
migrants is zero.  
 
Table 4-1. Comparison of Education Levels at the Pond and Shanghai77  
 
Variable  The Pond (%) Shanghai  (%) 
Education Illiterate 
Primary school  
Junior middle  
Senior middle  
College and above 
9.6 
28.9 
53.9 
0 
0 
5.4 
31.1 
38.2 
23.9 
11.4 
        
       The gap in income levels between rural migrants at the Pond and Shanghai 
residents is seen from an indirect comparison. As we only asked respondents the range 
of their monthly household incomes, it is hard to compute an average figure that can 
be compared to the annual per capita income of an average Shanghai resident, which 
reached 26675 yuan in 2008. Based on this, an average Shanghai family of three 
individuals make a monthly income of around 7000 to 8000 yuan.  
 
Table 4-2. Monthly Household Income at the Pond  
 
Variable Range % 
Household 
income (yuan) 
~2000 
2001~3500 
3501~5000 
5001~ 
25 
38.5 
15.4 
3.8 
        
       Comparatively and based on survey results in Table 4.2., the majority of rural 
migrants (63.5%) with an average family size of three to four individuals in a 
household make less than 3500 yuan per month. Only 3.8 percent of Pond families 
                                                 
77
 2000 PRC National Census, National Statistics Bureau, 2001.  
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make more than 5001 yuan a month. This small proportion of relatively well-to-do 
rural migrant families may number over 200 households in the Pond. 
 
Spatial Ecology 
       A wall apart from the shopping center, the Pond surprises every newcomer by its 
sudden compression of space and yet the dynamism of its market activities.  On 
walking into its 10-feet-wide “main street”, a newcomer may find himself busy not 
bumping into the eye-catching signs on both sides. The neighborhood bustles with 
activity from dawn to dusk, with two major “market streets” attracting a constant flow 
of people. There are constantly traders passing by on bicycles or tricycles carrying 
loads of vegetables, bottled water, or other goods for delivery, and there are customers 
waiting on food stands for their meals, women chatting with house chores in their 
hands, unattended schoolchildren playing at sideway walks, and a few jobless 
adolescents strolling around to pass time.  
       The small lanes are filled with a mixture of smells from restaurants, barber shops, 
snack stores, pancake stands, seafood stands, and public restrooms. There are over 200 
shops, grocery stores and small diners at the Pond. They cover almost every need and 
necessity. Some signs indicate regional food, such as Shandong Dumplings, Sichuan 
Stir fries, and Henan Noodles. All shops here belong to the grey sector of “unlicensed” 
businesses. 
       Shops are flung open for the curious eyes of an occasional visitor. Here, the 
limited space does not allow the luxury of personal “privacy”. So one may notice that 
these business people actually live inside their shops. On top of each shop space, there 
is a cupboard compartment, a “box-shaped bed” hanging down the ceiling for the shop 
owners to sleep in at night. During the daytime, they climb down and lay out their 
items or dishes. At night, the shop is turned into the living room and bedroom. Private 
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bath facilities are impossible to find. People use a public bathhouse nearby, which sell 
tickets for eight yuan per person.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5.   Main Entrance to the Pond 
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       My fieldwork observations in Shanghai, Beijing and Wuhan show that 
concentration by hukou origin and occupational clustering are noticeable 
characteristics of rural migrant communities. Some villages in suburban Beijing are 
literally the “spatial transplantation” of some rural Hebei or Henan villages. One can 
detect few trace of urban integration except that each family hangs up a picture taken 
at the Tian’anmen Square, an indication of their current location and a sense of 
national pride for living in the capital city. In Shanghai, rural migrants populate both 
inner city and suburban areas, but recent years have seen a trend of suburbanization of 
this population. In inner city neighborhoods, sometimes two or three families share a 
roof. Rooms for rent come in all sizes, because local landlords separate old housing 
units into compartments of all sizes. Some are terribly small that only one person can 
sleep in. I once saw a newcomer bargaining with a local landlord over a “room” that 
looked like a cell with one bed but no window. The landlord lady insisted on 300 yuan 
a month.78 The new arrival just frowned and stood in silent negotiation79. I took a deep 
breath when imagining myself sleeping with eyes wide open in this box-like cement 
cell.  
       A typical migrant family often uses a bunk bed, with children sleeping on the top, 
and parents on lower level. A used TV set is the must-have amenity in every family. 
Cupboards outside of the living space are for cooking. Due to the centrality of Pond 
community, rent is much higher than other places. But “For Rent” signs are seldom 
seen. In this “popular” area, information is quickly circulated through well-connected 
landlords.  
                                                 
78
 For this amount, one can rent a room that is three times larger in suburban Shanghai. According to the 
China Household Income Project survey results in 2002, over 55 percent of rural migrant workers had a 
living area of less than 10 square meters.78  Housing costs are a big financial burden for them due to 
rising rents and stagnation in wage growth. According to the CHIP survey, rent accounted for almost 
half of rural migrants’ total household expenditure.  
79
 If it’s in migrant-concentrated Songjiang district, with 300 yuan, one could rent a room three times 
larger than this. 
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History and Development 
       Pond is an “urban village” in central Shanghai, with rural migrants from Anhui 
(45%), Fujian (23%), Jiangsu (8%), Jiangxi (6%) and other provinces.80 Its 
demographic composition was predominantly made up of Fujian rural migrants before 
1992. There is a history behind the change.  
      As early as the 1970s, Shanghai’s M district was a manufacturing center for 
control panel instruments used in communication. An industrial zone was set up in this 
area, including many state-owned electronics factories. Around late 1980s, the 
instrument-making industry went through a restructuring, and many production units 
were turned into research centers. With this change, a large number of front line 
workers were laid off. Factory-provided housings were taken back from the workers. 
But one area was kept to accommodate retired workers, which later became the area 
Pond residents lived in. Although the factory wanted to claim it back, but because of 
the high compensation demanded by these retirees, they delayed demolition for years. 
Conflicts over this patch of land arose from time to time. Rumors of demolition were 
on and off. The area was kept “in peace” by this stalemate. Jian, an elder staff who has 
worked in this area for more than two decades, recounts the initial creation of this 
migrant community: 
 
“The panel instrument factory wanted this piece of land back in the 80s, 
but only agreed to give each worker 70 to 80 thousand as compensation. 
Some took the money and went elsewhere. But there were many ‘dingzi 
hu’ who would not cooperate and refused to leave.81 They knew that the 
factory meant to use this land to gain more. The reality was, at that time, 
the policies of demolition, compensation, and future reallocation were not 
                                                 
80
 From 2008 Pond Community Survey, conducted by the local NGO (ROOT) volunteers, including 
myself. We randomly selected 51 rural migrants, with the assistance of the local street committee, and 
conducted the survey within a month. ROOT has conducted a similar survey in 2003. Compositions of 
rural migrants’ origin of residence from two surveys are found in Appendix. 
81
 During China’s urbanization, the term “dingzi hu” ( literally means “nail households”) is coined to 
refer to the person or household who refuses to move and bargains for reasonably higher compensation.  
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clearly publicized. [which made people discontent] so they rent out their 
places while waiting for higher compensation.” (Jian, age 48, male, staff of 
Pond Street Committee) 
        
       In early 1990s, a large flow of Fujian migrants arrived in this neighborhood. 
Faced with slim chance of entering into the formal labor market—which was still 
dominated by state and collective owned firms at that time—this group developed 
strong entrepreneurial stills in trading regional specialties into Shanghai market. 
Within just a few years, Pond was built into a sizeable informal market for “nanbei 
huo” (northern-southern regional produce).82 Fujian migrants’ market-making process 
in Pond was very similar to Beijing’s “Zhejiang village” around that time: at the 
beginning, with increasing flows of rural migrants, grassroots administrators (street 
committees) considered informal businesses a good way to “create job opportunities” 
for them to avoid instability. They even collaborated with rural migrants in 
maintaining market order. For a time, the Pond market was very prosperous to have 
attracted substantial media attention:  
 
“The government was not involved with the Pond Market at the beginning. 
It was those Fujian migrants themselves who brought in regional produce 
(tuchan) to sell, then it evolved into a big market. In the 90s, we [Pond 
Street Committee] also joined in helping them managing the market. It was 
easier to manage back then. We allocated space, and discussed about 
putting up signs for each seller… even CCTV and other TV channels even 
reported this market when it was doing the best. It was even broadcasted 
abroad… Our district governor even visited this market.” (Wei, age 45, 
male, director of Pond Street Committee) 
        
       The prosperity of Pond market did not last for long. The chaotic land ownership 
issues and short-term orientation of market building by Fujian migrants eventually 
                                                 
82
 Fujian people’s merchant activities can be traced back to an early period. Fujian has always been 
known as the hometown for millions of “overseas Chinese” (huaqiao) who spread their commercial 
networks to all over the world as early as the Ming dynasty. 
 150 
resulted in deteriorating infrastructure. In 2002, authorities listed “overcrowding” and 
the “failure to pass inspection of fire preventative infrastructure” as reasons for 
relocation. “Our top officials were just afraid that it would become too ‘luan’ (chaotic) 
here,” recalled a staff at the street committee.  
       After 2003, the composition of Pond residents changed dramatically, from the 
more entrepreneurial Fujian migrants to a much poorer group of Anhui migrants.83 
Poverty and family migration characterizes rural migrants from Anhui. These new 
tenants of Pond used to inhabit a slum area near a deserted railway intersection. The 
image of inflowing “vagrants” terrified the local administrators at Pond. Together with 
the local Public Security Bureau, they spent a week in checking migrants’ permits. 
Similar surveillance was carried out on a weekly basis afterwards.   
       A background information here is necessary. Detention and deportation were part 
of the collective memory to rural migrants in China’s big cities from 1996 to 2003.84 
Regulations on rural migrants brought a lucrative business to police stations, so rural 
migrants became frequent targets of forced bribery, repatriation and physical 
violence.85 For each detainee, fines and bribes could add up to several hundred yuan. 
In Shanghai, 40000 detentions and deportations were reported in 1993; the number 
doubled in 1996, then rose to 100000 in 1997 (Unger 2002:119; Zhao 2000:102).   
       To staff of the Pond Street Committee, the rural migrants from Anhui were a 
totally very different group. If the demolition of the Pond market once left them with 
                                                 
83
 Anhui is known as one of China’s largest agricultural province, sometimes a euphemism for very 
poor areas. In history, poverty of the peasants were especially acute also because of the flooding of the 
Huai River. The most recent one was around 1991. The region’s GDP per capita only amounts to one 
third of the level of two neighboring provinces, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. According to a survey conducted 
by Anhui government, on average one out of six Anhui residents out-migrated in 2004, and the number 
kept increasing each year. Around 24.5 percent of these out-migrating peasants come to Shanghai. In 
2003, over 570 thousand children from age 5 to 14 followed their parents to other cities, taking up to 6 
percent of the total out-migrating population from Anhui. 
84
 In 2003, the Custody and Deportation System was abolished. 
85
 “A Report on Administrative Detention under the Custody and Repatriation Law,” Sept 1999. Also 
see Nicolas Becquelin (2002).  
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lingering frustration, they felt equally reluctant to welcome such a change. It is clear 
that from the beginning, the Pond Street Committee has associated “criminality” with 
the new rural migrants, and adopted a suspicious and exclusive attitude toward them. 
A social fabric of mutual trust and reciprocity is absent from the onset of their 
relationship. Furthermore, as Pan (2007) observes, high mobility and turnover bring 
about anonymity that breaks its collective identity into pieces, turning it into “a 
laboratory of social despair.” After the initial chaos, life in Pond settled into routines. 
Some rural migrants found work as temporary workers, cleaning ladies, or security 
guards. Others wander around as recyclers, street vendors and other irregular traders.  
       Since 2005, urban street committees underwent a reform, which left them on their 
initiatives to “generate revenues” to cover staff wages. They came up with the idea of 
market reconstruction. Wei, the director of Pond street committee, went to the Bureau 
of Commerce and Business inquiring about the possibility of allowing informal 
businesses for rural migrants in their administrative community. Wei recalls, “…they 
allowed us to charge management fees and organize the market here. Their only 
concern was about food security. So we required people who open restaurants and 
diners here to have health permits.” From talking with Wei, I sense that it was much to 
the local street committee’s own interests to allow informal businesses here, because 
their staff’s salaries depend mainly on collecting management fees from the over 200 
rental spaces here. The relationship between local administrators and rural migrants in 
Pond has been characterized by a mixed feeling of dependency and domination. 
 
 
 
 152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6. A Vegetable Shop in the Pond 
Figure 4-7.  A Video Rental Shop in the Pond 
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Maintaining Social Distinction 
        Categorization is an ongoing process of Pond’s local governance. Since June of 
2002, Shanghai changed its “temporary residence permit” system into a new 
“residence permit” system with three main categories: “skilled/talent” (rencai lei), 
“work” (congye lei), and “dependent” (toukao lei). Despite superficial differences, 
when it concerns real life situations, it is a mere name-change.  
       As Bourdieu (1991:236) argues, the process of social categorization, of “making 
things explicit and classifying them”, is a key mechanism of “identity-making of 
social control”. The action of “registration” symbolizes a certain power relationship 
among social status groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8.   Street Committee’s Announcement Board 
“Please register for residence permits before the deadline.” 
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       Public administrators can freely levy charges or release governance measures that 
entail different attitudes towards members and nonmembers of this system, and such 
practices forcefully reproduce the distinct social identity of the rural class. Though 
such social control devices are considered as indispensable by local administrators, 
many rural migrants see them as “no use” and a “hassle”. As a way of defiance against 
authority, they simply would not show up at registration windows. They also turned 
aloof to the one-child policy which used to be the toughest social control mechanism. 
A staff at Pond street committee expresses frustration in his job: 
 
“Our job is mainly to release information. Like… if you bring a migrant 
marriage certificate to Shanghai, you can have free check-ups in the 
hospitals. But they don’t care about such information. There are many free 
services, but you got to give us your legal papers. Most of them don’t… 
Only one tenth has registered for the residence permit. You see, our office 
downstairs is mainly for registration with the Public Security Bureau’s 
criminal system. If someone commits a crime at home then runs to live 
here, we could then find out. We just caught a ex-convict through this 
system, who has been hidden here for 5 or 6 years. But most of these 
people would not come to register. … These people are of poor suzhi (of 
lesser quality), I tell you. We don’t really want work for them. You see the 
government has been concerned and caring for them, but they themselves 
would not cooperate. Some have lived here for 7 or 8 years, but still 
haven’t registered for their permits! And they don’t come and report their 
information to us… Anyway, this place is going to be torn down sooner or 
later, maybe in a year, so it really doesn’t matter to us anymore…”  
        
       Administrative categorization has turned rural migrants more suspicious to 
outsiders, including NGO volunteers who present good will to help them. Most of my 
NGO friends at ROOT tell me that it is very difficult to build up trust with families 
there. After three years of regular involvement with members of this community, the 
ties between this NGO and its beneficiaries are loose. To most rural migrants, the fact 
this NGO is trying to help them at their organization’s own costs is simply beyond 
their comprehension. There have rarely been any free services they can access in the 
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city, and they are suspicious to the idea of “charity”. Indifference and social distrust 
inside a community has their structural causes. As Hardin (2004) states, distrust is not 
merely a rational and moral assessment, it also “protects against harms.” When a 
certain social status group has been treated inequitably for a long time, they tend to 
develop low trust in public institutions. Social disorganization and withdrawal are 
intensified after rigid patterns of social exclusion are formed.  
 
Families in the Pond 
       Given the predominant presence of migrant families with children at Pond (over 
two thirds), routines and accidents related to children make the story lines at Pond. 
Education is also a non-threatening topic that most rural migrants like to talk about, 
which often dispels the distrust and brings conversers in closer touch with life’s 
concerns. I select four families to present in more detail how their life chances were 
limited by the interlocking effects of informal employment, negative neighborhood 
effects, and inherited inequality across generations. 
      The Zhangs live in a room of around 15 square meters with their three children. A 
double-bunk bed takes up half of the space. Zhang’s older daughter Jing, sleeps on the 
top bunk, side by side to her younger brother. The couple and their youngest son sleep 
at the bottom level. Beside the bed, there is a lower writing table loaded with used 
books and paper boxes. In the summer when it gets too hot and humid in the room, the 
boys would make this writing table into their bed. Like other families here, they set up 
an extended area outside the window for cooking using recycled cupboard. All the 
furniture in the room are pushed against the walls in order to make more space.  
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       Zhang appears a heavily built northern man, with high hope for his three children. 
The heavy penalty for having three children left them in debt, the main reason why 
they left for the city. The couple first worked at a few construction sites. Then after a 
few years, their economic conditions improved, so they decided to bring the children 
with them.  
       “I never went to school,” says Zhang’s wife, “but after all, a good education for 
the children is most important.” So the whole family moved to Pond in 2000, because 
Zhang’s relatives lived here. They chose to do recycling because this job allows them 
to freely allocate time to take care of the three children.  
       At that time, there was a migrant school inside Pond community, with over 900 
migrant children enrolled. It only offered courses from grade one to the second year of 
    Figure 4-9.  Room Arrangements of the Zhang’s 
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junior middle (equivalent to grade seven). Afterwards most students will need to 
return to their hukou origin for the final year of junior middle, which will prepare them 
for the entrance exam to senior middle school. Although they were not happy about 
the quality of teaching in this migrant school, since no other schools in the proximity 
received migrant children, the Zhangs enrolled their three children in this school. 
 
“At that time, every class had over 50 students, so it was very crowded. 
And teachers were too busy to attend to every single student. Plus, their 
main purpose was to make money, so teachers were not as responsible as in 
our hometown schools. … Tuition was even higher than our village 
schools. They were, un-regulated [formal] schools. … Teachers would 
come and go, and few were truly responsible for the students. They knew 
that most parents like us did not have much education, so they gave out 
very high scores for the kids’ exams, to please some parents who could not 
even read. But many of us later found this out. They were simply 
irresponsible.” (Zhang, male, age 38, from rural Anhui) 
        
       Zhang’s account captures what situations were like around 2003, when local 
governments delayed providence of free education facilities led to the mushrooming of 
informal “hut schools” accommodating rural migrant children. Chapter five is devoted 
to a detailed analysis of this process.  
       Just like the fate of the Pond market, the Pond migrant school launched into 
operation with some informal head-nods from the street committee. Its closedown was 
foretold by its illegitimacy. In 2003, M district government decided that there should 
not be any migrant schools inside its administrative region. This was another turbulent 
event for Pond people. Eligible transfers into public schools needed to go through the 
district Education Bureau, with several required documents (proof of employment and 
vaccination certificate) from the parents. But since most families in Pond took up 
informal jobs such as domestic cleaning, delivery, recycling, street vending, many do 
not possess any type of work permit. Only a few managed to get proofs of work status 
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through personal connections. No statistics were available to see how many children 
were not transferred smoothly that year. But according to Pond street committee staff, 
only four hundred migrant families came for vaccination certificate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10.  The Pond Migrant School before Closedown (2003) 
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       The two months after the school’s abolition were the most difficult time for the 
Zhang family. As recyclers, Zhang never possessed any “work permit” to prove his 
working status. The couple asked around anxiously, and used all their connections to 
get a fake paper for Zhang as a temporary worker at some factory. Then Zhang’s wife 
lined up in front of the education bureau office for a whole month, hoping to get three 
registration forms for her children. When it was announced that there were no longer 
any quota left, she turned in distress and found her motorcycle stolen. Mrs. Zhang 
broke down. Her condition was noticed by an official in the education bureau. Out of 
sympathy, that official secured three quotas for her. 
       Since the re-allocation of students was completely arbitrary and slots were 
randomly drawn, Zhang’s three children went into three different public primary 
schools in that area. Although Zhang now needs to spend more time sending each to 
school by motorcycle, he is very content.  
       Since 2007, even tuition for primary school pupils were waived, so the children 
are enjoying a much better learning environment with much lower costs. The two 
boys, 11-year-old Ming and 8-year-old Jun have nurtured increasing interests in 
playing some musical instruments at school, so the parents are paying more attention 
to collect old drums and flutes for the kids during their work.  
 
Between Streets and Schools 
       Not all Pond families went through such a smooth adjustment after the school 
closedown like the Zhangs. Jet’s story is another case. The boy was said to be such a 
slow learner at the public school that his teachers hesitate to allow him move onto 
third grade. Jet’s mother is illiterate herself, and the father has been too busy to care 
for his homework, so Jet’s grade continued to drop.  
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       One Saturday morning, I met 10-year-old Jet for the first time in my English class 
for ROOT. Since then, Jet became my “tour guide” in the webs of small alleys inside 
Pond, and he seemed to enjoy it. Familiar with every small hidden turn, here and 
there, he is proud of his “local knowledge” that I have not acquired. Jet and his parents 
moved to this area seven years ago, when he was only a toddler. The mud and chaos, 
to an intruder from outside like me, has always been his familiar playground. 
       Jet is not a clean boy. A closer look at him show that his parents were raising the 
boy carelessly: his hair has grown into long strands, without being washed probably 
for a long time; his school uniform sky blue uniform is turning grey with dots of mud 
and ink. Most strikingly, as he stretches out his forearms, long bruises and scars 
jumped into my eyes.  
      “My dad beat me up again.” He explains to me.  
      “Why did he do that?” I asked, while suppressing my angry surprise.  
       Then Jet bowed down his dead and murmured, “because I went to play video 
game again…”  
       I knew the boy was not doing well in his schoolwork, but I was not informed of 
the domestic violence happened in his family. So I decided to visit Jet’s parents the 
next day.  
       Jet’s father, Liang, 40, opened a snack shop in Pond, selling soft drinks, snacks, 
and bubble tea. It is a tiny space of only 4 to 5 square meters. From seven to ten in the 
morning, Liang’s shop also sells fried pancakes (jianbing), a type of northern regional 
breakfast. I visited him when he was working at the pancake stand. I asked how many 
he usually sells per day. “Usually over a hundred”, he said, “two yuan each”. When 
business gets less busy for him after 10am, he sat down and talked to me. He 
continued with the rising living costs. Now he has to pay 450 yuan for this teashop, a 
rent doubled than last year. Another 300 yuan goes for the living room they rent down 
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at the back, where the family spend the nights in. The teashop is too small to hold a 
bed, as in other rental spaces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Liang appeared to have a mild temperament when talking to me. I almost 
hesitated to associate this mild-tempered father with the scars on Jet’s forearms. 
Trying to change the subject of our conversation from business to his son, I ask, “you 
know Jet came to my English class on Saturday. He did well, just a little bit distracted 
from time to time. Do you find it difficult to discipline him?”  
       Liang seemed to know that I was referring to, and he replied, “the boy is too hard 
to discipline, always spending money and time in video game rooms… Sometimes we 
could not find him anywhere, and we get anxious. Then every time I would find him 
Figure 4-11.  Liang’s Teashop Business Layout 
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playing video game again!! He simply wouldn’t listen. So I spanked him hard.” 
Pausing for a few seconds, Liang continued, “I know I shouldn’t beat him… You see, 
we had my son when I was in my late-thirties. People say it is a blessing for an older 
man to have his first son. I did not want to treat him like that, but it is the only way 
that works for him!”    
       Liang has a long, tough journey to the city. He left northern Jiangsu (subei) at the 
age of twenty after his mother passed away. With no close relatives to rely on, Liang 
came to Shanghai, and became a modern subei migrant. He did all kinds of work, such 
as construction, renovation, factory worker, etc. He sometimes liked drinking and 
hanging out with friends, so he never had much savings, which made it difficult for 
him to date any women. Liang later met his wife, who is ten years younger than him. 
“Because she also came from a poor family and did not go to school, she did not look 
down upon me,” Liang told me with a shy smile. So the couple had their son when 
Liang was 38 years old. Since then, they picked up street vending, because it allows 
more freedom to care for the child. Both of them value education very much. 
        Jet’s first grade was also spent in the migrant school at Pond. After its 
demolition, the boy was admitted into a public school, under the condition that the boy 
should re-take Grade One courses. Like the Zhang family, Liang also had to stop the 
business, and return to his hukou origin for necessary papers, which cost him several 
thousand yuan. When Jet continued to Grade Two, his school performance started to 
drop. Both Jet’s parents and the teachers knew the direct cause to be the boy’s 
addiction to video games.  
       Migrant-concentrated neighborhoods do not offer a positive learning environment 
for migrants’ second generation. With overcrowding and lack of spaces, the 
community offers exposure to many undesirable resources, such as video game rooms, 
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“internet bars” and small gambling casinos.86 These amenities flourished in the hidden 
lanes of Pond. Some businesses are located inside some families. With no external 
signs or advertisements, they are verbally broadcasted among dropout kids and jobless 
adults. Insufficient parental involvement in their coursework is actually the deeper 
root cause for children’s engagement into these activities. According to the 
community survey, parents are generally less educated (with 9.6 percent of illiteracy, 
and the most educated 48 percent with junior middle school education). Burdened with 
the daily pressure to make more money, most parents seldom spend much time and 
engage in helping their children’s homework. Most children in Pond wear keys around 
their necks. Some commute to schools by themselves, and come home to cook for 
themselves. Their parents work in nearby factories, often arriving home after 10pm. 
These “latch-key kids” are susceptible to becoming addicted to video games.87 Pond 
offers no playground or recreational sites other than narrow street corners for the 
children here. That created a “market” for video game businesses and internet bars. 
These places function as the socialization arena for children at Pond.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86
 In China, it is illegal for internet bars and video game shop owners to open for children below 18. But 
migrant communities are plagued with these, and also small gambling card rooms or “casinos” for 
adults. 
87
 It was because of this social problem that ROOT was formed. They initiated after-school programs 
for children to engage in reading and interest classes. The goal was to compensate for lack of parental 
involvement. Every afternoon, the activity room and library are open to children in this community. On 
weekends, volunteers (mostly college students) come to give personal tutoring. However, the lack of 
parental involvement also curtails the effect of NGO programs. 
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       The next time I went to tutor Jet’s English, his mother, Wang, shyly asks me if I 
could do them a favor by accompanying her to Jet’s school some day. It turned out 
that the school demanded Jet’s parents to transfer him immediately. Not wanting her 
son to experience too much interruption, Wang wanted to talk with the public school 
for one last time, and she wanted me to go along with her. 
       Wang usually takes care of the teashop from early 6am to 4pm in the afternoon, 
then goes to pick up Jet from school. We went to the school around the usual time. 
Standing at the door of Jet’s classroom, I noticed the boy sitting at the last row, 
turning his head around while other students were writing. The math teacher 
immediately noticed Wang, and frowned with obvious contempt. She angrily 
reproached her loudly while pointing at Jet, “your child could not answer any quiz 
Figure 4-12.  Limited Social Space for Children in the Pond 
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questions today! He even makes noises when others are studying. Look at his quiz 
yourself!!” Jet’s quiz paper was thrown at Wang’s face. She picked it up, and her face 
was all red.  
       Soon we were brought to see the director of Jet’s class, his Chinese teacher Lu. Lu 
frowned too at the sight of Wang, and with impatience in her tone, she said, “I am 
telling you again, this boy should not stay in class if he does not do any homework and 
cannot catch up.”  
        She remained in her seated position when Wang and I stood in front of her desk, 
with sorry looks on our faces, like two students who are caught in wrongdoings. All 
the teachers in the office looked at us, and when Wang apologized for her son’s 
misbehavior and her voice sounded almost like crying.  
         “And who are you?” Teacher Lu asked, spotting me as a stranger. I introduced 
myself as a volunteer mentor for Jet in Pond. With some confusion, she looked at me. 
Then I explained that we are a group of social workers who are trying to help children 
like Jet to catch up in coursework.  
          “That’s no use,” she uttered abruptly. “This boy is hopeless! Just look at him! 
He does not even wash his hair and his clothes.”  
          She then turns to Wang and scolded her. “What type of parents are you? And 
now you bring a college student to support you? That’s no use!!” Wang continued to 
apologize for a few more seconds, and then we were told to leave. 
         After this trip, ROOT volunteers, including myself, tried harder to help Jet’s 
schoolwork. For about a month, Jet seems to be learning well, and even stopped going 
to video games. His father was grateful for our help, and agreed to stop spanking him. 
Things went peacefully for two months, until one day, after my English class, Jet 
showed me the new bruises on his arms. “Again?!…” I thought to myself.  
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       The same month, Jet’s school insisted on his immediate transfer, and that Jet 
should not take part in the final exams.  
        “What do you plan to do?” I asked Liang. He said the only option would be to 
transfer Jet to the migrant school five miles away from Pond. Liang also decided to let 
Jet re-take Grade Two, since the boy did not learn much in the past year. Again? I 
thought to myself. This would make Jet the oldest student in his second grade class. 
       “A good thing is, I think he will be happy in that [migrant] school. At least the 
teachers would not look at them differently.” Liang says to me.  
       About one third of primary-school-age children at Pond go to attend this migrant 
school, because it’s the only migrant school in the adjacent area. The enrolled number 
once reached a record high of 1300 students. Since adjacent public schools only take 
in first-born children from families with appropriate documents. So most families with 
two or more children had to send their younger children to this migrant school. Many 
share similar experiences like Jet entering and dropping out of public schools. 
 
Accidents as Focal Points 
       A poor community as Pond is, most families here value children’s education. 
Drop out school-age children are rare. But when a child is identified as “being on the 
street” rather than properly schooled, a type of social stigma is labeled to the family.  
       8-year-old Qiang is probably the youngest dropout. His parents moved into Pond 
about 7 years ago. The family came from Henan province. Qiang’s father had a hard 
time finding jobs, and ended up addicted to gambling with a jobless group at Pond. 
This soon sent the family into dire poverty. For years, Qiang’s mother strived to find 
irregular jobs to sustain their livelihood. When Qiang reached the age of five, his 
father was into gambling, so his mother walked out of the home and never came back. 
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This change pulled Qiang’s father out of gambling but into deep depression. After he 
was able to pull himself to find some work, Qiang has been unschooled for a year.  
       Many families would sympathetically send the boy some food when his father 
was drunk or out for work. But most of them would not let their children play with 
Qiang. The family only had a bed, a TV set, a lamp, and a rice cooker in the room. 
When his father goes out for work, Qiang cooks some rice for himself. This explains 
why the boy always looked pale and undernourished.  
       Qiang’s father did find a job, as a night janitor for a hospital nearby. He started to 
ride his bike to work every evening, and came back the next morning. During the day, 
Qiang had to find something to do by himself while his father slept at home. The boy 
was very alone. He occasionally visits the video game rooms but has not money to 
play. He is looking forward to a new semester, because his father promised to send 
him to school again in September. We were all glad about how things were working 
out for the boy, and he showed more interest in learning in our after-school programs. 
       However, life is often disturbed by unexpected tragedies. As ROOT volunteers 
always discussed about safety issues for children here, for the two intersecting roads 
surrounding are often busy with traffic. Everyone sensed the potential risks with 
children running around in that area, but nobody took measures to prevent things from 
happening. 
       I was not in Shanghai when my friends at ROOT sent me the news report 
describing an accident in the Pond area, with two unschooled boys run over by a bus. 
It was confirmed that the two boys were Jet and Qiang. With his arm and leg muscles 
severely injured, Jet has been in coma for three days. Qiang was killed at the moment 
of the accident. 
       Jet’s accident changed the family’s trajectory in the city completely. The couple 
closed down their teashop, so that they could take shifts in caring for Jet, who still 
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needed to go through a few surgeries. They still kept their living space in Pond. 
Everyday Jet’s father cooks and brings the meals over to the hospital, where his wife 
stays overnight. Liang told me that when he heard of the accident, he cried because he 
thought he was going to loose his son. Regrets overwhelmed him, as he recollected. “I 
would never force him to study or beat him. I feel so content that he is alive and well 
now.” 
       In this tragic incident, the bus driver was at fault by running over pedestrian walks 
during red light, so the two families were guaranteed to get compensations. The 
tragedy, lawsuits, and compensations became the number one conversation topic at 
Pond. Qiang and his family became the focus. The boy’s father was devastated and 
guilty for his negligence. Qiang’s mother, who had been gone for over three years, 
reappeared at Qiang’s funeral, also devastated.  
        Mixed feelings of criticisms and sympathies stirred up people’s conversations. 
Every family started to warn their kids from running outdoors. ROOT volunteers held 
meetings to discuss how to reduce potential dangers in the community, and help the 
two families to get timely compensations. A communal response emerged, but such 
heightened atmosphere lasted for about a month before Pond returned to its old way of 
life. 
 
Finding Ling 
      Wan’s family is much admired in Pond. The couple now make about twice the 
income of an average migrant family. Both of them have quite decent jobs—Wan has 
been a baomu (domestic maid) for an American family for the past two years. 
Working for foreigners not only adds to the prestige of her job; Wan is also seen as 
lucky to have met a kind-hearted foreigner who late offered a job to her husband. They 
are probably economically better off than many local Shanghainese. For the past three 
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years, the family lived contently, with their youngest son slowly discovered his talent 
in music and art, and two older daughters growing into city teenage lifestyles. A crisis 
will approached when Wan’s oldest daughter Ling returns home for middle school.  
       One out of five families at Pond is incomplete, not by divorce, but due to family 
members living apart. Either the couple left their children home with their 
grandparents, or one of them left to accompany their post-primary-school-age children 
for further education at home. Making this decision was not easy. Wan had reasons to 
worry that such a drastic change would seem almost like an “exile” to the young girl, 
who barely understands the difficulties facing her parents.  
 
“She has grown in the city, and gotten so used to urban pop culture and 
lifestyles. Can you imagine her going back to live in our backward, 
deserted village in rural Anhui? I can’t. It will be hard for the girl, I know. 
… Maybe in the future, she will blame us for sending her back, but you 
see, we simply had no other choice.” 
        
       Wan’s husband accompanied their two teenage girls back to rural Anhui. With her 
worries and pains after their separation, Wan pulled herself together because life has 
to move on. The couple started to invest even more into the youngest boy. Two years 
later, the time came when their son was not allowed to move up to middle school. 
Wan went back to find an elite boarding middle school in the nearest township.  
“Tuition and living expenses cost a total of 6000 yuan a term, ” says Wan, “but it’s the 
best middle school in our township.” 
      The three children went through their ups and downs in different degrees. Wan’s 
worries were confirmed when her oldest daughter suddenly decided to quit school. 
“She has been into pop music and boys,” Wan told me, and started to blame herself for 
the decision to leave her at home. “My daughter always says to me, ‘don’t blame me, 
mama, if I could not make it to what you expected’. I said I would not, you just try 
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your best, and I would not blame you on whatever turns out. … We were not able to 
provide them good opportunities. Now I really regret bringing them to Shanghai at the 
beginning. It would have been much better if we let them stay in the countryside. … 
So it’s not their fault.” 
       I hear similar comments from a few families at Pond, “we regret bringing our 
children along to Shanghai… they could have done better in school at home.” 
Actually, most families are unprepared about which school their children can attend in 
Shanghai. Many had rosy expectations about their children’s chances of getting into 
formal schools. But their social networks and information channels are so limited that 
it is impossible for them to do any research or locate schools. Many parents ended up 
sending children to the closest migrant schools they could find.  
       An intense crisis disrupted the couple’s work when Ling was found gone, after 
leaving a note of goodbye. The direct cause was that the Ling and another teenage boy 
in her class, because of their romantic involvement, became the blame targets of 
parents and teachers. For the next two days, Wan and her husband rounded up every 
familiar corner of the nearby streets, parks, and the railway station where Ling could 
possibly have been. They spent several sleepless nights before Ling finally called back 
from a Suzhou factory where she found a temporary job.  
 
Social Organization and Co-optation 
       Are there self-help organizations among rural migrants? The NGO revolution 
since the mid-1990s in developing countries certainly has spread the concept of self-
help social organization to China. With relatively declining state intervention into 
people’s social life, compared with pre-reform years, this bottom-up process is 
happening within the state’s pre-set frameworks.  
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       The small number of nongovernmental organizations I got in touch with includes 
ROOT, and the Read For Yourself club (RFY). Both were established by urban elites. 
ROOT existed to serve children’s education issues within a migrant community, while 
RFY functioned to connect migrant workers in one industrial zone using a community 
school venue. Here I use RFY as a case study. 
      RFY started as a government-supported NGO, also quipped as “GNGO”, a 
paradoxical entity in China. The founder, 55-year-old Pan, who is a retired physician, 
is a local Shanghainese who had never come into contact with any rural migrants 
before 1997. An amateur calligrapher and local elite, Pan was informally affiliated 
with the Cultural Bureau of K District. In 1997, this region was home to many 
factories attracting cheap labor from other provinces. Responding to the rising influx 
of rural migrants and potential chaos as them saw it, the district government came up 
with a creative proposal—opening art classes for these “other-landers”—with the 
intent to lower crime rates in this area.  
       Pan volunteered for teaching a calligraphy class, and he taught for the next five 
years. A non-prejudicial Shanghainese, he enjoyed sharing this hobby with people. 
Pan gained much popularity among a group of young migrants with rural origins. 
Catching the talent of a few in reading, Pan later expanded his teaching to a reading 
club. The primitive form of SRC came into being, until one day Pan received a phone 
call from the Bureau of Civil Affairs (min zheng ju). 
 
“It was in 2002, and the BCA called me up, saying that this reading club was 
unregistered and thus illegal. I said to him, ok, we will register. But what he said 
afterwards puzzled me: ‘on the one hand, we do not allow registration for your 
organization; on the other hand, you are illegal if you do not register.’ That 
simply meant, RFY should end either way.” 
        
 172 
       In China, formal registration of organizations with the government as civil 
associations that are independent of the government is not legally allowed. Due to this 
constraint, many NGOs either choose to find an umbrella government body, or to 
remain in informal operation. Pan is not the kind of person to quit easily, especially on 
something that he likes doing. He thought of a tactic which silenced the Bureau of 
Civil Affairs: by using his personal connections, he invited some city-level party 
leaders to a reading club event. The success of this event sent out a signal to the 
district government that even the city officials approved of Pan’s “charity effort.”  
 
“I invited cadres from the city’s Civil Affairs, Public Security Department, 
and the city [Communist] Party Committee. It was a big event. Then the 
district officials said, ‘we have never registered an organization like yours. 
This is the first, and it will be the last one. We hope you can do well with 
it.’ I guessed they thought these activities for waidiren were just nuisances 
(mafan), because after all, these migrants will not stay for long here.” 
        
       At the end of 2004, RFY was registered as a legal NGO under the district 
government. It never occurred to Pan what RFY’s legalization would later bring about. 
Upon its establishment, the goal of RFY was to help rural migrant workers speaking 
out their concerns through reading and public speaking. Members liked coming, even 
for an hour after a day of work, because it offered a site for articulation of their 
frustrations, concerns, worries and hopes. Pan also envisioned it to be a place where 
through the practice of public speaking, RFY members can be somewhat empowered 
for self-expression. At its peak time, they once had over eighty people in a meeting. 
As senior member 36-year-old Yu, a self-taught writer now, remembered: 
 
“RFY gave us the opportunity to improve our suzhi (quality), to speak in 
public, and to think about some issues. I did not know how to talk before. 
Whenever I meet a lot of people, I just blush and turn speechless. But SRC 
gave us a sense of belonging, some idealism too, not like the rest of this 
world.” 
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       In my fieldwork, I found most rural migrants feel inhibited to speak. Part of it was 
because of the “official” tune delivered by “being interviewed”—people are supposed 
to say something “good” and presentable in your life. In the Chinese culture, people 
identify “hui jianghua” (knowing how to speak well) as a marker between rural and 
urban residents (Jacka 2006: 275). For rural migrants, “neng jianghua” is actually a 
survival strategy in the city. Many RFY members mention it as a gain. They also see 
this informal support group as one made of elite migrants with literary interests and 
relatively higher levels of education. Some people formed into strong friendships that 
lasted very long. A few couples were matched up and formed into families.  
       After its “formalization,” RFY members became a model project which the 
district government referrs to in its annual report. With the frequent visits of 
government officials to its reading seminars and public speaking sessions, RFY 
underwent a subtle transition over the next years. Words like “equality” and “rights” 
disappeared. Sometimes “showcase speeches” espousing public policies in permitted 
frames are needed. All end on a sanguine and hopeful tone in line with the state’s 
discourse.  
       The influx of the post-80 generation rural migrants and the SARS epidemic in 
2003, according to Pan, directly caused the decline of RFY membership. Now only 
two or three people show up at their weekly meetings. Sometimes five to six may 
come when there are journalists who want to get stories. Yu was among the few old 
members who showed up occasionally, although he has already moved away to 
another district. Reminiscing in the past “glory” of RFY, Yu sighed, “Now the 
balinghou (post-80) generation) are different. They grew up surfing the internet. Very 
few make time to read now. The club is less attracting to them...” 
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Conclusion 
       Jacobs (1961) criticizes the “urban renewal” policies by rationalist urban planners 
in the US as violently disrupting communities characterized by layered complexity 
and seeming chaos. Similar urban renewal projects are pushed forward in Chinese 
cities during the past decade. Most local governments considered migrant-
concentrated areas evident civic shames and used demolition as the only resort. Recent 
years have seen new paternalistic approaches in dealing with the cities’ 
“undesirables”, like building low-income dormitories for rural migrants in order to 
maintain visual order. 
       Li Zhang’s ethnographic study of the life, death and the rebirth of the Zhejiang 
village in Beijing in the 1990s stands out as an exceptional case where rural migrants 
(of the same Wenzhou origin) actively mobilized themselves into seizing spatial 
power and legitimacy for long-term settlement and development (Zhang 2001). 
However, the Zhejiang village is far from the typical migrant community. Nor is the 
Pond, the rural migrant community in this chapter, a typical community among urban-
dwelling rural migrants. Whether or not rural migrants’ city life presents patterns of 
communal life with the capacity for collective action is a difficult question to start 
with. From her field studies, sociologist Ching Kwan Lee (2007) writes that migrants’ 
class-consciousness seems “muted”, as they rarely speak of themselves as “workers” 
even when some have worked in a factory for years. Labeling themselves “peasants”, 
migrants unambiguously maintain such residence-bound, ascribed status. Even 
organizations that emerged to directly respond to the needs of this disadvantaged 
group tend to assimilate themselves into the dominant official discourse.  
       But it would be equally biased to generalize that rural migrants are incapable of 
self-organization and collective actions. The number of protests in factories and 
construction projects has been on the rise in recent years, leading the central 
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government’s repeated warning over migrants’ wage issues (Asia News, Feb 8, 2010). 
Rural migrants’ initiatives in business start-ups, market-building and school-building 
have been active efforts.  
       In a residential neighborhood setting, the formation of trust and solidarity 
reciprocity does require an “active” social network. Bayat (1997) develops a model to 
distinguish “passive” from “active” social networks within a residential community.88 
By his definition, a passive social network has “low potential for collective action for 
common interests”, and it’s not a “consciously organized” and “mobilized” 
community.  
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 Adapted from figures on page 18 of Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran, by Asef Bayat, 
Columbia University Press. 1997. 
Figure 4-14. Model of Community Networks Mobilization 
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       From observing the living dynamics of over twenty rural migrant concentrated 
neighborhoods, I notice some common features: high turnover rate of tenants, closely-
knit kinship ties but fragmented social networks. Rrural migrants are a coordinated 
group only on some small scales, such as a closely-knit network of native origin 
people, an informal migrant labor marketplace, ect. Just like Pan (2007) describes, 
“Rural migrants often could not form into a community of trust in where they settled 
down. High mobility and anonymity break the community identity into pieces and turn 
it into a laboratory of social despair.”89 For NGOs that are rooted in these 
neighborhoods, trust building and mobilization have always been difficult. In southern 
provinces of China, where millions of teenage migrant labor concentrate in factories, 
migrant neighborhoods are plagued with youth gang activities. 
       In many countries, the church provides a base for collective action among the 
structurally disadvantaged. For example, the black churches assumed a leadership role 
in the US Civil Rights Movement, which also provided the moral authority for non-
violent techniques. Churches in other countries also fulfill a role in organizing social 
life and providing informal support. However, in China’s cities, traces of religious 
organizations in these migrant communities are hardly visible. The combination of 
spatial separation and concentrated poverty lock them into “cultural and structural 
effects” of poverty (Massey and Denton 1993). 
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 Pan, Zequan, Society, Subjectivity and Order: Spatial Turn of Rural Migrant Research. Social 
Science Archives Press. 2007 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INHERITING THE DISTINCTION 
 
“China has declared its free ‘Compulsory Education’ policy to the world, 
but if other countries know the true reality, it would be a shame on us. It is 
said to be an emerging social problem, but …  it has been ‘new’ for many 
years now …”      
           --An “unlicensed” migrant school principal (founder) in Shanghai, Nov 2007. 
 
       Zhang Qidong, 37, Shanghai’s first rural migrant to receive the Model Citizen 
award, became a celebrity after another honorable advancement into communist party 
membership. Having worked as a blue-collar technician for twenty-one years, he is 
now promoted to a well-paid senior position. But even for Zhang, equality of 
education opportunity for his daughter is still a far-reaching dream. Without 
permanent resident status in the city, Zhang faces the difficult decision of sending the 
child back to his rural hometown for schooling.  
       By September of 2007, according to Shanghai Education Bureau, over 80 
thousand migrant students who are enrolled in junior middle schools are faced with the 
prospect of returning to their rural high schools for qualifying exams and further 
education. Many have actually grown up in the city, but with no opportunities of entry 
into any local high schools, they are faced with family separation and difficult 
adjustments back to rural life. Discontinuation of education increases. According to a 
survey conducted by the China Youth Development Foundation in 2005, over 60 
percent of rural teenagers enter into the labor market after junior middle school.90  
       Institutionalized social closure, unlike other types of covert social prejudice, 
forcefully shapes the life chances of the structurally excluded. When it is combined 
                                                 
90
 A report from the Ministry of Education in the same year confirms a close estimate of over 35 million 
rural youth (2005 China Education Development Statistics Report). Cases of over-reported age are 
often observed among younger rural migrants in factories. 
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with hereditary status, the disadvantages will be perpetuated among later 
generations.91 In China’s predominantly state-funded education system, the sharp 
boundary between the urban and the rural class is redrawn.  
  
Migrant Children Falling Through the Cracks  
       By 2005, around 20 million school-aged children had relocated with their parents 
to the cities (Xinhua News, Jan 14, 2005). But the Chinese hukou system determines 
that children from rural families inherit their parents’ legal status in the “agricultural” 
category, even when they have lived in the city for many years. These children fell 
through the cracks of China’s education system characterized by rural-urban 
distinction (UNESCO Courier, 2000). When migrant children came to the cities in the 
early 1990s, urban public schools in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai received 
children who could afford the “temporary study fee” (Cao 1997).92  
       In public schools that received migrant children, informal discrimination 
persisted. With some urban residents preferring to transfer their children, an “urban 
flight” lowered the ranking of these migrant-receiving schools to the bottom tier of the 
public school system. It also created pressures for the school to limit the admission of 
migrant children or to arrange them into separated classes that are explicitly labeled as 
“mingong ban” (rural-migrant-only class).93 Teachers for these classes refrain from 
                                                 
91
 My definition of second-generation rural migrants is to contrast their experience with those of the 
later generation of majority urban residents. I broaden this classification to include all migrant children 
from 5 to 16 years old, within the age range for compulsory basic education.  
92
 Results from the 1997 Beijing Floating Population Census show that among rural migrants whose 
children were not enrolled in school, 43 percent replied that it was because the fees requested by 
schools were too high, and 7.4 replied schools’ rejection (BFPC, 1998, P.174). Beijing Floating 
Population Census Office. 1998. The 1997 Beijing Floating Population Census. Beijing: China 
Commerce Publishing House. Shanghai integrated migrant children in a more active manner. By 2002, 
Shanghai’s public schools have taken in 43 percent of the total population of migrant children 
(Shanghai Education Committee 2003).  
93
 The term “urban flight” was coined after “white flight”, a trend in US history (after 1954) when white 
people moved away from urban neighborhoods that were becoming more racially desegregated.  
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devoting their full efforts as in other classes, because they know that these students 
have to return to rural areas for key-point exams. 
       Amidst such systematic exclusion, some unlicensed “migrant-only” schools 
emerged and multiplied, founded by rural migrant entrepreneurs.94 The illegality of 
this “informal education sector” and their substandard quality made them easy targets 
of urban renewal campaigns and official rent seeking.  
        As a result, segregated schooling and family separation characterize rural 
migrants’ educational experiences in the city. Education inequality has aggravated for 
the second generation of rural migrants over the years.95 School attendance and 
retention rates have been much lower among migrant children than local children.96 A 
more recent study shows that increased educational costs and poor career prospects for 
second-generation rural migrants deter investments in higher levels of education (De 
Brauw and Giles 2008). Since China’s exam system requires students to take key-
point exams only in their hukou registration location, most urban-dwelling migrant 
children (some were urban-born) have to return to rural areas if they wish to continue 
middle school. Disadvantages in educational attainment perpetuate patterns of labor 
market segmentation along the hukou line.97  
       With the issue of migrant children’s education becoming one focal point in public 
discussion, why hasn’t China fixed the cracks in its education system? In this chapter, 
I unravel the multi-faceted nature of this problem. Reforms in the education system 
display strong inertia because it is embedded in the politicized discourses and 
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 A news report shows that the majority of migrant children (76 percent) either entered migrant schools 
or joined the army of left-behind children in rural villages (China Daily, Nov 4, 2004).  
95
 A report (UNDP 2009) shows that 14 to 20 million school-aged migrant children lack access to 
quality education. 
96
 6.9 percent never attended school and 2.4 percent dropped out before completing the mandated 
school years in 2004 (Xinhua News, June 11, 2004).  
97
 A survey in 2004 shows that 60 percent of dropout students from rural migrant families (aged 12 to 
14) took up informal jobs in the city. The survey was conducted by the China Children Center. 
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structural conflicts of interests between the state and local governments with the 
partially reformed hukou system in place. 
 
Market Transition and China’s Education System 
Politicized Education 
       In China’s history, the state has always dominated the decision making of 
education policies. In the socialist era, a radical and artificially egalitarian education 
agenda completely disrupted and even overthrew the normal social mobility patterns, 
by casting the educated to the bottom social stratum and elevating the uneducated 
(Hannum, 1999).98 After the reform, the need for economic development was a top 
priority, and education served a slightly different goal. But the education system 
remained largely “socialist”, characterized by state-dominated institutions.  
       China’s public funding for education has been far below the levels of other 
developing countries in the 1980s and most of the 1990s.99 There’s a temporal gap too: 
the nine-year compulsory education policy was enforced in underdeveloped regions 
almost a decade later than in cities and developed regions. Consequently, individuals 
in richer regions enjoyed more and higher quality education, while those in poor 
regions (especially rural areas) had little improved education facilities. Before rural-to-
urban migration was legalized, there were already vast disparities in educational 
funding and policy implementation. For example, when the state mandated the nine-
year compulsory education policy in 1986, it was first implemented in more developed 
                                                 
98
 Hannum also quotes from Robert (1984). Hanuum also points out that the former Soviet Union also 
had vacillations between socialist experiments and traditionalist backlashes, which culminated a short-
lived cultural revolution from 1928 to 1931. 
99
 The state also fell short of its goals set in the Education Law (1986), which promised 4 percent of 
GDP by 2000. It only devoted 2.4 percent of its GDP to education, far lower than the average 4.1 
percent in other developing countries. 
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areas, and then extended to underdeveloped regions (mostly rural) almost a decade 
later.100 
       Like the labor market structures, urban and rural education systems have been 
deliberately separated from each other, eliminating any transfers between these two 
systems. Education reforms around 1985 decentralized education administration and 
finance to mobilize non-government resources. Since then, state budgetary funds 
dropped each year. Rural basic education in particular, was delegated to the township 
and county levels, which directly burdened peasants. Local governments prioritized 
economic programs as their primary resource allocation, and public expenditures on 
education and other public goods continued to decline. In fact, legal enforcements in 
the area of education have been so feeble that all types of illegal activities, such as 
embezzlement of education funds, delay and arrears of teachers’ wages became 
prevalent in basic education enterprises.  
 
Spatial Mismatch of Education Financing after Mass Migration 
       Mass migration brought challenges to policy-making in education. Decentralized 
and insufficient education financing has produced a “spatial mismatch effect” on the 
already unequal and separated urban and rural education systems. In 1998, when 
millions of rural migrant families had relocated to cities, the state legislation still 
stipulated that local governments at “sending regions” (liuchudi guanli) should take 
full responsibility for financing the education of out-migrating students. It was not 
until 2003 that the state education legislation made it clear that “hosting governments” 
should be perform the duty for financing and managing the schooling of students with 
rural background (liurudi guanli). Even after 2003, no “legally binding institutions” 
                                                 
100
 In 2004, Shanghai government subsidized each primary school pupil with 6700 yuan, and nearly 
6000 yuan of it was from budgetary appropriations. In comparison, the poorest province of Guizhou 
only spent 745 yuan per pupil, of which 670 yuan was from the budget (Wong, 2008). 
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were in place to enforce city governments’ responsibilities. According to the system, 
when school-aged children relocate with the parents from rural to urban areas, the city 
government is not responsible to provide education opportunities. This acute social 
problem has not been addressed adequately in many cities. Zhu Fang, the vice director 
of Jiading District Education Bureau and representative of Shanghai People’s 
Congress, explains this fiscal difficulty: 
 
“As an educator, I really wished this could come true sooner. But the 
reality is, lack of government resources made it impossible. You see 
education finance has been linked to one’s registered residence. So if a 
student from rural Anhui wishes to continue schooling in Shanghai, this 
money still goes to Anhui. … many cities are not keeping in pace with each 
other in terms of reform, so Shanghai cannot be the first to experiment. 
Otherwise, what if everybody else swarm into this city for high school 
education?”101 
        
       City government’s rationale encouraged public schools to levy user charges at 
non-local families. The earliest public schools that opened up requested large sums of 
“temporary study fees” with the justification that these families do not possess the 
legal documents. A public school principal commented on this “conditional” reception 
as fair, saying that “if her parents can meet our requirements [to possess the 
documents], then the student can be treated as other local students here, no charge of 
fees.”102  
       For over a decade, it had become a commonality for non-local families (both rural 
and urban) to pay extra fees in order to enroll in Shanghai’s public schools. Many 
rural migrant families made school choices mainly based on economic concerns. 
Tuition at an informal migrant school (around 900 yuan per semester in Shanghai) is 
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 These comments were drawn from Xihuan News report on Feb 18, 2008. Jiading district is in 
Shanghai’s suburbs, with 500 thousand local residents and 700 thousand rural migrants.  
102
 Interview in Shanghai, December 2007. 
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on average much lower than paying the temporary study fees at a public school 
(ranging from 800 to a few thousand yuan). It was only after 2006 when the first four 
migrant schools in Pudong district were legalized as “private” schools that schools 
became free. After all rural primary schools were waived of tuition from 2007, an 
increasing number of families choose to transfer their children back to rural schools. 
Apart from economic concerns, they think it better that their children’s education is 
not interrupted by school relocation and exam transfers. Empirical evidence shows 
that from 1985 to 2000, about 150 million rural youths nation-wide did not receive 
nine years of education due to overcharges by schools (Zhang 2003). 
       Information discrepancy between policy slogans and the harsh reality failed to 
inform newcomers of the existence of these “cracks” in the urban education system. 
Many rural migrant families had high expectations about getting their children into 
urban public schools. They heard about positive changes and promises such as “Let 
urban schools in the host city take the primary responsibility of receiving migrant 
children, and migrant schools can function as an assisting role” from the state 
media.103 Most of the earliest migrating families are uninformed about which school 
their children can attend in the cities. Their social networks and information channels 
are so limited that it is impossible for them to do any research about which school 
their children can go. A parent recalls the discrepancy between policy and reality: 
 
“Before coming to Shanghai, I always thought that city schools are 
certainly better than our village school. But now looking back, I almost 
regret letting my son transfer here. We had to transfer him several times 
from school to school. Now I realize that education here is worse than our 
village school. Back home our teachers are qualified state-hired teachers. 
But teachers here never had any experience before, and even the principal 
does not care.”104  
                                                 
103
 “Suggestions on How to Better Improve Compulsory Education for Children of Migrant Peasants in 
Cities”, State Council, 2003. 
104
 Interview in Shanghai, March 2008. 
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       The system’s inability to catch up with the needs of rural migrants has to do with 
its characteristic of being a predominantly state-funded system. The Chinese state, 
unlike governments in other countries, only carved out a limited scope for private 
schools. The state has been the main provider of basic education, so it is the state’s 
dominant role in specifying school administration and curriculum within the public 
system. Granting “legitimacy” to non-public education has been a highly political one.  
 
The Life and Death of Migrant Schools 
       Since 1949, most privately funded educational institutions in China were 
abolished, leaving the communist state as the sole monopoly. Education policy-
making, curriculum design, school finance and personnel management were all 
centrally controlled.105 Although the state promised to legalize private education as 
early as in 1993, its legislations phrased ambiguous permission to “schools run by 
social forces”. Until today, no clearly defined laws have been made for private 
education.106 Limited support from financial institutions, restricted growth of non-
profit organizations, and rationed college recruitments have discouraged private 
education to grow. 
       It is within this social context that migrant schools emerged in the extra-legal 
sphere. Born with resource deficiency and lack of legitimacy, these informal schools 
                                                 
105
 Recent years saw some loosening of private education legislations, and by 2006, around 8 percent of 
the 197 million children aged 5 to 14 years are enrolled in 77,000 non-state schools, still half the share 
of India’s privately funded schools. See (Mukherjee 2007).  
106
 As some theorize, communist governments often promote mass education as an instrument of 
political socialization. So they may suppress private education for possible ideological dilution. In Sept 
2003, China promulgated a new law, allowing non-state schools to collect “reasonable economic returns 
from net income after deducting costs, development funds, and other items stipulate by the 
government.” 
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became contested interface between state monopoly of education resources and 
spontaneous social organization by migrants. 
         Rural migrants’ engagement in collective action is most evident in their school-
building efforts. The first informal migrant school was founded in Beijing in 1992.107 
Although family migration became the predominant trend in the late 1990s, the state 
maintained its legislative code for governments of sending regions to take up the 
responsibility to provide education.108 It reflected the long-held anti-urbanization 
ideology of political elites against peasants’ migration into the cities. It was only after 
2003 when the state changed governance by sending governments to  “hosting 
governments” (liurudi guanli), and released a guideline for migrant children’s 
education: “let urban schools in the host city take the primary responsibility of 
receiving migrant children, and migrant schools can function as an assisting role”.109 
This “top decree” was no more than a slogan because no incentives or legal penalties 
were designed for its enforcement. Some public schools only selectively receive 
children from migrant families who are willing to pay large sums of “temporary study 
fees”.110  
       During my fieldwork in 2008, Shanghai had over 200 migrant schools with over 
200,000 migrant children enrolled. I visited over 15 of them, most pushed to the 
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 Xingzhi Migration School in Beijing was first set up in a vegetable field. The founder, Sumei Li and 
her husband were former rural teachers. Li was pleaded by her own hometown folks to teach their 
children, so they started a “hut” school with just nine pupils. In the next seven years, the school size 
rose to a few hundred, then to over two thousand in 2003. When interviewed by state media reporters, 
Sumei tells stories of numerous school dislocations. Sometimes they had to move to a larger facility 
because of overcrowding, and other times they were forced to relocate because of illegitimacy. 
108
 The law in 1998 stipulated that responsibilities fall upon local governments at “sending regions” 
(liuchudi guanli). 
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 “Suggestions on How to Better Improve Compulsory Education for Children of Migrant Peasants in 
Cities”, State Council, 2003. 
110
 Decisions to cancel “temporary study fees” were decentralized to local governments followed the 
State Council’s Suggestions in 2003. In Beijing, for example, it was only since September of 2004 that 
the city government demanded all public schools to exempt migrant children from “temporary study 
fees”. But in reality, many schools continued to overcharge migrant families in the names of other 
miscellaneous fees, ranging from a few thousand to higher amounts. 
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suburban areas of Pudong, Minhang, and Baoshan districts. Among the principals I 
interviewed, many came from the group of “rural-teacher-turned-entrepreneurs” in the 
late 90s. 60-year-old Sun had taught as a rural teacher for 29 years before she retired. 
In 1996, Sun came to live with her relatives, and met a few Anhui “laoxiang” (people 
from the same native place). “They were all glad to know that I had retired, and 
pleaded me to teach their children,” Sun recalls, “then I realize that many of these 
children did not schools to go to.” Sun agreed to teach but only promised a few 
months. To her surprise, the school expanded to a thriving site in the neighborhood 
with over 400 students.  
 
Education as a Market for Migrant Entrepreneurship 
       Around the late 1990s, migrant children’s needs for education facilities became so 
visible that migrant schools were seen as a market model for migrant entrepreneurship 
in the cities. Migrant schools replicated into for-profit, moneymaking “private 
ventures”. Investments in their facilities were cut down to the minimum. When 
interviewed, most founders express such similar concerns: “the school has to make a 
profit, otherwise it cannot survive. We ourselves do not have the money to run a 
charity,” says Zhao, the founder and principal of a school with 1300 students in 
Shanghai. His business partner, the vice principal Gu, explains: 
 
“Our school cannot be compared with Shanghai’s public schools, no matter 
the facilities, teachers’ salaries or curriculum. You see, Shanghai’s primary 
school pupils receive 5000 to 7000 yuan subsidy per pupil every year. We 
have no subsidies from the state. We can only rely on ourselves to raise 
money to cover the rent, teachers’ salaries. Even when security 
departments came to inspect our school, and when they demanded us to 
renovate or fix the security facilities, we need to raise the money by 
ourselves. … These families are making the lowest income in the city, but 
we have no other choice but to charge them. I always think, if the state is 
willing to subsidize them, even partially, then we could waive tuition for 
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these families, and it could help them a lot.” (Gu, male, age 36, vice 
principal at Y migrant school) 
        
       Many rural migrants like Zhao and Gu proclaim goodwill for providing 
“education for the disadvantaged children”. In reality, very few promised quality or 
responsibility. Facilities and utilities are kept at the lowest expense possible, and 
teachers are often underpaid.  
       In Shanghai, founders of these informal schools mostly come from Shouxian, 
Huoqiu and Liuan counties of Anhui province. In 2001, only one fourth of the 519 
informal schools have complied with regulations requiring both permission from their 
government of origin and registration with Shanghai education authorities (Liberation 
Daily, Sept 10, 2001). Since government departments in various parts of Anhui had 
different organizational structures overseeing this issue, some of these founders 
obtained papers from the physical education department, some from the office for 
managing social forces. A few even purchased some temporary permit for education 
investment from the black market for “permits”. Born without legitimacy and public 
funding, similar major problems such as low qualification and high turnover of 
teachers, poor teaching facilities, willful management, and instability of students 
plague most migrant schools. As a migrant teacher explains, 
 
“By 2000, Shanghai had many migrant schools. Most of them were 
founded by Anhui people, and some were run like ‘family enterprises’. 
Many founders did not have much education or teaching experiences 
themselves. So the situation was quite chaotic. I felt many schools at that 
time were just irresponsible.” (Deng, age 37, former migrant school 
teacher) 
        
       Compared with the overwhelming charge of “temporary study fees” in the city’s 
public schools, rural migrants willingly pay in several hundred for their children to 
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enter these informal schools.111 For migrant families who can only send their children 
into unsubsidized migrant schools, they are not only disadvantaged in terms of 
economic spending, but also in the quality of education their children can get, which is 
sometimes even worse than rural villages because of the high turnover rate of migrant 
teachers in these schools.  
 
Illegality and Closedown Campaigns 
       Until today, most migrant schools are still struggling on the verge of “illegality”. 
Most migrant schools convert old factories and warehouse into classrooms. A few 
upgraded schools use old public school facilities. Due to the substandard facilities and 
illegal status, many became targets of evictions and clear up campaigns. In the 
summer of 2006, 39 unlicensed migrant schools in Beijing were ordered by F district 
government to close down (Newsweek, Oct 10, 2006).112 In Shanghai, the closedown 
of Jianying School in 2007 after its ten years of “illegal operation” even led to a 
violent crackdown of protesting parents by armed police (Xinhua News, Jan 10, 2007; 
New York Times, Jan 25, 2007). During this incident, a high-ranking education 
official justified their decision to close it down, “when migrant children’s rights for 
survival and health come into conflicts with their rights for education, we should first 
consider the former—their basic safety and health.” This mentality prevails among 
education officials who use safety concerns as the excuse to close down migrant 
schools.  
                                                 
111
 In Shanghai, migrant schools charge a unified tuition for all pupils. It’s usually around 800 or 900 
yuan per semester, an amount relatively higher than Beijing’s migrant schools where families only pay 
around 500. It was only after 2006 when the first four migrant schools in Pudong district were legalized 
as “private” schools that students in these schools were exempted from tuition. 
112
 Officials from Beijing Education Committee explained to reporters from Newsweek, an official news 
agency under CCTV, that these decisions were made because of “disturbing” findings from their large 
scale research about most schools’ “unsafe” facilities. 
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       Accidents in school sometimes invite penalties from the education bureau, 
sometimes climaxed with a closedown order. Several traffic accidents involved 
“informal” school buses overloaded with students from a migrant school invited 
banning of all school buses in M district by the education bureau. Other risks such as 
food poisoning also invite similar pressures from the education authorities. Informal 
migrant schools all have dining rooms and snack shops that cater students. During an 
interview, a 62-year-old migrant schoolteacher who has worked in at least three 
migrant schools told me that the snack shop is the second profitable source for the 
school founder other than tuition. 
       In 2003, the state passed the PRC Law on Promoting Private Education, allowing 
migrant schools to apply for legal status, provided that they meet certain criteria. In 
Shanghai, legalization did not start until 2006. My fieldwork interviews with migrant 
school principals, directors and teachers reveal that the “legitimation” process has 
been a “black box”. Whether migrant schools with comparable hardware and teaching 
facilities can be legalized depends a lot on personal connections and even the amount 
of bribes paid to local education authorities.  
       “Of course we wish to be legalized, but there’s no way we can.” Such is a 
common frustration among migrant school founders. Rent-seeking from government 
education administrators often happen under the name of inspection and 
“management”. In Beijing and Shanghai, even the few schools that have obtained 
official permits are constantly faced with continued uncertainty. Xingzhi migrant 
school, being the earliest one to obtain a license in 2003, also experienced closedown 
in 2006. 
       Reforming the current education system is difficult because it requires an 
overhaul of a range of institutions, including hukou and the fiscal system. The 
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financial system has not been restructured to accommodate the needs of migrant 
families for more flexible school enrollment.  
 
“Our school obtained permission from the district education bureau just 
this year [11 years after founding]. In 2000, they set up two administrative 
departments for migrant schools, and we registered with them. But I always 
felt the policies have been lagging behind. You see, we have run our school 
for over 11 years now, but there have been no specific policies as what we 
should do next. … When we attend meetings at the education bureau, they 
would hand us some survey forms. They’ve done such surveys for the past 
eleven years, what else have they not known about us? The policies are not 
clear, so we cannot expect what would happen in the future. … I may also 
because the officials in charge are always changing, no continuity. … 
Although we registered in 2000, but we have never been given any ‘legal 
permit’. The policies are not clear on top [state level], so how dare district 
officials give us any kind of permit?” (Zhao, male, age 38, migrant school 
principal, founded in 1997) 
        
       In 2008, Shanghai government has released a timeline that by 2010, “all migrant 
schools must be included into the private education system”, and “no new migrant 
schools will be allowed” (Liberation Daily, Jan 22, 2008). When I visited Sun in 2008, 
her 500-student school has been ordered to close down. It still came as a shock to Sun, 
for she had already obtained a permit in 2003 and even received wide media attention 
that year. Eventually, these could not shield her and her school from the bulldozers of 
urban reconstruction. 
 
Discrimination in Urban Public Schools 
       Forest Primary School, a public school in close proximity to the Pond, now has 
388 students enrolled. 40 percent of students come from rural migrant families. Meng, 
the young headmaster, told me that it was in the 2003 demolition movement when the 
school was demanded by education authorities to receive displaced migrant children 
from migrant schools that were closed down in that area.  
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“Around ten public primary schools, including our school, were demanded 
to receive migrant children. We were asked to take in pupils who are old 
enough for first grade without any other requirements. If the child was 
older, like a second grader, then he or she will need to be reallocated 
through the education bureau to a school that has open slots for that 
particular grade. So for our school, we opened two more classes for 
migrant children only in our third and fourth grades that year. We also took 
in all the first graders who come to enroll.” (Meng, female, age 32, Forest 
Public Primary School principal) 
        
       Meng also recalls that the district education bureau required seven “permits” for 
rural migrant families in 2003. These included parents’ temporary residence permits 
(before 2003), the One Child Certificate, the Comprehensive Insurance Certificate, a 
out-for-work certificate issued by home county authority, and a document proving that 
there were no one who could take custody of the child at home.  From year 2004 
onwards, the school only took in first-grader from rural migrant families.  
       She confirmed something I heard from rural migrants living in the Pond: since 
one-child birth certificates were required upon migrant children’s enrollment, usually 
only the first-born child of the family can qualify. For families with more than one 
child, they had to find another migrant school for their older children. With migrant 
schools in M district demolished, the only option is a migrant school that is located ten 
miles away. 
       A very small proportion of migrant children are lucky enough to make smooth 
transfers into Shanghai’s public schools. Many parents regarded this mobility as 
“disaster brings about good bliss” (yin huo de fu) after the demolition of their 
neighborhood. In fact, Shanghai’s over 600 primary public schools are stratified into 
several tiers in terms of ranking based on quality and competitiveness. Only schools at 
the bottom stratum are open to receive migrant children. Scanty statistics are available 
on this issue, but a trend is widely observed that with the increasing inflow of children 
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from poor rural migrant families, the demographics in some schools tends to see a 
simultaneous “urban flight”—urban parents tend to transfer their children into top-
tiered public schools.  
       Outside of the gate of an elite public school, I made a few casual conversations 
with parents who were waiting for their children. One native Shanghai lady told me 
that she just transferred her 10-year-old daughter from a K school that was closer to 
her home. “That school started to have more migrant students last year. I don’t think 
that’s good for my daughter, to be in the same class with those kids of rural migrants.” 
She says to me. I asked her why she would feel uncomfortable with that, she simply 
replied, “They are just another lower-quality group (sushi di) You see, there are more 
crimes and thefts in Shanghai now. I am sure, all those were done by the rural 
migrants.”  
       I asked why she was so sure that all such crimes were committed by waidiren. She 
said, “I simply know that, because we Shanghainese would never do that.” Although 
her comment cannot be taken as representative of what all natives tend to hold, this 
ongoing trend is confirmed by principal Meng, who has dealt with many complaining 
urban parents who grumble about the school’s taking in too many rural students.  
       Public schools that partially integrate migrant children organize the classes and 
curriculum differently. Forest Primary Public School enroll migrant children into 
mixed classes, and sets up a unified standard for all pupils. But there are some public 
schools where migrant children are enrolled into separate, or “migrant only classes” 
(mingong ban). Some schools even enforce strict “codes” against social mixing. 41-
year-old Shen, a self-made migrant entrepreneur in renovation business, tells the story 
in another public school where his son entered.  
       Before coming to Shanghai, Shen had taught as a rural teacher in his village for 
three years. Classified as an extra-quota “surrogate teacher” (daike jiaoshi) unfunded 
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by public sources, his wage was on 60 yuan a month in the 1990s. When rural 
surrogate teachers were dismissed, he came to Shanghai to dagong. Shen worked as 
construction workers, security guards, and later started his own renovation business.  
       After gaining steadier foothold, Shen decided to bring his son to Shanghai for 
better education. He later found the school search to be more difficult than he thought: 
the three migrant schools in the proximity appeared to lack good quality. Neither were 
they in stable existence. He finally decided on one school, but it was demolished 
within a year. After several transfers, Shen finally managed to enroll his son into a 
public school through personal connections. 
       Most of Shen’s relatives congratulated him. After all, only a small number of 
migrant families could afford to send their children into public schools. Surprisingly, 
Shen now regrets about the decision. He goes on to tell me that this public school sets 
up a separate class for all migrants’ children. Teachers for this class are not required to 
follow any curriculum schedule like other classes. The rationale for this “special 
treatment”, according to the school, is because that since migrant students in this class 
will not take the key-point exam in Shanghai, their grades “don’t matter” for the 
school’s ranking. Furthermore, the school even strictly prohibits students of the 
“migrant class” from talking to students from other classes.  
       One day, Shen got a call from the class advisor, who reminded him to ask his son 
not to make friends with a student from another class. Shen got very angry and had an 
argument with the teacher over the phone. He even brought up this issue of 
discrimination to the headmaster, together with a few other parents. To their 
disappointment, class rules remained the same.  
       Some schools have been illicitly reaping economic gains through such 
categorizing, by overcharging migrant families in the name of “temporary study fees”, 
which may range from a few hundred to a few thousand per semester. Usually when 
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education inspections tighten up, such practices are less common, but they never die 
out.  
       One day one of my informant Zhou, a father of three, asked me over the phone if 
it is still legal for public schools to charge migrant children “temporary study fees” 
(jiedu fei). I told her that to my knowledge, “temporary study fees” have long been 
forbidden. Zhou said to me with a worrisome voice, “I thought so, because my two 
other children have not paid it, but my son’s school asked us to turn in 800 yuan by 
this week, as ‘temporary study fee’.” There are only five migrant children in Jun’s 
class, and three families have conceded to pay, even when knowing that such practices 
are inappropriate.  Since the teachers have repeatedly asked Jun to pay, now Zhou is 
concerned that the boy is under a lot of stress. The boy comes back every day to plead 
his parents to pay this 800 yuan, saying that the teacher asked him again that day.  
       I promised Zhou that I would call in to the education bureau and ask about this for 
him. The next day I dialed the hotline of Shanghai education bureau. To my surprise, 
the staff who answered the phone told me that schools can charge “temporary study 
fees” if the parents cannot provide formal proof of their occupations. Being recyclers, 
Zhou never had any formal work permit. I asked again if this applies to rural migrants 
doing informal work, the staff said “yes” and abruptly hang up. I tried to look into the 
official website of Shanghai education bureau, only to find a news on that day: “Rural 
Migrant Families Are Exempted from All Fees”. If I were an average reader, I would 
take this announcement as what it literally means. But the reality is certainly the 
opposite.  
       A few days later, I visited the Zhou family, and told about what I was told after 
consulting the education bureau. I also told him my own understanding of the 
situation, and suggested him to wait until the last minute on this matter. One week 
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later, Zhou told me that he eventually paid the 800 yuan “temporary study fee”. But he 
said it with much regrets: 
 
“I shouldn’t have paid it in such a haste, because later I found out, in 
another class of Grade 6, all migrant parents decided not to pay. Strangely, 
the school did not do anything about it! So they never got to pay that 800 
yuan. … So we shouldn’t have paid it either! … But how can we know? I 
had been too concerned about the consequences to my son, if I hadn’t paid 
it. …” 
        
       I said to him, “next time this happens, you could try to organize other parents to 
‘boycott’ such practices.” Zhou waved away my suggestion with a timid shake of 
head. “Getting organized” (zuzhi qilai) does not sound “politically right” to him, even 
for a last resort. 
 
Migrant Children’s Academic Performance 
       Existing sociological research (Coleman et al 1966; Peaker 1971) points out that 
family background plays a more important role than school factors in determining 
children’s educational achievements in developed countries. In the context of 
developing countries, however, Heyneman and Loxley (1983) find that “the poorer the 
country, the greater the impact of school and teacher quality on achievement.” In the 
case of rural migrants’ children’s education, the relationship between family 
background and school factors is more complicated because the two may be 
simultaneous and interactive processes.  
       In Chapter Four, I try to offer a contextualized analysis of rural migrants’ 
communal life. Low and unstable income, high residential mobility, lack of role 
models in segregated neighborhoods, low aspirations from parents, teacher and 
children themselves all pose as constraints on migrant children’s education 
performance.  
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       During his 11 years as a migrant school principal, Zhao shares with me an overall 
observation of how migrant children’s family backgrounds may affect their chances of 
academic excellence. 
 
“… [parents] they came to the city to dagong, and dagong is all about 
making money through hard labor work. Some enter into factories, so do 
small businesses like selling vegetables. It’s hard life, we know that. Time 
for them is money. … These families share similar economic background, 
generally very poor and many kids, earning 800 or 900 yuan a month. They 
came to dagong because they don’t have any skills. But think about it, if 
you don’t have skills, what kind of job can you find in a city like 
Shanghai? … They certainly want their kids to have better education, but 
unfortunately many have too many kids and were fined heavily for 
breaking the one-child policy. These monetary penalties pushed them 
further into poverty.” (Zhao, male, age 43, Y migrant school principal) 
        
       In public schools, parents’ meetings are regular events, and teachers have regular 
family visits. But such parental-teacher connections are absent in most migrant 
schools. For parents, irregular working time and long hours have made it impossible 
for them to take care of their children, not to say attending school meetings: 
 
“Most parents do not have time to care for their children. We used to have 
parents’ meetings, but only a small number of parents show up. Sometimes 
our teachers would call them. But we understand. Most of them are doing 
jobs that other people wouldn’t take. They are out before dawn and back 
after dark. Many of our students live by themselves, with keys on their 
necks.” (Zhao, male, age 43, Y migrant school principal) 
        
       In most migrant schools I visited, most of these eight- or nine-year-old each had a 
key and a name tag around the neck. These “latchkey kids” get up by themselves, cook 
meals, go to school, finish homework and go to bed by themselves.  
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Evidence from a Four-School Survey 
       In collaboration with the Survey Data Center at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, I conducted a Four-School 
Survey of Migrant Children Education in Shanghai towards the end of my 
fieldwork.113 We sampled 281 fourth grader in our different types of schools: a public 
school with predominantly urban students, a public school with a small fraction of 
urban students, a migrant-turned-private school, and an informal “unlicensed” migrant 
school.114 In this sense, the survey is not designed to offer a representative picture, but 
rather to show how students’ perform within different school organizational settings 
(Table 5.1).  
       The survey was designed to address two questions: (1) to what extent are 
differences due to socioeconomic and family factors affect students’ academic 
performance? (2) what determines migrant children’s academic achievements across 
different school organizational settings? We use four sets of survey instruments: (1) a 
student questionnaire, (2) a teacher questionnaire, (3) a parent questionnaire, and (4) a 
standardized math test (see Appendices). 
       Table 5.1 shows that over-sized classes, low teacher-pupil ratio, teachers’ low 
qualifications, and segregation by residence characterize school A and school B. There 
is a huge difference in average math test scores across four schools, with students in A 
and B doing significantly worse. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 The research project was funded by a research grant from the China National Natural Science 
Foundation. The pilot survey was conducted in November 2008, sampling 281 fourth graders in four 
schools in Shanghai’s two administrative districts, Yangpu and Minhang. It was designed to be part of a 
longitudinal study of 50 schools in Shanghai in a sequence of three years. 
114
 They are labeled as schools D, C, A, B respectively in Table 1.  
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          Table 5-1. Four-school Survey in 2008: Descriptive Statistics (N=281) 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
       Outcome Measures and Control Covariates           Math score is obtained through 
a 30-minutes standardized test administered across four schools. Age, gender and 
hukou are kept in every model as individual-level control variables. 
       Family resources are measured by parents’ respective education levels, incomes, 
time devoted to spend with their children, and their aspiration. These may not exhaust 
all areas of family factors (such as cultural capital or social capital), but they are three 
key indicators of the family environment. 
       Neighborhood effects are much more difficult to capture. We only included the 
length of stay at the local community, and time for commuting to school everyday as 
proxies. 
       Individual agency factors such as time spent on homework, being a group leader 
in class, and students’ self aspirations are also included into the analysis. 
School      A        B       C      D 
Founding year 2002 1999 1993 1991 
School type Private Migrant Public Public 
Tuition (yuan/year) 900 850 0 0 
Number of pupils 720 477 534 676 
Average class size 48 47.4 25.4 28.2 
Teacher-pupil ratio 1 : 24 1 : 26.7 1 : 12.4 1 : 11.9 
Teachers’ qualifications 
- Senior 
middle/vocational 
- College diploma 
- College degree & abv 
 
40.0 % 
53.3 % 
6.7 % 
 
50.0 % 
37.5 % 
12.5 % 
 
11.6 % 
60.5 % 
27.9 % 
 
8.8% 
49.1 % 
42.1 % 
Non-agri (urban) hukou 3.26 % 7.69 % 32.14 % 100 % 
Math test score (mean) 39.7 
(17.080) 
45.4 
(14.974) 
55.5 
(18.893) 
73.8 
(9.955) 
Sample size  92 78 56 55 
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       I use a multi-level model (Generalized Linear Mixed Model, GLMM) for 
estimating separately the variance between pupils within the same school, and the 
variance between schools. This technique helps to include the school context in which 
Table 5-2. Descriptive Statistics of Individual, Family, and Neighborhood Variables 
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other processes occur, and better address the questions: What proportion of variation 
in math achievement occurs between schools and what proportion occurs between 
pupils? The GLMM equation can be written as,  
 
Level 1:    yij = pi0i + pi1i (schooli) + eij 
Level 2: pi0i = β00 + β01(agei) + β02 (genderi) + β03 (urbanhukoui) + ... + r0i 
             pi1i = β10 + β11(agei) + β12 (genderi) + β13 (urbanhukoui) + ... + r1i 
 
 
 
Table 5-3. GLM Model Coefficients for Math Score Determinants (N=281) 
 
 
        
       Model 1 to 4 respectively includes baseline, family-level, neighborhood, and 
individual agency variables. Model 5 builds on the previous models and excluded two 
low-coefficient and insignificant variables (parental time, and commuting time). 
Results show that even taking intra-school variation into consideration, students’ math 
achievement is significantly determined by their hukou status, parental aspirations, 
and group leadership.  
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       Urban hukou status is tested invariably as a significant determinant across all five 
models, even when intra-school correlations are considered. This is evidence that the 
effect of hukou remains strong on students’ academic achievement, controlling for 
school type. 
       The fact that parents’ aspiration has a significant positive relationship with a 
student’s math achievement makes it another key mechanism. For rural migrant 
families, lower expected education returns is directly resulted from distortions in the 
segmented urban labor market, the dominance of materialistic culture and popular 
consumerism. Given persistent labor market segmentation along hukou lines, most 
migrant youth repeat their parents’ trajectory by entering into the unprotected informal 
sector.  
 
Exam Closure, Return Migration, and Left-Behind Children 
       Sociologists of education differentiate between the primary and secondary effects 
of social background on education attainments (Boudon, 1974). The former refers to 
the effects of minority status on attainment tests during compulsory education, and the 
latter refers to the continuation rates afterwards. In China, migrant children are 
disadvantaged both in terms of primary effects of their social status, and also in terms 
of the secondary effects. With exam closures in the current education system, their 
educational trajectory after compulsory education is more rugged than that of their 
urban counterparts. Institutionalized closure in the current exam system is a major 
barrier. 
       China’s most public schools only allow “registered students” to take the key-point 
exams (to high school and to college) at each locality, and such student registrations 
(xueji) are often directly related to one’s residence status (hukou). Non-native students 
are required by law to return to their native residence for these key-point exams. 
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Unable to pay surcharges or to secure strong connections, the majority of rural migrant 
families need to send their children back to their native residence place to take the 
exams. Sometimes one of the parents chooses to quit the job and leave for their rural 
hometown, in order to better take care of the child. Every year, this causes great 
disruption for millions of migrant families. Wang, the principal of a 500-student 
migrant school in Shanghai tells me that around 60 percent of six graders leave for 
their rural hometowns every year. “If they want to stay, they can only enter into the 
very few private vocational school in Shanghai, and it’s usually expensive. So most of 
them choose to return for high schools.” 
       Zhu moved to Shanghai with his whole family in early 1990s, now works as a van 
driver outside a wholesale market. When his old daughter Hong finished junior middle 
school in Shanghai, they were faced with the dilemma of whether to send her home for 
the high school entrance exam. But since they no longer have any relatives in their 
rural hometown, Hong would have been left on her own if she goes back. Seeing it 
important for a family to stay together, the couple later decided to enter her into a 
private vocational school in Shanghai. It was the only post-secondary school that takes 
in migrant youth, and Hong studied accounting there. She did not like the experience 
and quit after a year. Her parents managed to find her a job at an electronics factory 
since last year. Now the family is faced with the same dilemma again, with their 
second daughter about to finish junior middle school. 
 
“I don’t understand, why can’t they give our child a chance to take the 
exam? Even just a chance to try? Why is it that Shanghai could be so 
different? We migrants came here and devoted our lifetime to the city’s 
construction, but why cannot our children get equal opportunity to schools 
here? Who wouldn’t want their children by their side when they work 
here? This is really the biggest issue for us. You see, of all these children of 
migrants, how many of them could eventually go to high school or college? 
Very few.” 
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       For children of rural migrants to bypass such regulations and become eligible to 
take key-point exams in Shanghai, there are only two ways: getting a “talent-type” 
permanent residence permit, or marrying a native Shanghainese. Out of my pool of 
140 informants, only two have successfully traveled these paths—Du and Xu. The 
limited publicity concerning cases of upward mobility actually sustains a strong belief 
in the difficulty of boundary crossing (Lipset and Bendix 1962: 260). 
       Du transferred her daughter from rural Jiangsu to a public primary school in 
Shanghai in 1996, with the help of a native Shanghai friend. She paid 2000 yuan in the 
name of “supporting fee” (zanzhu fei) and another 150 yuan of “temporary study fee” 
each year. In 2000, her daughter enrolled into a public junior middle school, which 
was the duikou (paired-up) school of her primary school. It demanded 8000 yuan of 
“supporting fee” every year. Du and her husband had no other choice but paid for two 
consecutive years. The school did not charge them for the third year, because that was 
the time the city government enforced anti-corruption rules more strictly. However, it 
did not sound like a good news to Du, who was more willing to pay bribery than to 
have her daughter’s education path discontinued after junior middle school. She 
started actively search for possible loopholes.  
 
“There are only two ways to get the quota for my daughter to enter high 
schools here, one is through ‘buying’ a permanent residence permit, 
another is through buying a blue stamp hukou. But by that time, blue stamp 
hukou policy has been stopped. … Then a native friend told me that he 
could help me to buy a permanent residence permit.” 
        
       Obtaining the permanent residence permit changed Du’s life. It was a recently 
invented system in Shanghai after the abolition of the notorious “temporary residence 
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permit” (zanzhuzheng) since 2003.115 I asked Du what she thinks about this policy 
change, she said: 
 
“It doesn’t make sense. Why can only children of the ‘talent’ type take the 
exam here, not our children? I even thought about writing a petition to the 
government, but what’s the use of it? This city only wants ‘talents’, but 
who covers the costs of education? … Sometimes I thought I am lucky [to 
have being able to buy a residence permit], because I don’t need to worry 
about my daughter’s future now. … But for most [rural migrant] families, 
it’s a big headache…” 
        
       36-year-old Xu also worries little about her daughter’s schooling now. In 1997, 
Xu married a Shanghai native. According to the law, she had to wait for four years to 
obtain a new Shanghai rural hukou. While most of her relatives are struggling with 
whether or not to return to rural Sichuan with their children, Xu’s daughter is free to 
choose from a list of public schools in their district. Xu says with relief, “We have 
helped with what we can. It’s up to her own efforts now.” 
       For students who have no other choice but to transfer back to middle schools in 
their hometown, adjusting to the rural teaching setting and curricula differences is 
major barrier. In large cities like Shanghai, primary schools are using “elite curricula” 
that differ from the rest of the country. For students who need to take exams in another 
region, this means that they will be tested by a different curriculum when they go 
back. Faced with such a “curriculum mismatch”, some teachers tend to encourage 
early transfers, such as in grade two of junior middle school, so that there can be more 
buffer time for students to adapt to a different curriculum and testing requirements 
before exams. School transfers tend to result in academic disruptions, and such 
                                                 
115
 It registers all individuals into three codified categories: “domestic talents” (code starting with 
cr100), “overseas talents” (code starting with L), and “workers.” The first two categories apply to urban 
migrants and overseas returnees with certain levels of education and qualifications. Children of these 
two groups are eligible for receiving up to higher education in Shanghai. The third category applies to 
migrants without a college degree. 
 205 
negative effects are strengthened if the two learning environments are socially and 
culturally different, just as urban schools in contrast with rural village schools.  
       16-year-old Zeng had to return for senior middle school after several years of 
schooling in Shanghai. It’s very difficult for a teenager like Zeng who has been 
brought up in a culture imbued with modern consumerism to adapt to rural life. 
Without his parents around, Zeng has been emotionally distraught by the sudden 
“transplantation” of life. To his juvenile sensitivity, his parents’ absence and the 
sudden “exile” experience was proof of parental negligence and indifference. His 
schoolwork dropped, and his relationship with parents became strained. He ganged up 
with a similar group of left-behind teenagers and dropped out of school.  
       This story line happens to millions of migrant families. A survey shows that 16 
percent of school-age migrant children are not in school, and 87 percent of pre-school-
age are not attending kindergarten, and 67 percent of migrant children pay higher 
school fees than local children (Han 2001). Many migrant youth lingered in the city 
after finishing primary or junior middle. Zhao, the principal of Y migrant school, 
shows concern for the increasingly visible problem of unschooled migrant youth in the 
city. 
 
“Most of our six graders leave for home after they graduate. But every year 
we have two to three teenagers, graduated from sixth grade, but they often 
wandered about in front of our gate. Then the teachers would go to ask 
them. Many have been on the streets and would not go home. It’s 
becoming a serious issue. Some of these youth cannot go back to their rural 
hometowns for middle school, because they have no one to take care of 
them. Some want to continue middle school in Shanghai, but could not.” 
(Zhao, male, age 38, migrant school principal, founded in 1997) 
        
       Every child of rural migrant family background, at some point in life, has to 
experience being left behind. Some poorer migrants have never accumulated enough 
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money or connections to bring their children to go to city schools. These children are 
left with their grandparents or close relatives. Parental involvement in their academic 
and social life is too much a luxury, as their parents only return home briefly during 
spring festivals. Those who are transferred into migrant schools in the cities do not 
necessarily enjoy much parental involvement either because of the nature and 
instability of jobs. After these children finish primary school or second grade of junior 
middle school, almost all of them have to return to the village for key-point exams. 
The other option is to drop out and take up informal jobs. In some areas, left-behind 
children far outnumber those who out-migrate with their parents.116   
       I often heard similar comments from my informants on the potential problems in 
leaving children to be taken care of by the grandparents, a normative practice in many 
rural areas. In reality, the elderly can only care for the grandchildren’s meals and 
living, but not their schoolwork and other aspects of socialization in rural 
communities. Often times these children grow up totally spoiled and undisciplined in 
the presence of their grandparents.  
 
“Why did we bring him along? You see, there are many problems with 
leaving him to his grandparents. They only spoil the kid, and he had grown 
into many bad habits when we went back within a year. Another thing is, 
the child grew cold to parents when they are away. Like my son, when we 
first brought him to live with us in Shanghai, he had a difficult time 
adjusting to us being around him. He would rather stay with some of 
relatives than with us.” (Fang, male, age 38, from rural Anhui) 
        
                                                 
116
 A survey of 619 rural migrant families in Beijing shows that 65 percent of school-age children of 
these families were left behind in rural villages. The survey was conducted in June of 2000 by the 
Center for Rural Economy Research at the Ministry of Agriculture, funded by the Ford Foundation. 
Beijing Normal University also conducted a survey in 2003, showing that with the number of rural-to-
urban migration exceeding 130 million that year, there were over 10 million children below the age of 
16 who were left behind in rural areas (China Education News, June 5th, 2004). Another study by 
Meishan city government in Sichuan province in 2004 surveyed 11651 students in 21 rural schools, and 
results show that over 51 percent of these rural students’ parents have migrated to cities for work, with 
the percentage for primary-school-age students ever higher to 67 percent. 
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       For most children who have attended public schools in Shanghai for a number of 
years, and later had to return for high school education in their rural hometowns, they 
are challenged by the near-to-exile experience of adjusting to a less exciting rural life. 
Besides, the attitudes of village youth sometimes reflect social rejection. From my 
informants’ narratives, I sometimes can only vaguely imagine what this type of 
experience brings about: a lost sense of belonging, feelings of confusion and being 
forsaken by urban civilization, and discontinued friendships. Migrants’ narratives 
reveal similar “identity crisis” like what happens to second generation immigrant 
groups in other contexts. 
 
“My friend’s son grew up here but had to go back for high school. He was 
teased as ‘Shanghainese’ in school, but when he was going to school here, 
he was called ‘xiangxia ren’ (countryside people). So the kid was caught in 
between these. He does not know where he belongs. It’s the same for us 
adults. When we work here, nobody accepts us. But one day when we 
return, nobody sees us as locals either. I have lived in Shanghai for so long 
that my country folks all tease me as ‘Shanghainese’. But I don’t feel good 
about that.” (Huang, male, age 36, from rural Anhui) 
       
       Since the beginning of 2008, Shanghai city government has been releasing news 
about opening up its technical or vocational schools to migrant youth, as a response to 
the increasing demand for secondary education resources from rural migrant 
families.117 But they have delayed in implementations. But even if they had actively 
open up this channel for migrant youth, the system would still have been made into 
one similar to what Turner (1960) termed “sponsored mobility”: early tracking of 
                                                 
117
 Yin Houqing, vice director of Shanghai Education Committee, said in an interview by Xinhuan News 
Agency on Feb 19, 2008, that education authorities have been discussing and making public policies 
about opening up secondary vocational schools to include children of rural migrant families. However 
the implementation of these policies are very slow, and only a very small number of private vocational 
schools opened up by early 2009 when I finished my fieldwork in Shanghai.  
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teenagers of rural origin into working-class while their urban counterparts have a 
higher chance entering into higher education and thus high-prestige jobs.  
 
Second Generation in the Labor Market 
       For many rural migrants, investments in their children’s education could do little 
to stop the perpetuation of social and economic disadvantage. Some families even 
sunk into debts and poverty due to education investments. Rural social status, 
education inequality, and difficulties in seeking urban employment concertedly led to 
intergenerational transmission of poverty and status disadvantage. Just like Qian and 
Liu (2008) writes: 
 
“Poor families who piled up huge debts by investing into their children’s 
education used to be considered ‘heroes’ in these poor areas. But there are 
two brutal facts. First, as the costs for higher education kept rising, the 
distribution of education resources, however, turned towards unfairness. 
Second, it is now more difficult for college graduates from poor rural 
families to settle down in the cities with a job. Many well-educated young 
people wandered between villages and townships. They are better 
educated, and urban-biased values motivated them to ‘leave soil’; but on 
the other hand, they are rejected by the cities. So education has not 
improved the lot of Chinese peasants, but it turned out to be a deadly 
burden. ‘Unemployment after college graduation’ becomes an acute social 
problem for the rural class.” 
        
       Research on second generation immigrants’ economic integration shows that 
minorities experience “ethnic penalties” in the labor market, compared with their 
urban peers (Heath and McMahon, 1997), represented by higher risks of 
unemployment, etc. I argue that China is likely to see a similar pattern.  
       First, exclusion of urban public school system and the urban-biased exam system 
deprive their chances of higher human capital investments. Second, second-generation 
rural migrants continue to be locked into the informal economy by institutionalized 
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exclusion in the Chinese labor market. Such employment inequality (the inability to 
enter into formal professional tracks with promotional ladders) is likely to perpetuate. 
These two dimensions (employment and education) operate simultaneously to form a 
system of social distinction.  
       After primary-school age, children of migrant families face two choices. They 
could either stay or take up similar jobs like their parents, or they could return to 
pursue junior and senior middle school education. In both cases, these children or 
youth normally go through a social-psychological stage called “identity crisis”, which 
has been widely discussed in migration studies. Such a tension emerges when a 
stranger is attracted to the city with the hope to become one of the city-dwellers, but 
later caught by a social force turning the opposite direction towards marginalization. 
The crisis emerges from being culturally assimilated but economically excluded from 
formal labor markets.  
       For a long time, China’s rural migrant workers have been depicted as a docile, 
diligent and nameless group who are willing to work under any conditions at great 
lengths for little pay. But things began to change as more and more second generation 
migrants, some born in the 1980s and 1990s arrived on factory floors with more legal 
awareness. Unlike their parents, many second-generation migrants have grown up in 
the cities, and their reference group is no longer the old rural way of life. Returning to 
the rural hometown appeals the least to them. But like their parents, they are no better 
accepted by the urban society when Hukou-based discrimination still persists in 
various forms in the job market. A handful of interviews with second-generation rural 
migrants during my fieldwork show that they tend to have a stronger reaction against 
injustice in the workplace. Are they becoming a more resistant group of the migrant 
working class? New empirical research is needed in this direction.  
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Education and the Perpetuation of Social Distinction 
       For Chinese rural migrants, closure-induced disadvantages are perpetuated to their 
second generation through the semi-exclusive, state-dominated education system. On a 
macro-level, structural changes in the economy, labor market, and the education 
system concertedly determine individuals’ chances of education achievements their 
later positions in social stratification. Negative effects of school, family, and 
neighborhood dimensions mutually reinforce each other to discourage expectations 
from parents, teachers and students themselves, and consequently influence their 
investments. Second, persistent institutionalized closure in the labor market also 
dampens expectation for future employment of the second generation. 
       A meso-level analysis in this chapter involves explaining the complicated 
relationships between migrant schools, public schools and education authorities over a 
period of two decades. Although it was the fundamental institutionalized closure in the 
dualistic educational system that has led to the creation of a separate “informal” 
educational sector, the issue of legitimacy again constrained the survival of migrant 
schools. According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is a ‘perception that actions of an 
entity are desirable or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions.’ Although intangible in most cases, legitimacy, like 
labor and capital, is a necessary resource for socially organized entities.  
       In many cases, what is the legitimate way to organize education resources is 
controlled by those outside of the disadvantaged groups, by groups with legitimacy-
determining power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Migrant schools appeal to education 
authorities and urban administrators with a different type of “legitimacy”. In 
closedown campaigns, migrant school founders often resort to a kind of “moral 
legitimacy” in defense of their schools’ existence—“We are doing a good thing for the 
migrants here!” But to urban administrators, just like the way they deal with rural 
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migrants in the informal economy, they see migrant schools, a relatively new 
organizational form, as extra-legal entities against the old rules and norms of the 
socialist education system.  
       Although the public school system has gradually opened up for migrant children, 
the prospect of their getting equal opportunities in primary and post-secondary 
education is bleak. With school registration linked with household registration, 
migrant children do not have the right to take key-point exams outside their hukou 
origin. This “exam closure” caused the increasing tide of returning migrant youth to 
rural areas, and simultaneously dropouts in the cities. Such a systematic disruption 
have produced thousands of second generation rural migrants, who, with much lower 
stock of human capital, have no other choice but to repeat their parents’ trajectories in 
the still segmented urban labor market. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
       With a grandiose acknowledgement of rural migrants’ contribution to China’s 
economic growth, a recently released state policy report unambiguously refers to this 
group as “the contemporary Chinese working class.”118 This statement is followed by 
a realistic depiction of how over 200 million rural migrant workers are still bound by 
the peasant hukou identity. This symbolizes a dramatic change in the official 
vocabulary referring to rural migrants, first as “blind floaters” (mangliu) deviated from 
their socialist duties, then as “peasant-workers (nongmingong), and now “industrial 
workers” (chanye gongren). On the other hand, the state defers granting equal legal 
status to rural migrant workers, and free labor is not a term for them either, despite 
three decades of market reform. This paradox is telling of a critical conjuncture of 
China’s transition nowadays regarding class formation and institutional change. 
 
Gradualist Market Transition 
       China’s market transition involves a redefinition of the social contract the state 
maintains with its people (Tang and Parish, 2000). Before 1978, the division of labor 
between agricultural production and industry was accepted as part of the blueprint for 
realizing an earthly utopia. Under particular historical conjunctures, the household 
registration (hukou) system was considered part of the Soviet planning formula and 
instituted as a major part of the socialist social contract (Chapter 1). While promising 
an ideal, egalitarian society, the state in turn demanded sacrifices of personal 
gratification in consumption and aspirations, and made the goal of “the collective 
                                                 
118
 “An Inevitable Path: From Nongmingong to Industrial Workers,” in People’s Political Consultative 
Conference News, Sept 22, 2009.  
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good” the highest ideological priority. The historical processes of how peasants were 
collectivatized into rigid divisions, as we learned later, were more draconian and 
violent. As Hayek (1944:56) claims, socialism as a “species of collectivism” involves 
the “deliberate organization of labor for a definite social goal”, and such a social order 
inevitably turns out to be “totalitarian”.  
       The pragmatic transition from socialism to market capitalism entails a sharp turn, 
and the Chinese government chose to follow a gradualist approach that maintained its 
political legitimacy. China’s gradualist reform (economic liberalization without 
political reform) has been extolled as a miracle to world spectators, and a puzzle to 
economists. However, recent years have seen more and more of its pitfalls. Over three 
decades after the market reform, with China claiming to have turned its economy into 
a free market economy, the state still controls many key institutions such as land, 
banking, and labor market arrangements. Labor flows, as research on rural migrants 
shows, are far from being “free.”  
 
Fuzzy Land Ownership 
       Research on China’s rural-to-urban migration is incomplete without 
understanding the land system, because different forms of land tenure exert different 
constraints on out-migration and urban poverty. China’s dual land tenure system 
comprises state-owned and collectively owned land, only allowing individuals to have 
“use rights” but not the ultimate ownership of land. During the explosive age of mass 
rural out-migration, such institutional arrangements greatly harmed the interests of 
rural migrants. With no right to lease or transfer their land-use rights into real capital, 
rural migrants can only work as wage labor in the city. They do not have the autonomy 
to sell the land and reinvest in small businesses in the cities. It also leaves much room 
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for malfeasance and corruption among local officials who profit from land seizures 
and under-compensations.   
       In comparing Mexico-US immigrants with China’s rural migrants, Roberts (2007) 
argues that in both cases, land arrangements are similar mechanisms in socially 
stratifying (im)migrants.  In both contexts, out-migrating peasants are seasonal flows 
who periodically return to their home villages where cultivation of farmland offers a 
reservation wage. Circular migration patterns are also highly dependent on the 
oscillations of border control policies. The fact that the land system, together with the 
remnants of the hukou system, lock rural migrants into a class of permanent transients 
in their own country makes China an even more peculiar case.  
       Debates on land privatization have been going on in China for a long time. Many 
officials and intellectuals take pride in the current land institution as a type of “social 
insurance” or “buffer mechanism” for rural migrants. The rationale is that those who 
cannot make it in the city always have an option to return to the countryside, and this 
may help lessen social tension and instability. In reality, this argument overlooks a 
series of problems in the long run. Apart from rampant illegal land seizure by local 
officials, commuting costs for short-term rural migrants are huge. This arrangement 
also lowers rural migrants’ chances to stay and be fully incorporated into the urban 
society.  
       In rural areas, migrants tend to leave their small plots of land to relatives who stay 
behind, adding another layer of ambiguity to ownership. During the economic 
downturn of 2008, many migrants returned to their home villages, and land disputes 
increased among villagers. This institutional arrangement, to some extent, is causally 
related to the dissolution of many rural families—many migrants leave their children 
and elderly behind to work on subsistence farming, and social connections between 
generations have weakened.  
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Fiscal Decentralization 
       According to Young (2000), partial removal of state-mandated controls in some 
sectors but not all of the economy lead to systematic distortions in the post-socialist 
economy. With more opportunities for rent seeking being created, these distortions in 
turn “beget more distortions”. Localism and fragmentation of the domestic market will 
occur because continued reform and interregional competition threaten the 
profitability of high margin industries in each location. He summarizes it as a trend 
towards a fragmented internal market with “fiefdoms” controlled by local officials. I 
agree with his argument to a large extent. The logic of gradualism in hukou reform has 
led to strong local residence barriers, best represented by the various “green card” 
systems in major cities. 
       Wong (2007) points out that the reform of the public finance system is at the core 
of transition in all former Soviet-type economies. In China, the overdue fiscal reform 
in the mid 1990s has been charting its voyage “with neither a clear strategy nor a 
consensus for redrawing the public-private divide in the new market economy that 
China would become” (Wong, 2008).  Reform measures were enacted without cutting 
down on government personnel. Consequently, with state budgetary transfers 
declining, local governments transferred the costs of retrenchment to individuals by 
levying user charges of all sorts.  
       Even when the state determinedly allocates funding to support local public 
services, these monetary transfers need to cut paths through layers of the bureaucratic 
system before reaching the needy. Leakages are beyond the state’s leverage to hold 
local officials accountable. The inter-governmental system was not only “broken” but 
also rife with “distrust and mutual blame” (Wong 2008). Local officials often 
complained about higher level governments “grabbing” revenues while “pushing 
down” expenditures. 
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Table 6-1.  Fiscal Trends for Government, by Level 
 
I. Revenues 1993 1998 2004 
Central government 22% 49.5% 54.9% 
Provinces 13% 10.5% 11.2% 
Municipalities 34% 19.7% 16.6% 
Counties 19% 11.5% 12% 
Townships 13% 8.8% 5.2% 
II. Expenditures    
Central government 34% 28.9% 27.7% 
Provinces 11% 18.8% 18.7% 
Municipalities 29% 24.1% 22.2% 
Counties 16% 19.9% 25.2% 
Townships 11% 8.3% 6.1% 
 
*Data compiled by Wong (2008), from sources of 
Wong (1997). World Bank (2002), Ministry of 
Finance, Compendium of Local Fiscal Statistics, 
various years. 
 
       A 2005 World Bank study shows that China’s public sector has become 
increasingly “commercialized”, referring to its increasing orientation towards revenue 
seeking. Examples abound in everyday life. Hospitals adopt a “performance-based” 
remuneration system for doctors. Civil servants receive a basic paycheck plus a range 
of bonuses and subsidies financed by the revenues at their work units. Museums rent 
out space for advertisements. Libraries set up photocopy rooms and other fee-
charging services. 
       This produced counterproductive consequences for social welfare, because public 
services, such as low-income housing, health and education, received insufficient 
investments. Regional inequality in public goods provision also enlarged. Without 
check-and-balance mechanisms for local regimes, fiscal decentralization in China 
increased the autonomy of local governments to dispense resources prioritizing 
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economic programs over social programs. To a large extent, China’s problematic 
fiscal decentralization has been a structural cause for rural migrants’ delayed and 
segmented integration into the urban society. Education is the best example. 
       Fiscal decentralization induced a “multiplier effect” for the worsening of 
education inequality. In 1985, the state government demanded provincial governments 
to coordinate county-level governments in local education financing. Since then, 
county and township governments have directly relied on peasants themselves to 
provide for local basic education.  
 
 
Table 6-2.  Distribution of Budgetary Expenditures, by Level (2004)  
 
 Budgetary 
Expenditures 
Education Health Social Welfare 
and Relief 
Central 28% 7% 3% 0.7% 
Province 19% 15% 22% 9.5% 
Municipalities 22% 18% 31% 26.6% 
County+Township 31% 61% 44% 64% 
         * Source: Wong (2008) 
 
       This has worsened education facilities in poor regions. Richer cities and regions 
have better education resources, which set up entry thresholds for incoming migrants 
(both urban and rural) to enjoy these privileges. In 2003, urban regions spend three 
times more on education than rural regions in terms of per capita recurrent expenditure 
(UNDP 2005). From my interviews with local administrators, the state-local 
government relationship has deteriorated into a system lacking certainty and 
transparency. Education officials often say, “Policies from above are not clear, so we 
just do what seems least risky for now.” This “downward accountability” is a 
disincentive for local governments to provide adequate services. The fragmentation of 
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authority and loose accountability reinforce the importance of “guanxi” clientelism, 
opportunism and corruption. 
 
Localism and Rent Seeking 
       Many scholars maintain that the transition from socialist planning to a 
decentralized but partially marketized economy is highly likely to be accompanied by 
rising rent seeking (Lee, 1990; Sands, 1990; Liew, 1993). Manion (2004) offers a 
game-theoretic analysis of rent seeking (or a type of “corruption by design” in her 
vocabulary) in transitional economies, where the “institutional design” includes 
changes in both formal structures and informal expectations which pose as inductive 
conditions for rent seeking, such as “information asymmetry, monopoly power, high 
expected costs of citizen appeals” (Manion, 2004).119 Some government regulations 
result in a “snowballing effect” in the scale of administrative power: government 
interference into economic activities creates room for rent seeking, and this 
consequence later causes the government to further interfere.  
       In China, each process is intensified by highly decentralized administrative power. 
Consequently, public goods are “hijacked” and priced higher (even made unavailable) 
to certain groups, which makes a type of rent. “Symptoms of a trapped transition” 
gradually emerged with increasingly “decentralized administrative predation” (Pei, 
2006). The mixture of “centralized government” and “centralized administration” 
make a powerful political apparatus, an extreme form of domination by the 
                                                 
119
 Take residence control or hukou licensing for example. Information about how to transfer one’s 
hukou status through inter-marriage is held by the Public Security Bureau as “internal” and 
inappropriate to distribute. Procedures are obscure, and it’s extremely costly for rural migrants to make 
any appeals if they encounter injustice during the hukou transfer process. Liu (2008) mentions that for 
rural migrants who purchased real estate in Shanghai to get a BSH, they still need to wait for a few 
years to finally obtain one. During this time, any violation of existing “laws” (such as the one-child 
policy) could result in loss of such eligibility. 
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bureaucracy (Wu 1995).120 Tocqueville notes a similar observation of the French 
government before the revolution: 
 
“… a centralized government acquires immense power when united to 
centralized administration. Thus combined, it accustoms men to set their 
own will habitually and completely aside; to submit, not only for once, or 
upon one point, but in every respect, and at all times. Not only, therefore, 
does this union of power subdue them compulsorily, but it affects their 
ordinary habits; it isolates them, and then influences each separately. … 
Although such an administration can bring together at a given moment, on 
a given point, all the disposable resources of a people, it injures the renewal 
of those resources. It may insure a victory in the hour of strife, but it 
gradually relaxes the sinews of strength. It may help admirably the 
transient greatness of a man, but not the durable prosperity of a nation. … 
But whenever a central administration affects completely to supersede the 
persons most interested, I believe that it is either misled, or desirous to 
mislead. However enlightened and skillful a central power may be, it 
cannot of itself embrace all the details of the life of a great nation. Such 
vigilance exceeds the power of man.” (Tocqueville 2002[1865]: 108-114) 
         
       This “union of power”, according to Tocqueville, produces social psychological 
changes both among political actors and the governed. Commoners, who were subjects 
of these formal structures, had little influence over the process of policy formulation. 
The overstaffed administrative bureaucracy in China has appeals as “lucrative” and 
“leisurely” positions for the better educated, giving rise to the “civil servant exam 
fever” (Reuters, Jan 19, 2009).121 Even the state media is unambivalent about what is 
behind the rush into the “power ladder”: although basic salaries are kept low, civil 
servants receive lump sums of “grey income” (cash subsidies and allowances) and 
social security packages (Southern Daily, Oct 31, 2005; China Youth News, Nov 28, 
                                                 
120
 Tocqueville (1865: 108) defines the two terms of “centralized government” and “centralized 
administration”—“when the power which directs the former or general interests is concentrated in one 
place or in the same persons, it constitutes a centralized government. To concentrate in like manner into 
one place the direction of the latter or local interests, constitutes what may be termed a centralized 
administration.” 
121
 In 2009, the exams attracted over 775 thousand candidates competing for 13500 national posts. 
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2006). Tens of thousands of street committee administrators and hukou police (huji 
jing) in China’s cities, who directly extract via user charges, make up the grassroots 
positions of this ladder. 
 
Much Ado about Law-Making 
       Local governments’ low commitment to provide public services persisted also 
because of the absence of enforceable legal penalties. Many newly made laws were 
not “legally binding” for local governments. Take the Education Law for example. 
Although the state mandates nine years of compulsory education for all children, 
empirical evidence shows that from 1985 to 2000, about 150 million rural youths did 
not receive nine years of education due to overcharges by schools (Zhang 2003). In 
fact, legal enforcements in the area of education have been so feeble that all types of 
illegal activities, such as embezzlement of education funds and delay and arrears of 
teachers’ wages, are prevalent in basic education enterprises.  
        Constitutional rights in China do not provide legal safeguards that keep the 
channels of mobility open. Between 1954 and 2004, the Chinese constitution has gone 
through five times of revision. In real life, however, informal law-like decrees and 
regulations are used as frequently as in the socialist era. State and local governments 
often improvise legislatures targeting the “floating population.” Many migrant school 
founders express similar frustrations over the verbal commitment they hear on state 
media—one has to know the difference between what is on paper and what is actually 
going on. Education officials are equally confused about the codes, despite frequent 
meetings where they ritually study the “guidelines” given by higher-ranking leaders. 
These verbal “decrees” are often packaged into catchy slogans rather than specifying 
the legal responsibilities and costs of penalty for malfeasance.  
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       Hukou legislation, for example, has always been a secretive process as I found out 
at the beginning of my fieldwork. I used personal connections to approach the Public 
Security bureau but was warned by close friends who work inside the hukou police 
system that any questions relating to hukou legislation are “highly sensitive.” In this 
context, local government bureaus manipulate hukou policies to their best interests.  
       Take the new Shanghai Residence Permit (juzhuzheng) system as another 
example. In 2004 the city government announced this system to take effect, stating 
clearly that rural migrants can apply for Shanghai Residence Permit. Public media 
lauded it as a liberal progress. But when rural migrants go to apply, the office staff tell 
them that this permit has two types—a six-month permit, and a long-term permit. 
Individuals who wish to obtain the long-term permit need to submit proofs of stable 
jobs and housing. Many of my informants found out at the government’s office that 
the new permit system is no different than the notorious “temporary permit system” 
before 2003. This second type of long-term residence permit is a basic criterion for 
one’s child to enter local public schools.  
       This example shows that vaguely defined guidelines for hukou reform from the 
state were exploited by local administrators to their own interests. OECD report on the 
governance of China’s public sector summarizes a few major defects of the changing 
system, including lack of co-ordination, incoherence of public action, fragmentation of 
decision-making responsibilities, and co-existence of institutions with conflicting 
working rationale (OECD, 2005: 23). 
 
Politicized Urbanization: From Central Planning to Urban Planning 
       Many public policy failures in China are rooted in the belief of the “omnipotence 
and omniscience of state planning” (Saunders, 2001:50). Post-socialist urban planning 
strategies followed central planning in committing the same mistake. Since the mid 
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1980s, the state has experimented strategies to “develop small towns” in order to 
divert migration flows from entering into large cities. Preferential policies were made 
to develop coastal regions since 1992, a state-manipulated urbanization plan. In the 
same time, the state strictly prohibited the transfer of residence status (hukou), creating 
a peculiar pattern of “staged urbanization without integration” as I term it. It was not 
until 1998 when the State Council approved transfer of hukou status under its 
guidelines.122 
       In post-socialist urbanizing China, top-down directives and bottom-up processes 
often run into conflicts. Political actors with redistributive power continue to favor 
“totality” and “gigantism” in their ways of organizing the space and urban planning 
(Kostinskiy, 2001:451). But these “rationalist planning” policies, similar to what was 
criticized by Jacobs (1961) in the United States, violently disrupt communities 
characterized by layered complexity and what appears to be chaos. Saunders 
(2001:50) seconds with Jacobs in noticing the counterproductive spatial engineering: 
 
“… there is an inherited ‘wisdom’ in evolved urban forms which, although 
it lacks ‘purpose’ and is opaque to our conscious understanding, 
nevertheless helps structure and order the environments in which we live. 
There is often a spontaneous order in the apparent chaos of the largely 
unplanned city just as, conversely, there is a profound absence of social 
organization and cohesion in many post-war planned urban environments. 
… If this is correct, then attempts to re-engineer social cohesion by forcing 
spatial proximity upon socially distant groups have failed because they 
have run against the grain of our genetic inheritance. … that unplanned 
urban environments often ‘work’ because they (unconsciously) incorporate 
an evolved spatial ‘syntax’ which is lacking in consciously designed urban 
blueprints.”  
        
       This planning ideology is even stronger in an urbanizing nation with a central 
planning legacy. Most local governments in China’s cities considered rural-migrant-
                                                 
122
 These guidelines specified that children of migrant families could choose to inherit residence status 
from either the father or the mother; while previously children can only inherit the mother’s status. 
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concentrated areas as “face-loosing” sites with potential of social unrest. A prevailing 
state rhetoric in China nowadays is “To Construct A Harmonious Society” which was 
invented in 2006 by the Hu-Wen administration as a socio-economic vision. 
Ironically, “harmonization” has become a euphemism for eradicating socio-economic 
elements that are seen as “politically incorrect.” In the official rationale, the 
emergence of rural migrant neighborhoods signals illegality and chaos, instead of 
needs for public goods provision. In times of international showcases, such as the 
2008 Olympics in Beijing and the 2010 International Exposition in Shanghai, 
“beautification of the city” becomes another justification for demolition campaigns.  
       With the land system still in public ownership, many Chinese cities are seeing 
demolition and reconstruction campaigns directed by the coalition between local 
officials and private developers to wipe out slum-like dwellings (Wu 2002).123 The 
real estate market has become a battlefield for companies to compete for political 
resources. In cities, gated commercial housing communities are encroaching on low-
rise old town neighborhoods. The urban poor are gradually pushed to the invisible 
verges of the suburbs.124 In sum, China’s urbanization took on the institutional inertia 
of the society’s unfinished opening up—redistributive institutions in land and public 
service are still based on differential citizenship, which continue to function as carriers 
of institutionalized discrimination. 
 
Citizenship and Informalization 
       Clark (2003) argues that underlying the legal order is the informal 
conceptualizations of “rights” and “citizenship”, or the consensus of what is “just” 
                                                 
123
 Recent surveys show that over 60% of rural migrants live in slum-like dwellings, with another 29% 
living in factory dorms or workshed, also substandard conditions (Wu 2002).  
124
 From 1991 to 1997, SH city has effectively relocated more than 1.5 million people to the outskirts. 
These efforts continued throughout the past decade. 
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among members of that society. In paternalistic states, as Anagnost (1997) and Ong 
(1999) argue, individuals construct a version of “passive citizenship rights,” which 
view individual rights as conferred by benevolent authorities. From my interviews 
with rural migrants and urban administrators in Shanghai, I find these normative 
beliefs to be as binding as the formal system itself.  
       Institutionalized closures perpetuate themselves because few members of that 
society feel uncomfortable with such systematic exclusion, including the discriminated 
group themselves. Even now, rural migrants tend to normalize or internalize such 
status discrimination. Sometimes my informants compared their current life with the 
socialist memory, an age of immobility and starvation, and commented that life as a 
recycler or a peddler in the segregated neighborhood offers at least some economic 
“freedom,” if not a lot. But even in situations when they encounter extreme 
mistreatments (e.g. wage arrears, physical abused, or infringements of other labor 
rights), “getting organized” would sound like a high-risk and “subversive” method. 
The silent suppression by the official rhetoric “building-a-harmonious-society” is 
strong to turn off these reactions. Many rural migrants hesitate to vent out their 
dissatisfaction and verbally pledge loyalty to the ruling party, but I often sensed fear 
between their lines. 
       In explaining why “bounded and exclusive citizenries” persist in a time when the 
world is increasingly bridged by modern transportation and communication, Brubaker 
(1992:9) also stresses that due to “ideological” and conceptual continuity, 
“citizenship” continues to be a powerful instrument of social closure within or 
between states:  
 
“Every state establishes a conceptual, legal, and ideological boundary 
between citizens and foreigners. … discriminates between citizens and 
resident foreigners, reserving certain rights and benefits, as well as certain 
obligations, for citizens. … Its legitimacy depends on its furthering, or 
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seeming to further, the interests of a particular, bounded citizenry.” 
(Brubaker, 1992: 10)  
        
       China’s quasi-feudal system of hukou and the differential citizenship (Wu, 
forthcoming) for the rural class persist because they generate a social order that is 
“compatible with the incentives and constraints of those in power” (North et al. 2007). 
Without fundamental changes made to the political system, China is not likely to 
effectively curtail the perpetuation of exclusion and poverty of the rural migrant class. 
Recent years have seen many oscillations of state policies towards this issue.125 But 
olitical officials have just come to the realization that many public policies in the past 
have institutionalized discrimination against rural migrants. However, programs to 
eliminate exclusion and discrimination on rural migrants’ second generation have not 
been effectively enacted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 An editorial by China’s thirteen newspaper urged for genuine hukou reform again in March of 2010, 
but this editorial was soon removed from the website on the second day. A week later, the chief editor 
of one newspaper was removed from office. See “Chinese Editorials Assail a Government System,” 
New York Times, Mar 1, 2010.  “Chinese Editor Punished for Bold Editorial,” in the Associated Press, 
Mar 10, 2010. Earlier exposures of hukou reform include: “China Reviews ‘Apartheid’ for 900m 
Peasants,” in The Independent, Jun 10, 2001. “China Rethinks Peasant ‘Apartheid’”, in BBC News, Nov 
10, 2005. 
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Figure 6-1. Interplay of Marketization, Urbanization and Informalization Processes and  
The Perpetuation of Inequality among Rural Migrants 
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Deinstitutionalization: A Comparison 
       I compare China’s hukou abolition efforts, a slowly emerging social movement, 
with two similar processes of deinstitutionalization: the Civil Rights movement 
against the Jim Crow laws in the United States and the Anti-Apartheid movement in 
South Africa. I argue that these three systems of differential citizenship and separation 
are comparable. Firstly, they all had historical roots in closed social systems (slavery, 
colonialism, and Soviet-type central planning). Secondly, each system resulted in an 
imposed domination of one status group over another distinguished by a certain 
ascribed trait (race and the quasi-ethnic native-place identity).  
        Societies awaiting positive social change towards a more open order usually see 
social movements emerge as potential agents that contribute to “the creation of a 
public space … in which consequential deliberation over public affairs takes place” 
(Tilly 1993). McAdam’s political process model of social movements argues that for 
movements to emerge there needs to be a ‘structural potential’ following “expanding 
political opportunities” and “indigenous organizations of the minority community” 
(McAdam 1999[1982]). This potential is then transformed into actual insurgency after 
a process of “cognitive liberation” or “ideological shift.”  
 
 
 
                                         Expanding political  
                                         opportunities 
    Socioeconomic                                                  Cognitive liberalization           SM 
    processes  
                                         Indigenous  
                                         organizations  
 
 
     Structural potential                                          Ideological Shift 
 
        
Figure 6-2. McAdam’s Political Process Model (1982) 
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       Socioeconomic processes, ideological changes, expansion of political 
opportunities, and the mobilization of civil society organizations helped the two 
systems in the United States and South Africa to disintegrate. In the United States, 
even when every individual is treated equally by the state, institutionalized 
discrimination still existed. The combination of laws, public and private acts of 
discrimination, marginal economic opportunity, and violence directed toward African 
Americans in the southern states became known as Jim Crow laws (1876-1965).126 
Gradualist approaches towards racial desegregation became one source of frustration 
among common citizens. By the late 1950s, evidence of changing attitudes were 
observed around the country. Due to African Americans’ service in the World War II, 
many advocated for equal citizenship. Some veterans became active mobilizers in the 
movement. A combination strategy of direct action with nonviolent resistance, known 
as civil disobedience, left a legendary imprint in the US history. In South Africa, the 
British colonialists established the programme of Apartheid which led to constant 
internal resistance and violence. The imprisoning of anti-apartheid leaders stirred up a 
series of uprisings and protests. Reforms in the 1980s failed to quell this mounting 
opposition. Peaceful negotiations began in 1990 and culminated in multi-racial 
democratic elections in 1994. In these two cases, a series of historically and 
institutionally embedded factors concertedly pushed for desintitutionalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126
 The Jim Crow laws mandated de jure racial segregation in all public facilities with the slogan of 
“separate but equal.”  
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Table 6-1. Deinstitutionalization of Systems of Differential Citizenship 
 
 US 
Civil Rights 
(1941-1964) 
South Africa 
Anti-Apartheid 
Campaigns 
(1948-1994) 
China 
Post-reform hukou 
Abolition 
(1984-   ) 
Political 
regime 
 
Liberal 
democracy 
 
Hybrid (white rule, 
democracy) 
Authoritarian communist 
party-state 
Historical 
legacy 
 
Slavery  Colonialism (e.g. 1913 Land 
Act) 
Ancient state domination, 
Soviet-type central-planning 
Legal 
apparatus 
 
 
Jim Crow 
Laws (1876-
1965);  
Brown v. 
Board of 
Education 
(1954) 
Political partition policy 
(1948), Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act (1949), 
Population Registration Act 
(1950), Group Areas Act 
(1950), Bantu Authorities 
Act (1951), Bantu Education 
Act (1953) 
PRC Hukou Registration 
Regulations (1958); 
Prohibition of Peasants’ 
Migration into Townships 
(1964); Abolition of Freedom 
of Movement from PRC 
Constitution (1975); Tighten 
Control of Rural Labor Into 
Cities (1981); Detention and 
Deportation System (1982) 
Socioeconomi
c processes  
 
The Great 
Migration of 
southern poor 
black 
Americans 
During downturn, 
maintenance of segregation 
proved uneconomic; blacks 
(70% of the population) 
lacked purchasing power due 
to poverty; growing trend of 
decolonialization 
Market transition, rural 
decollectivization, endogenous 
economic growth; regional 
inequality induces the rise of 
rural-to-urban migration 
 
Political 
opportunities 
 
Expanded Expanded Limited; legislative offices are 
staffed by urban elites 
State Actions  
 
Supreme court 
rulings 
Negotiations from 1990 to 
1993; universal suffrage in 
1994 
Abolition of Detention and 
Deportation System (2003), 
New Labor Law (2009) 
Organization
al strength 
 
Civil society 
organizations, 
especially 
church groups, 
formed and 
successfully 
mobilized civil 
disobedience. 
Creation of organizations 
using peaceful or armed 
strategies; often oppressed 
brutally by the state; church 
groups played a pivotal role.  
Suppressed civil society; lack 
of peaceful bargaining 
strategies; church groups or 
faith-based organizations are 
banned. 
 
Ideological 
shift 
 
Direct, 
peaceful acts 
of civil 
disobedience 
in the 1950s 
and 1960s led 
to changes in 
attitudes 
around the 
country. 
International scrutiny and ban 
since 1960; Influence from 
US anti-apartheid 
movements. 
In the process of change since 
2003; emerging liberal 
discussions in state media; 
strong social prejudice due to 
localism; little change in 
mainstream attitudes towards 
equal rights. 
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       In contemporary China, so far only socioeconomic processes (that is, market 
transition) are functioning as endogenous forces for the system’s partial disintegration. 
Without political liberalization, the structural potential is limited. Political 
liberalization and civil society organizations are in even weaker forms. An ideological 
shift has just taken place in the early 2000s, symbolized by the participatory abolition 
efforts after the Sun Zhigang event. In the years that followed, however, China failed 
to produce similar effective participatory processes in the civil society regarding the 
system. Based on this model, the deinstitutionalization of China’s hukou system still 
faces many institutional barriers, both formal and informal. 
 
Institutional Mechanisms: A NIES Model 
       Under China’s partial reform, the institutional matrix of political, fiscal, and 
economic constraints comprises the deeper causes that determine rural migrants’ 
purposive actions and networks advancing segregative more often than integrative 
processes (Greif 2006; Nee and Ingram 1998). Firstly, gradualism preserved major 
pieces of the political bureaucracy, of which hukou being an important device of 
governance and social control. Secondly, the heterogeneity in local institutions, due to 
fiscal decentralization, resulted in a fragmented localism with “fiefdoms” controlled 
by local officials who prioritize economic growth over equal rights (Young 2006). 
Lack of participatory processes in law making and policy-making led to oscillations of 
hukou reform, creating greater uncertainty in the institutional environment. Behind 
formal restructuring, ideological changes became more fundamental. The legacies of 
traditional state governance and central planning imprinted a belief in the inferiority of 
the rural class, which still dominates the minds of most Chinese. McAdam highlights 
the importance of this process of cognitive realization among individuals of the 
disadvantaged group:   
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“While important, expanding political opportunities and indigenous 
organizations … only offer insurgents a certain objective ‘structural 
potential’ for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity 
and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their 
situations… this process must occur if an organized protest campaign is to 
take place” (McAdam, 1982:48). 
        
       An ideological shift, I argue, has just begun since 2003 symbolized by the 
abolition of the Detention and Deportation System after the Sun Zhigang event. In that 
year, the central state became aware of the necessity to acknowledge rural migrants’ 
economic contribution and to protect their legal rights (Froissart 2005). However, for 
the mainstream beliefs to align with a conceptualization of “equal rights” and “equal 
citizenship,” this process is still in its primitive stage. The legacies of traditional 
governance and central planning imprinted a differential citizenship viewing 
“ruralness” as an inferior status. The rule of jus sanguinis embodied in the Chinese 
hukou is still received as legitimate. A shift in mainstream attitudes and opinions 
regarding the equality of rights is yet to occur. 
       In a post-socialist economy where such institutionalized discrimination persists 
and a rule of law has not yet established, at an organizational level, private enterprise 
employers, urban administrators, and urban public schools gain from practicing 
discrimination. Lack of coercive isomorphism in these organizational fields led to 
persistence of prejudice and exclusive policies (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Take the 
urban economy for example. Without equal employment laws, employers gain, rather 
than are penalized, when they discriminate. The central contradiction, but also a self-
reinforcing mechanism of the whole system’s persistence, arose out of the need to 
secure a cheap and disposable supply of labor while minimizing the costs of their 
presence in the city.  China’s export-oriented economic growth generated the 
momentum for hiring cheap labor, thus the structure for a system like hukou to exist. 
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Without increasing the costs of discrimination, economic incentives only legitimatize 
the wage structure as something “natural” in a segmented labor market. Such private 
discrimination largely exists in every economy. But state-endorsed or state-sponsored 
discrimination have far-reaching social ramifications.  
        Rural migrants’ presence in the urban society, including their participation in the 
informal economy, their concentration in poor neighborhoods, and their institutional 
subversion in various forms (including the creation of an informal education sector), 
all signal “illegality” and “chaos.” These activities produced unintended consequences 
and invited order-seeking regulations. The prime time of urban renewals legitimize 
coercive regulations such as demolitions and evictions for the visual order of the city. 
These actions by local authorities reinforce the distinction between urban residents and 
migrants. 
       This dissertation project focuses on how rural migrants emerged as an 
underprivileged working class after China’s gradualist reform out of state socialism. 
Three years of empirical fieldwork, archival research and writing up on this topic 
gradually unraveled to me the significance and complexity of this issue. With the 
efforts to document the multi-faceted processes of rural migrants’ assimilation into the 
urban society, a much broader theme emerges: what makes it so difficult for a society 
to transform from a closed system to an open order? 
       Economic history shows that economic growth, in the long run, contributes to 
more opportunities and freedom for individuals, pluralistic tolerance, more social 
mobility, more social equity, and democratization (Friedman, 2007). These processes 
have happened in China but only to a limited extent. As Sen (1999) claims, 
overcoming social “closedness” represented by deprivation, destitution and oppression 
is “a central part of the exercise of development”. This “development as freedom” 
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concept is yet to be grasped by the Chinese who have been over-preoccupied with 
GDP growth of the economy, termed by Sen as “narrower views of development”: 
 
“Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that 
leave people with little choice and little opportunity of excersing their 
reasoned agency. … The intrinsic importance of human freedom, in 
general, as the preeminent objective of development is strongly 
supplemented by the instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of particular 
kinds to promote freedoms of other kinds. The linkages between different 
types of freedoms are empirical and causal, rather than constitutive and 
compositional.” (Sen 1999:xii) 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3. NIES Model: the Perpetuation of Rural-Urban Distinction 
after Market Reform in China 
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       The change from a closed social system to an open social order is a difficult one 
because “rent-creation through the assignment of exclusive rights and privileges” 
produces a unique type of self-reinforcing equilibrium.  China’s two-tiered hukou 
system has been staffed by urban elites, who inevitably form a common interest group 
to enforce the borderlines of entitlements to privileges. Through technological tools in 
the modern state, this type of social domination has taken on more subtle forms.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
       In the summer of 2007, I spent two months in Beijing and Shanghai doing a pilot 
study on rural migrant workers. A rural migrant neighborhood in Zhijingshan district 
of Beijing caught my interest because of its gigantic size: over 40 thousand “floating 
population” in this urban-rural periphery (chengxiang jiehe bu) of less than one square 
kilometers. Businesses, markets and migrant schools thrived in this area. Over 30 
thousand adult rural migrants labor in Beijing’s manufacturing, construction, and 
service sectors. They also made up the construction crew for the Olympics facilities. 
By July of 2008 when I revisited, this neighborhood was completely bulldozed. 
Standing on the relics of what used to be the market street, my NGO friend Ying said, 
“Twenty years from now on, who will ever know that there used to be people, 
thousands of working people who labored and lived here?” She seemed to be 
murmuring to herself, “Their stories are never recorded, and they are gone in a minute, 
just like these brick houses.” 
       The initial motivation for this study is to record rural migrants’ untold stories. I 
see the scholarly efforts in excavating the class of rural migrant workers in its 
formative years from the mid 1980s to the present lacking among both Chinese and 
western sociologists. Like what E. P. Thompson (1980:12) set out to do in “seeking to 
rescure the poor stockinger, the Luddite copper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the 
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‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the 
enormous condescension of posterity”, I desired to do similar things with the historical 
and contemporary phases of this topic. But after extensive research and rethinking 
through writing-up, the understanding of the historical torrents as well as social forces 
that shape rural migrants’ life trajectories made me rethink more generalizeable 
themes such as institutional change, ideological shift, social mobility and class 
formation.  
       As Lipset and Bendix (1962) argue, industrializing societies tend to expand to 
allow higher internal social mobility, and hereditary aristocracy is bound to make way 
for mobility from the lower strata. Market-driven industrialization much later in the 
Chinese society, leaving these complex symptoms entangled together. The attempt 
here is not to project rural migrant workers as the victim of history. Nor am I seeking 
to depict government or political actors as rapacious oppressors. The social problem 
here is a true dilemma when China’s transition towards a free market economy is only 
half way through. Residue beliefs, norms, status hierarchies and institutions have 
strong hold on the Chinese. As social actors, their choices and behaviors are also 
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon 1957). Through the one-year 
ethnographic research, I can only present parts of these processes with the data I 
collected. Although I point out the two meso-level institutions that determine the basic 
redistributive system in China, i.e. the fiscal system and the administrative 
bureaucracy of urban governance, I only had access to secondary literature on these 
two aspects. In-depth qualitative research can be done to shed light on these political 
processes. This line of research is important, not just because they offer interesting 
intellectual exercise on societies change, but often they reflect the dilemmas of social 
reality.  
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       In the future, more work can be done through both carefully designed longitudinal 
surveys and longer periods of qualitative fieldwork. The intergenerational mobility, in 
particular, deserves more scholarly attention because second generation rural migrants 
make up a potential force for social change in both the Chinese economy and society. 
The ideological and institutional processes are only beginning to attract sociologists’ 
interests.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. In-Depth Fieldwork Interview Outline 
 
[Migration History] 
For what reasons did you first decide to migrate to the city? What was your living 
condition like when you were in your hometown? 
Where have you been? What kind of jobs have you taken? Do you have to obtain any 
permit for these jobs? Have you received any trainings for these jobs? 
Is life getting better for you over the years? 
Did you receive help from relatives or friends for all your past jobs? 
 
[Current Job] 
How did you get this job? (Or How did you start this business?) 
Can you describe what you do on a regular day for your current job? 
What skills does your job require? Have you developed some expertise? 
How do you get along with people you meet at work everyday? 
How do you get along with government officials here? What do you think of them? 
What is the usual difficulty you encounter during work? 
 
[Rural-Urban Ties] 
How often do you go back to visit your family?  
How is the economic situation in your family in your hometown now? How dependent 
are they upon your contribution by working in the city? How has it changed over the 
years? 
How often do you send remittance back home now? Over the years, how much have 
you contributed to your family income? 
 
 [Community and Neighborhood] 
In your personal network, whom do you often socialize with? (Who are your best 
friends?) How do you spend time together? 
When and why did you choose to live in this neighborhood? And how do you find life 
living here? Do you feel belonging here?  
How has this neighborhood changed over the years? 
How do you get along with people in this community?  
How do you see people from *** region as different from you? 
Do you associate with those in the same business as you in this neighborhood? 
 
[Second Generation Education] 
How is your child’s schooling situation? Does he/she go to a public school? 
How much do you invest in your child’s education?  
What do you expect of him/her in the long term? 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B.  Coding Frame of Qualitative Interview Data 
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Theme  Topic  Sub-topic 
H Hukou system H1000 Constraints H1001 On job opportunities 
    H1002 On work conditions 
    H1003 On social security 
    H1004 On education 
      
  H2000 Loosening    
      
Q 
Detention and 
Deportation 
system Q1000 Abuse Q1001 
Experiences of 
detention 
    Q1002 
Experiences of 
deportation 
    Q1003 Violence 
      
C 
City 
management C1000 system C1001 regulations 
    C1002 Personnel 
      
G 
Bureaucratic 
system G1000 
Rural 
bureaucrats G1001 Morale 
    G1002 Social impacts 
  G2000 
Urban 
bureaucrats G2001 Incentives 
    G2002 Regulations 
      
E 
Children's 
education E1000 Parents E1001 Value education 
    E1002 
Parents' 
responsibilities 
    E1003 
Family education 
methods 
    E1004 Decision to transfer 
    E1005 
Separation from 
children 
  E2000 Rural education E2001 Schools 
    E2002 Teachers 
    E2003 Overall conditions 
  E3000 
Migrant 
schools E3001 
Experiences of 
transfer 
    E3002 Facilities 
    E3003 Teachers  
    E3004 Pedagogy 
    E3005 Continued education 
  E4000 
Urban 
education E4001 
Policies by 
authorities 
    E4002 Entry thresholds 
    E4003 Discrimination 
    E4004 
Reception to 
migrant children 
 239 
    E4005 Teachers 
  E5000 
Overall 
evaluation of 
children's 
education E5001 Needs 
    E5002 Current conditions 
  E6000 Expenses E6001 Tuitions 
  E7000 Career E7001 
Future career 
prospects 
  E8000 Prospects E8001 Future prospects 
  E9000 
Transfer back 
to rural schools E9001 Impacts 
CX 
Urban-rural 
gap CX100 
Subjective 
understandings CX101 Before migration 
    CX102 After migration 
    CX103 
Returning 
experiences 
    CX104 On the city 
  CX200 Return to rural CX201 Plans to return 
      
  CX300 
Family 
planning CX301 Family size 
    CX302 
Penalty due to one-
child policy 
  CX400 
Work in rural 
hometowns CX401 Job opportunities 
S Social identity S1000 
Subjective 
identification S1001 
Different from 
urbanites 
    S1002 Feel the inequality 
    S1003 Double identities 
    S1004 
Hope to change in 
the future 
  S2000 Social labeling S2001 By urban residents 
    S2002 
By urban 
administrators 
    S2003 
By urban school 
educators 
      
J 
Urban 
employment J1000 
Initial job 
search J1001 
Hard to enter formal 
jobs 
    J1002 No insurance 
    J1003 
Economic 
improvement 
  J2000 Jobless J2001 
Experiencing 
joblessness 
  J3000 
Informal 
employment J3001 Street vending 
    J3002 Factory work 
  J4000 Labor market J4001 Segmentation 
  J500 Wages J501 
Wage deductions or 
suppressions 
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    J502 Low wage 
U Inequality U1000 Jobs U1001 
Unequal pays for 
equal work 
    U1002 
Workplace 
discrimination 
    U1003 Work time 
  U2000 Welfare U2001 
Insurance and 
welfare s 
    U2002 Work conditions 
  U3000 
Children's 
education U3001 Right to school 
    U3002 
Right to compulsory 
education 
    U3003 
Right to continue 
education 
  U4000 Discrimination U4001 Experiences 
    U4002 
Subjective feelings 
of being 
discriminated 
against 
CR Criminality   CR101 Tendencies 
    CR102 
Subjective 
evaluations of 
migrants' criminality 
CM Community CM100 Observation CM101 
History and 
composition 
  CM200 Communal life CM201 Incidents 
    CM202 Relationships 
    CM203 Community setting 
  CM300 Demolitions CM301 Reasons  
    CM302 Impacts 
D Dagong   D1001 Define the term 
    D1002 Feelings 
    D1003 Future plans 
I Illnesses I1000 Old illnesses I1001 Impacts on jobs 
    I1002 Expenses 
  I2000 
Illnesses 
contracted in 
workplaces I2001 Incidents 
  I3000 
Medical 
services I3001 Formal hospitals 
    I3002 Informal clinics 
M 
Migrant 
schools M100 Students M101 
Turnover rates and 
reasons 
    M102 
Academic 
performance 
    M103 
Chances for further 
education  
  M200 Teachers M201 
Mobility and 
turnover 
    M202 Wages 
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    M203 Stress and workload 
  M300 Facilities M301 Classrooms 
    M302 Other facilities 
  M400 Parents M401 
Relationship 
between schools and 
parents 
  M500 External aids M501 Donations 
    M502 External assistance 
    M503 
Relationship with 
education authorities 
      
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. Neighborhood Survey Questionnaire in the Pond 
 
I 甄别问题 Screening Questions 
请问您的户口是哪里的？具体是什么地址？ 
a) ___________省___________市/县___________镇___________村 
b) 上海本地户口      → 简单寒暄，感谢并终止访问 
请问你成家没？有没有孩子？孩子在上小学吗？  
还未成家……………………………1  →简单寒暄，感谢并终止访问 
成家了，但没有子女………………2  →简单寒暄，感谢并终止访问 
成家了，孩子在上小学………… 3   →继续 
成家了，孩子目前不在上小学… 4   →简单寒暄，感谢并终止访问 
A．子女入学和选校 Number of Children and School Choice 
请问你家（指直系亲属，包括在家乡的）有几个正在上学的孩子？最大的多大？是男孩女孩？现在城市还
是在农村？ 
在上学（或幼儿园）吗？上几年级？目前在读的学校是公立的私立的？平时给他买课外书或补课的费用大
概多少？老二呢？……… [按年龄顺序逐个询问] 
孩子 性别  年龄 现在居住地 是否就学 年级 
第一个 男…1  女…2 ___岁 城…1 乡…2 是…1 否…2 ___ 
第二个 男…1  女…2 ___岁 城…1 乡…2 是…1 否…2 ___ 
第三个 男…1  女…2 ___岁 城…1 乡…2 是…1 否…2 ___ 
学校名称 学校性质 课外书／补课 
________ 公…1 私…2 _____元／年 
________ 公…1 私…2 _____元／年 
________ 公…1 私…2 _____元／年 
 [针对目前或未来把孩子接到城市读书的] 
我们想知道你在为孩子选学校的时候最看重什么。这里有5个方面，请选出你认为重要的。Reasons for 
Enrolling Children for Schooling in the City（最多选3个） 
离家不远………………………………………………………………1   
伙食好…………………………………………………………………2 
教学质量好……………………………………………………………3  
道德教育………………………………………………………………4 
特色教育（比如开设美术，音乐，体育，外语等特色课）………5 
5．您觉得您的孩子在学校接受的教育是否能够满足您的需求 Overall Satisfaction with Children’s Education 
a)  能……1  b)不能……2 
                     ∟5a. 如果不能，为什么？ If dissatisfied, why? 
                 a)  课程设置单一……1    b)  教学进度太快……2 
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                 c)  学校的环境不利于孩子身心健康成长……3    
                 d)  课外活动少，对孩子的动手能力重视不足……4 
                 e)  其他________________________ 
B． 家长与学校的联系    Parental Contacts with Schools 
6. 
我们也想了解下您和学校的联系怎样。请问最大的孩子所在的学校是否定期举办家长会？你们家长是否固
定参加？老师有没有过家访？这学期您是否和老师联系过（通过电话）？你是否希望老师来做家访呢？老
二的学校呢？ [按年龄顺序逐个询问] 
填写本表时，注意与第1，2题的表格对应。 
孩子 学校是否定期 
有家长会？ 
你是否固定 
参加？ 
老师是否 
家访过？ 
第一个 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
第二个 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
第三个 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
你是否希望 
老师家访？ 
和老师联系过？ 
有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
有…1 没有…2 有…1 没有…2 
7. 您都知道平时孩子在学校里上哪些课吗？  
    a) 知道……1   b) 不知道…2 
8. 对于学校里所开的课程，您是否满意？ 
       a) 很满意…1  b) 基本满意…2   c)一般…3   d)不满意…4   e)很不满意…5 
9．对于学校的硬件设施是否满意（包括教室的大小光线、操场、卫生状况等） 
      a) 很满意…1  b) 基本满意…2   c)一般…3   d)不满意…4   e)很不满意…5 
10．您认为现在的民工子弟学校和上海当地的学校有什么差距？（可多选） 
       a) 教学质量不高…1      b) 办学的资金不够…2      c) 教师的责任心不强…3 
       d) 学校的设施太差…4    e) 课程设置不合理…5      f) 政府政策不支持…6 
       g) 其他 __________________                                                       
 
C．教育期望 Educational Expectations 
11. 请问就您现在的收入情况和对将来收入的预期，你希望自己的孩子能读到什么学历？ 
a) 小学…………1   b) 初中…………2   c) 高中…………3   d) 专科…………4   e) 大学及以上…5 
12. 请问您希望你的孩子将来从事什么职业？____________________________________________ 
 
D．家庭教育 Parental Involvement in Children’s Education 
13. 请问你家孩子放学回家?天平均花多少时间写作业？___________小时 
14. 您是否看过孩子学校的教材？  a)  有………1   b) 没有………2 
15. 您是否为过孩子买课外书、辅导书或给他报名上任何辅导班？ a)  有………1  b）没有………2 
16. 您平时有没有花时间给孩子辅导功课？  a)  有………1   b)没有………2 
17. 请问 ?你 天与子女相处交谈的时间有多少？ 
    a)?天一小时及以上……1 b)?周一小时及以上……2 c)?月一小时及以上……3 d)?月不足一小时……4 
 
E．ROOT项目  Knowledge and Satisfaction with the NGO Programs 
18. 您是否知道社区里有ROOT这个助学项目来帮助这里的孩子们开展一些课外活动？ 
    a)知道并且打过交道…1        b) 听说过，但并不了解…2            c) 不知道…3 
19. 您对ROOT项目的活动形式    a)非常了解…1      b)了解…2      c)不了解…3   
20. 在您看来，ROOT的活动对您的孩子有帮助吗？ 
    a)  有很大帮助…1  b)有帮助…2   c)一般…3   d)没什么帮助…4   e)不清楚…5  
            ∟21a. 如果有帮助的话，你觉得主要体现在哪些方面？ 
        a) 学习成绩提高…1  b)学习主动性增强…2  c)对知识的兴趣…3 d)更能理解别人…4 e)其他_____ 
21. 总的来说，您对ROOT项目提供的服务满意吗？ 
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    a)  很满意   b)  比较满意   c)  一般  d)  不太满意  e)很不满意（追问原因）_______________ 
22. 您最希望ROOT给孩子提供那些帮助？（追问具体内容） 
    a)  功课辅导（哪门功课）________ 
    b)  兴趣特长班     _____________ 
    c)  户外活动 
    d)  课外知识拓展 
    e)  其他________________________ 
为了分析的需要，我们还需要了解你几个“个人及家庭情况”的问题，请不要介意。 
背景资料 Demographic Information 
请你在上海居住多久了？___________年 
您在这个社区居住了几年了？_________年 
您家在这个社区里有亲戚吗？都有谁？____________________________________ 
请问您的学历？_________ 
请问你现在具体做些什么？工作：___________  
请问你配偶具体做些什么？工作：___________  
请问你的个人月收入是？   家庭月收入是？ 
                                个人     家庭 
1000元及以下   1    1 
1001－2000元   2    2 
2001－3500元   3    3 
3501－5000元   4    4 
5001－10000元                   5    5 
10000元以上   6    6 
姓名：___________  性别：_______年龄：_____联系电话：_____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D. Four-School Survey Instruments  
 
1. School Questionnaire (filled out by interviewing the principal of each school) 
  School type, founding year, initial sources of funding, current number of enrollment, class 
sizes, facilities, students’ hukou, number of teachers, teachers’ turnover rate, teachers’ 
qualifications, teachers’ wages, required permits/certification upon enrollment, tuition. 
 
1. 学校名称：                     地址：           区/县                                            
2. 学校性质：1）公立学校      2）民办学校      3）非正规学校      4）其他，请注明                   
3. 最初办学时间            年 
4. 学校预算情况： 自筹款项占          ％（含学生收费等项目）； 政府拨款占          ％ 
5. 目前在校学生人数：1）学前部：     班         人；  2）小学部：     班         人； 
                     3）中学部：     班         人；  4）其他，请注明：（          ） 
6. 本学期小学部人数情况： 
 
班级数 
男生人数 女生人数 上海户籍学生 非上海户籍学生 转入学生 转出学生 
一年级            
二年级            
三年级            
四年级            
五年级            
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六年级            
7. 学校是否配备以下设施？ 
学生用电脑房： 1） 有；  2） 无；                   图书室： 1） 有；  2） 无； 
操场：         1） 有；  2） 无。 
以下问题只针对小学部 
8. 学校教师人数情况（只包括本学期在学校上课的老师）： 
   教师总人数：                人；其中： 
   具高级职称教师：             人；具教师资格证的教师：           人； 师范类学校毕业教师：           人 
9. 以上教师的教龄分布情况 
 1年以下 1-2年 3-5年 6-9年 10年及以上 
教师人数       
10. 以上教师的学历分布情况: 
 初中及以下 高中（中专/中师/职业技术学校） 大学专科 大学本科及
以上 
教师人数     
 
11. 以上教师的全年月平均工资收入（含奖金、津贴等）分布情况： 
 1000元以下 1000-2000元 2000-3000元 3000-4000元 
教师人数      
4000-5000元 5000元以上 
  
12. 目前本校教师中，本学期转入教师人数：           人；转出教师人数：             人 
    
（“转入教师”为：上学期不在本校，这本学期在本校教课的教师（包括新聘）；“转出教师”为：上学
期在本校，本学期不在本校教课的教师（包括退休）。 
13. 非上海户籍学生入学的要求（主要指进城就业务工农民子弟） 
 需要 不需要 
1) 
流出地政府（乡/镇派出所）开具的“适龄子女户籍所在地无法定监护人
”的证明 
1 2 
2) 
父母双方在本市务工就业一年以上，并已参加上海市外来人员综合保险
（持上海市外来人员综合保险卡） 
1 2 
3) 在本区有固定住所（持合法租房合同）并已连续居住满一年以上 1 2 
4) 父、母及适龄子女的农业户口本，父、母身份证 1 2 
5) 适龄子女预防接种卡 1 2 
6) 在本区就读幼儿园（持相关证明） 1 2 
7) 独生子女证 1 2 
8) 其他要求，请详细注明  1 2 
14. 上学期对学生的总共收费（含学费、书本费、伙食费、其他杂费等学生必交费用）： 
    上海籍学生：             元/人；非上海籍学生：             元/人 
 
 
2. Class Questionnaire (filled out by interviewing the main-course teacher of each class) 
    Courses offered, class size, students’ hukou, attendance, frequency of class disorders, 
qualifications of the teachers for this class, course hours 
 
1. 学校名称：                         班级：          年级          班 
2. 受访教师姓名:                
3. 您是这个班级的：１）班主任   ２）语文老师   ３）数学老师   ４）其他：                
4. 您所带的这个班学生总人数为：         人；其中：  
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5.本班任课老师情况：（包括被访者本人。若班主任不是语文、数学、英语老师，请在表格最后空行中列
出。） 
  
班主任
性别  学历 教 龄 在本校工作时间（年） 
在本班工作
时间（学期
） 
是否有教师证 
语文老师              
数学老师              
英语老师              
 
 
      
学历说明：1）初中及以下；2) 高中（中专/中师/职业技术学校）；3) 大学专科； 4) 大学本科及以上； 
7. 根据上周的课时情况来回答以下问题（如果上周不是一个正常周，请选择另外一周作为参考) 
上一个正常周的课程安排为：总课时：            ；其中： 
语文：             ；数学：              ；英语：              ；  
其他课程：课程名称：               ；课时：           ；  
 
 
3. Family Questionnaire (filled out by parents) 
    Relationship with the student, home address, duration of stay in the neighborhood, rent, 
reasons for choosing the neighborhood, hukou, income, job, education, expectation for 
children’s education attainment, involvement in children’s home education, duration of time 
spent with children, reasons for choosing the current school for the child, number of children  
 
1. 您的姓名：                    
2. 您和孩子的关系：1）父亲    2）母亲    3）其他，请注明：                
3. 您目前居住的家庭地址：                                      ；您的联系电话：                    
4. 您是从何时开始居住此地的？               年； 
5. 您目前居住的地方是：1）自有住宅；        2）租房，房租?月是：          元； 
6. 您在选择目前居住地的时候，主要考虑的因素是什么？（可多选） 
    1）房租或房价低；    2）离工作点方便；     3）小孩教育；       4）周边环境及配套设施； 
5）其他因素，请注明：                     
7．父母基本信息： 
 父 亲 母 亲 
姓名：   
出生年份：            年             年 
户口所在地：         省       市/县         省       市/县 
户口状态： 1）城市户口 1）城市户口 
2）农村户口 2）农村户口 
3）其他：（           ） 3）其他：（           ） 
[此题针对非上海户口]   
首次来上海工作时间        年     月         年     月 
 
学历： 
1）初中及以下 1）初中及以下 
2）高中/中专/职校 2）高中/中专/职校 
3）大专 3）大专 
4）大学本科及以上 4）大学本科及以上 
 
目前从事的工作： 
  
 
目前工作开始时间： 
 
        年     月 
 
         年     月 
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目前平均?月收入： 
1）1,000元及以下 1）1,000元及以下 
2）1,000－3,000元 2）1,000－3,000元 
3）3,000－5,000元 3）3,000－5,000元 
4）5,000－10,000元 4）5,000－10,000元 
5）10,000元及以上 5）10,000元及以上 
 
8. 该孩子出生时的体重是            斤； 
9. 您觉得孩子现在的学习对他的未来会有多大影响？  
1）非常大的影响；      2）有一些影响；        3）基本没有影响； 
10. 您选择让孩子在目前的学校就读，主要考虑的因素是什么？（可多选） 
1）学校教学质量好；    2）老师教学认真负责；     3）离家近；       4）收费便宜； 
5）没有其他学校可供选择    6）其他因素，请注明：                     
11. 您希望孩子未来的教育程度至少能达到：1）初中；   2）高中；    3）大专；    4）大学本科及以上； 
12. 您平均?天和孩子在一起的时间大约是      小时，其中辅导作业的时间大约是      小时； 
13. 该孩子家里是否有不满18周岁的兄弟姐妹？若有，请填写下列情况： 
孩子姓名 性别  年龄 现在居住地 是否就学 
1.  1)男 2)女 (     )岁 1) 上海 2) 外地 1)是 2)否 
2.  1)男 2)女 (     )岁 1) 上海 2) 外地 1)是 2)否 
3.  1)男 2)女 (     )岁 1) 上海 2) 外地 1)是 2)否 
4.  1)男 2)女 (     )岁 1) 上海 2) 外地 1)是 2)否 
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